



# **DIMENSIONS OF BLACKNESS**

**Racial Identity and Political Beliefs**

**Jas M. Sullivan, Jonathan Winburn,  
& William E. Cross Jr.**

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Dedicated to all those who challenge “conventional wisdom,”  
especially my son, Malik

—JAS M. SULLIVAN

Dedicated to my daughters, Julia and Addison

—JONATHAN WINBURN

Dedicated to my daughter, Tuere Binta Cross

—WILLIAM E. CROSS JR.



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—JAS M. SULLIVAN

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—WILLIAM E. CROSS, JR.

# Introduction

It is not unusual for black racial identity to be assessed by a single item that is reflective of a binary conceptualization. This dualistic thinking is reinforced in survey research (especially political science) when the black racial identity of a respondent is assessed using a single item requiring a “Yes” or “No” response, or in a slightly less dualistic manner, through a Likert scale format that allows the respondent to indicate strength of identity. The higher the score, the stronger one’s black racial identity. While not categorical, as in a yes–no response, the overall implication is one that either does or does not embrace a sense of black racial identity.

Black racial identity conceived as a binary variable has a long tradition in psychology. In the now-famous doll studies conducted by Kenneth and Mamie Clark, young black children were positioned in front of two dolls, identical except for skin color, and asked a series of questions such as which doll is bad, nice, ugly, etc. A child responded by pointing to one or the other dolls [binary]. The results, which showed that the children exhibited a preference for the color white, became part of the evidentiary battering ram employed by Thurgood Marshall and his NAACP defense team in the *Brown v. Board of Education* case that was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Shifting the focus to black popular culture, identity dualism is readily discovered. When the late Malcolm X discussed identity, the terms “Uncle Tom” and “Negro” captured what for him were exemplars of a negative or incorrect type of black racial identity, while the labels black or African pointed to a more correct stance. It is ironic that during an earlier period of black awakening in the 1930s, supporters of the Harlem Renaissance celebrated the emergence of a new sense of awareness with the phrase: “The New Negro.”<sup>2</sup> However, by the late 1950s,

“Negro” took on an entirely different meaning within the black community, signifying disaffiliation and cultural estrangement. In the 1940s, when pockets of black elites developed a presence in almost every major city in both the north and south,<sup>3</sup> the term Negro became heavily linked to assimilation, respectability, and intentional disaffiliation from the masses. This was depicted in E. Franklin Frazier’s searing critique of the black middle class.<sup>4</sup>

By the mid-1960s, the cultural reconfiguration of the term Negro was complete; consequently, the identity transformation said to undergird the Black Consciousness Movement of the 1960s was described as the Negro-to-Black conversion experience.<sup>5</sup> Within this discourse “Negro” was treasured in psychological negatives, and Charles Thomas, one of the original founders of the Association of Black Psychology, coined the term “Negromachy” to depict the pathology associated with a nonmilitant, assimilationist stance.<sup>6</sup>

Dualistic thinking leaves little wiggle room for disagreement, and during the heyday of Black Power (circa 1960s), tensions between competing identity attitudes embraced by blacks resulted in what George Napper called the *blacker than thou* phenomenon, wherein blacks “compared” each other’s expressions of blackness to determine which was more authentic and socially acceptable.<sup>7</sup> When the identity comparisons were conducted at an organizational level, the inevitable internecine conflicts could be explosive, as in the 1969 UCLA campus shootout between members of the Black Panther party and black cultural nationalists, which left two people dead.<sup>8</sup> The Panther/cultural nationalist conflict was between two organizations; however, similar conflicts took place within the same organization, as in the ideological and identity split experienced by members of the Nation of Islam, culminating in the assassination of Malcolm X.<sup>9</sup>

When we fast-forward to the present, some of the most important contemporary measures of black racial identity incorporate this dualism. The Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI)<sup>10</sup> is a measure of black racial identity, but researchers often extract from this measure a single subscale that taps how *central* black racial identity is to the respondent. In what is considered the gold standard for accessing racial-ethnic identity—the *Multigroup Measure of Ethnic Identity* or MEIM<sup>11</sup>—respondents score either high or low on a scale, with higher scores indicative of a positive identity and lower scores a less developed or even negative identity dynamic.

In moving away from the binary approach, one encounters a conceptual quagmire leading to a Sisyphean challenge. Black people are human beings

categorized by the totally unscientific label: race. While the dynamics of racial oppression limit the range of attitudes blacks may construct and hold, their basic humanity introduces additional attitudinal variance that is nearly boundless. Rather than claim it is possible to conceptualize and measure every iteration of blackness, modern social theorists such as Sellers, et al.,<sup>12</sup> and Cross<sup>13</sup> argue, instead, that one should systematically “sample” the otherwise unmanageable range of different identity frames found among blacks. For the sake of discussion, the acronym MIBI will reference Sellers’s approach and NT the Nigrescence or the Cross perspective.

A supposition guiding both MIBI and NT is that in a large random sample of black folk, one can excavate a broad range of attitudes on what it means to be black. While making note of this expansive diversity of opinion, research demands compromise, parsimony, and, where possible, elegant simplicity. To a certain degree, both MIBI and NT turned to identity discourses found within Black studies and political science for a solution on specifically ideological measures—such as assimilationist, nationalist, and integrationist. It is, of course, ironic that both MIBI and NT relied in part on readings from political science in the construction of these ideological categories, at the same time that political science research became enamored with binary conceptualizations of black racial identity.

This book seeks greater linkage between psychology and political science by engaging the identity categories found in research driven by MIBI and NT conceptualizations of black racial identity. The point to be stressed is that there is no single solitary way to express black racial identity, and the writing and research contained in this book attempt to move away from blackness as binary and reveal instead what happens when black racial identity is conceptualized with “difference of opinion” maximized. The hope, of course, is to account for a larger proportion of the variance linked to black racial identity variation, both in statistical and conceptual terms.

To that end, we explore whether black racial identity differences among blacks influence political attitudes and behavior from a multidimensional perspective. Specifically, using MIBI to measure black racial identity, we account for both the “significance (importance) and meaning of racial group membership.”<sup>14</sup> We show how identity varies across three key areas: public regard, or how individuals think non-blacks perceive blacks; private regard, or how individuals perceive being black; and centrality, or the central role race plays in their lives. We then focus on the implications of these different identities across a range of



political, policy, and social issues. Overall, we argue that black racial identity plays an important but varying role for blacks across these various domains.

With this approach, we can develop theoretical expectations about the complementary or contradictory relationships expected for black racial identity and then test them empirically. The advantage of the multidimensional approach is that it does not assume that one measure (i.e., linked fate, centrality) accurately captures all of the complexities of black racial identity. We do not believe either a single domain of identity or a binary measure of identity can easily sum up a person's identity. In contrast, our argument is that the different dimensions of identity may have varying influences on political attitudes and behavior.

Thus, we use a modified version of the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI) scale, which is detailed in chapter 3.<sup>15</sup> We selected the MIBI because it is one of the most often used measures of black racial identity by social psychologists, educational psychologists, public health researchers, and scholars whose research focuses on understanding the racial identity of blacks. There are several other equally reliable and valid identity measures that capture the multidimensionality of black identity (such as the Cross Racial Identity Scale); however, the National Study of American Life (NSAL), the data source used in this volume, only queried questions from the MIBI questionnaire.

The subsequent chapters in the book are as follows: In chapter 1, we discuss the theoretical and methodological development of black racial identity to highlight the uses and changes in the concept over the years. We focus on both the use in political science as well as the development of the multidimensional measures in social psychology. Chapter 2 then lays out our theoretical expectations based on the discussion in chapter 1. Here we also provide details of data used throughout the book, as well as the measures used to determine black racial identity. We also provide a descriptive analysis of racial identity among blacks on our three scales. Finally, we give an overview of the methodology and measures used in the remaining chapters.

In chapters 3–6, we explore the influence of black racial identity on different aspects of politics, public policy, and social life. In chapter 3, we delve into an important psychological concept with a look at views towards social dominance, or the view of group-based hierarchy in society. Black nationalism is one of the topics in chapter 4 as we analyze the relationship between black racial identity and support for the cultural ideology of retaining black self-sufficiency and institutions within society. Chapter 4 also takes a look at the relationship between

black racial identity and racial attitudes on a range of topics that often generate debate when trying to understand white attitudes toward blacks. Chapter 5 focuses specifically on policy attitudes with an emphasis on issues often considered racial in nature. Chapter 6 concludes the analysis with an examination of black political participation, including both non-electoral (i.e., contacting government officials) and electoral forms of participation (i.e., voting). Finally, in the concluding chapter we summarize our main findings, discuss the broader impact of our findings in the lives of blacks, and discuss the importance of using multidimensional measures of black racial identity instead of the standard one-dimensional and binary measures currently utilized.

In the end, will show the following: 1) blacks are not monolithic in their thinking about black racial identity; 2) black racial identity is significantly important on political attitudes and behavior; and 3) different dimensions of racial identity affect behaviors and attitudes very differently. Most significantly, our research demonstrates the importance of using multidimensional black racial identity measures. Nonetheless, this book is neither a beginning point nor an end of black racial identity research; instead, we enter the debate with a fresh perspective. Our hope is that this book will bring about further discussion and exploration in the area of black racial identity and politics.



# 1 Understanding Black Racial Identity

As the tragic events surrounding the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, unfolded in the fall of 2014, much of the mainstream print and television media's portrayal of events focused on issues of black and white. In much of this rhetoric was a presentation of the "black" view as a single, unified voice surrounding the tragic, complicated, and often confusing events of the death of Michael Brown and the subsequent protests and riots, followed by the non-indictment by the grand jury, which fostered more protests and riots. When former National Basketball Association (NBA) star and current NBA analyst Charles Barkley spoke out against the protests and riots, it stirred a controversy. In a series of back-and-forth open letters between Barkley and current cohost and former NBA player, Kenny Smith, Barkley said, "Listen man, I know that I'm Black and I'm always going to be. I know anytime I disagree with Black people I'm going to be a sell-out or an Uncle Tom."<sup>1</sup>

During the 2012 presidential election, actor Stacey Dash, most notably from the movie *Clueless*, endorsed Mitt Romney for president. This endorsement by a black celebrity for a white candidate over a very popular black incumbent president set off a firestorm. Comments on social media ranged from calling Dash an "airhead, a "nobody," and an "indoor slave," to suggesting she was "no longer Black." Even Samuel L. Jackson posted on Twitter: "Is Stacey Dash crazy?" There was so much animosity, Dash responded by saying, "The fury, I really don't understand the fury. I don't understand it. I don't get it. . . . But you know what, you can't expect everyone to agree with you. I was shocked, saddened. Not angry."<sup>2</sup> She went on to argue that

It's my right as an American citizen, it's my constitutional right to have my choice to who I want to vote for President. And I chose him not by the color of his skin, but the content of his character.<sup>3</sup>

When Barack Obama announced that he was entering an already-crowded field of contenders vying to be the president of the United States, he attracted a great deal of attention from political pundits and white Democrats. However, there was some ambivalence among blacks toward his candidacy. According to the *Washington Post*-ABC poll taken December 2006 and January 2007, Hillary Clinton was “preferred” three to one over Obama by black Democrats, and four out of five black Democrats viewed her “more favorably” than Obama.<sup>4</sup> Even in the early primary season, some black legislators endorsed Clinton instead of Obama, and the chairwoman of the Congressional Black Caucus, Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick, said she was “99 percent sure her group would not support Obama *en masse* the way the powerful women’s political organization Emily’s List was backing Hillary Clinton.”<sup>5</sup> It was certainly not the type of reception the black electorate often gave to a black Democratic candidate. Based on precedent, black Democratic candidates have often enjoyed strong support among blacks and have struggled mightily to gain support among whites. In this case, oddly enough, Obama found himself as a stranger working diligently to gain the support of blacks.

What then was holding blacks back from supporting Obama? Was it his policies? Voters didn’t clearly know what those were early on. So it was difficult to say that was the reason. Was it his political inexperience? There had been other black candidates with less political experience. Neither Jesse Jackson nor Al Sharpton held elected positions, but they, while unsuccessful, ran for the presidency. So that didn’t seem like a probable reason. Was it his race? While no one in the black community questioned whether Obama was black (regarding skin color), there was a considerable amount of questions surrounding his “blackness.” In other words, was he “black” enough?

Some suggested that questions regarding Obama’s blackness were linked to his background. Obama was born to a white mother from Kansas and a black Kenyan father, raised in Hawaii by his white grandparents, and had spent a few years in Indonesia with his Indonesian stepfather. Even Obama realized “there were elements within the black community who might suggest ‘Well, he’s from Hyde Park’ or ‘He went to Harvard’ or ‘He was born in Hawaii, so he might not be Black enough’” (Fletcher, 2007). However, Obama explained in his book, *The Audacity of Hope*, “I’ve never had the option of restricting my loyalties on the basis of race, or measuring my worth on the basis of tribe.” Nevertheless, his background and experiences had created a situation in which Debra J. Dickerson,

a black author and essayist, declared that “Obama isn’t Black”<sup>6</sup> in the American racial context, “because he does not embody the experiences of most Blacks whose ancestors endured slavery, segregation, and the bitter struggle for civil rights.”<sup>7</sup> Dickerson further explained

I’ve got nothing but love for the brother, but we don’t have anything in common. His father was African. His mother was a white woman. He grew up with white grandparents. Now, I’m willing to adopt him. He married black. He acts black. But there’s a lot of distance between black Africans and African-Americans.<sup>8</sup>

According to Ron Walters, “They [blacks] have a right to be somewhat suspicious of people who come into the country and don’t share their experiences.”<sup>9</sup>

These cases show opposing views within the black community, which is often a surprise to many, since generally it has been portrayed that all blacks think alike. Prior research has shown that black intragroup racial identity differences exist, and, consequently, in this chapter we discuss the following: 1) theories and conceptualizations of black racial identity, 2) black racial identity formation, and 3) its effect specifically on politics and measurement of black racial identity (both multidimensional and unidimensional). Beyond simply outlining the difference between the type of measures, this chapter lays the foundation for the movement away from a sole reliance on unidimensional measures to the adoption of multidimensional measures in political research.

### Defining and Conceptualizing Black Racial Identity

Generally, the concept of black racial identity is ambiguous and socially constructed. It implies a “consciousness of self within a particular group.” It has been viewed as the “meanings a person attributes to the self as an object in a social situation or social role,”<sup>10</sup> and it relates to a “sense of people-hood, which provides a sense of belonging.”<sup>11</sup> Black racial identity is “emerging, changing, and complex,”<sup>12</sup> and “there is no one identity among Blacks that can be delineated, as social scientists have sometimes suggested, but many complex and changing identities among them.”<sup>13</sup> The “level of uncertainty about the nature of Black racial identity”<sup>14</sup> and the “indicative confusion about the topic”<sup>15</sup> is illustrated by the lack of a standard definition. Nevertheless, according to symbolic interactionism, “racial identity is treated as one of the many identities contained within

self,”<sup>16</sup> and it is given fundamental and overriding importance in the United States. Winant (1995) explained

Racial identity outweighs all other identities. We are compelled to think racially, to use the racial categories and the meaning systems into which we have been socialized. . . . It is not possible to be “color blind,” for race is a basic element of our identity. . . . For better or worse, without a clear racial identity, an American is in danger of having no identity.<sup>17</sup>

Due to its multifaceted nature, black racial identity has been conceptualized by scholars in a variety of different ways, including “racial categorization,” “common fate or linked fate,” “racial salience,” “closeness,” “Black separatism,” “racial self-esteem,” “Africentrism,” “racial solidarity,” and “racial awareness and consciousness.”<sup>18</sup> Others suggest that black racial identity has “multiple dimensions,” and formation occurs over time through various “stages.”<sup>19</sup>

Some researchers studying racial identity have focused on universal aspects of group identity, using blacks as an example. Gains and Reed (1994) refer to this work as part of the mainstream approach.<sup>20</sup> Researchers of the mainstream perspective typically employ measures of group identity that are applicable to a variety of groups.<sup>21</sup> Much of the early mainstream perspective research defined racial identity based on a group’s stigma and status in society. The earliest sociological research investigated the racial preferences and self-identification of children, which was determined by having children select between white and black stimuli such as dolls.<sup>22</sup> Based on this work, researchers concluded that black children had a more negative orientation to their own race than white children. Consequently, blacks’ “self-hatred” became a staple in much of the early work from the mainstream perspective.<sup>23</sup>

In the late 1960s, researchers began to redefine black racial identity based on the uniqueness of black oppression and cultural experiences. William Cross (1971) defined the concept as stages of identity that change across an individual’s lifetime. He called this process “nigrescence” or a resocializing experience that “seeks to transform a preexisting identity (a non-Afrocentric identity) into one that is Afrocentric.”<sup>24</sup> This research constituted an Afrocentric approach, or what Gains and Reed referred to as the “underground perspective.”<sup>25</sup> The underground (or Afrocentric) approach emphasizes “the experiential properties associated with the unique historical and cultural influences associated with the African American

experience,” and for this reason, Afrocentric theorists argue against using models based on other racial or ethnic groups to explain the experiences of blacks.<sup>26</sup>

Afrocentric researchers have defined racial identity based on physical characteristics, cultural and political alliances, ancestry, and history. Sanders Thompson defined it as “a psychological attachment to one of several social categories available to individuals when the category selected is based on race or skin color and/or a common history, particularly as it relates to oppression and discrimination due to skin color.”<sup>27</sup> For Sanders Thompson, racial identification is particularly significant for blacks because it provides insight into the unique psychological orientation resulting from sustained disparities in the historical conditions of racial groups in American society.

A pivotal component of Afrocentrism is the measure of adherence to the seven principles (or *Nguza Saba*) of the Afrocentric worldview. These Afrocentric principles are essentially “codes of conduct for daily life” that “represent guidelines for healthy living.”<sup>28</sup> The main tenets include *umoja* (unity), *kujichagulia* (self-determination), *ujima* (collective work and responsibility), *ujamaa* (cooperative economics), *nia* (purpose), *kuumba* (creativity), and *imani* (faith). These tenets are symbolic and philosophical and not empirical and materialistic, as many consider the Eurocentric model.<sup>29</sup>

Research in the underground approach has also defined racial identity by describing what it means to be “black.” For example, Sellers, et al., referred to racial identity as “the significance and meaning that African Americans place on race in defining themselves.”<sup>30</sup> Put another way, this research provides “identity profiles” regarding individuals’ feelings about their racial group membership. These profiles can vary “as a function of identity development,” as described in Cross’s *nigrescence* model, “or exposure to a fostering sociocultural environment,” as seen in Baldwin’s *African Self-Consciousness* model.<sup>31</sup> Together, the diversity in these definitions illustrates the complexity of racial identity among blacks. Recognizing this complexity, scholars have developed different measures that tap identity. These measures are often clumped into two major categories—multi-dimensional and unitary measures.

### Formation of Black Racial Identity

Black racial identity formation is produced by the everyday “interactions and challenges” that an individual encounters.<sup>32</sup> It is “dynamic and changing over



time, as people explore and make decisions about the role of race in their lives.”<sup>33</sup> It is affected by social and demographic factors, childhood socialization, interracial interaction, social class, age, family and friends, and socioeconomic status.<sup>34</sup> Broman, et al., found that people who were older, Southern, and less educated scored higher on an index measuring closeness to other blacks.<sup>35</sup> Demo and Hughes examined the social structural process and arrangements related to racial group identification. They found that group identity is shaped by the content of parental socialization. In particular, “feelings of closeness and Black group evaluation are enhanced by positive interpersonal relations with family and friends.”<sup>36</sup>

Interracial contact has also been found to shape black racial identity. Harris explored the impact of childhood interracial contact on adult black racial identity and found that “interracial contact in childhood weakens adult feelings of closeness to other Blacks.”<sup>37</sup> Similar findings were also in Demo and Hughes’s study, in which they discovered that the impact of interracial interaction depends on timing; specifically, “contact during childhood and adolescence has a negative impact on the Black group identity; however, interracial relationships during adulthood promote positive Black group evaluations.”<sup>38</sup> Social movements have also been shown to affect black racial identity. In their study, Condi and Christiansen show a “significant shift in identity structure of Blacks and that the Black Power movement was an important causal factor in effecting change.”<sup>39</sup>

Residential racial composition, competition, and conflict have also been shown to affect black racial identity. Conflict theorists argue group identity and cohesiveness increase as a result of conflict with an adversary<sup>40</sup>, and competition theorists argue competition among racial-ethnic groups in work and community settings also increases the likelihood that people will attach more importance to their racial-ethnic identity.<sup>41</sup> Jaret and Reitzes suggest that black racial identity changes across various settings; specifically, identity is more important for blacks at work and less important at home. In addition, changes in black racial identity are affected by racial composition of the local area. They found that blacks

... living in areas that are “intermediate” in percentage Black say that their racial-ethnic identity is more important to them than do Blacks living in areas with “low” amounts of Black residents or with “high” amounts of Black residents.<sup>42</sup>

Contrary to Jaret and Reitzes, the findings of Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman, and Combs show those who live in neighborhoods with more blacks scored

significantly higher on a racial solidarity scale as mixed neighborhoods showed less solidarity than more heavily black neighborhoods.<sup>43</sup> The key reason was that “those who live in mixed-race neighborhoods have more frequent and intimate contact with Whites; surrounded by White friends, acquaintances, neighbors, merchants, and service providers, these Blacks may simply perceive less reason to engage in collective action on behalf of Blacks.”<sup>44</sup> This suggests racial identity sentiments and attitudes are heterogeneous even among people of the same race because individuals have different experiences and encounters.

### Black Racial Identity Effects on Politics

There is a tremendous amount of research on the effects of black racial identity on black social attitudes and behavior. However, in this section we will focus on black racial identity and its effects on political views. A plethora of research has demonstrated the importance of racial identity as a factor influencing both individual and group political attitudes and behavior.<sup>45</sup> Blacks’ sense of racial identification influences both the degree and nature of their political participation. Those with a greater sense of racial identification are more likely to engage in a wider range of political activities.<sup>46</sup> For example, Olsen found that blacks who identify with the group are more likely to vote, discuss politics, engage in campaign activities, and contact government officials than other blacks.<sup>47</sup> Verba and Nie found that blacks who frequently mention race in their discussion of political issues are more likely to vote and engage in campaign activities than those who gave less race-oriented responses.<sup>48</sup> Tate found that “black identification was significantly related to Black political interest and to voter participation in congressional elections.”<sup>49</sup>

Researchers have also examined the relationship between racial identity and several factors of psychological orientations (e.g., political interest, political awareness, political efficacy, and trust in government), and their influence on political participation.<sup>50</sup> They have found that “racial identity potentially heightens political interest and awareness, boosts group pride and political efficacy, alters perception of group problems, and promotes support for collective action.”<sup>51</sup> For example, Shingles discovered that “Black consciousness has a dramatic effect on political participation because it contributes to the combination of a sense of political efficacy and political mistrust which in turn induces political involvement.”<sup>52</sup>

Black racial identity has also been shown to be related to social movements, in that racial identity can motivate individuals to take part in social

movements and collective action. For example, blacks with a stronger sense of racial identity are more likely “to belong to an organization intended to improve the status of blacks, and to work in developing the black community rather than pursuing integration.”<sup>53</sup> The relationship to the women’s movement is also worth noting, as Simien finds black men who have a stronger race identification are also more likely to support pro-women causes.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to the effects of racial identity on political participation and social activism, racial identity has also been shown to influence blacks’ voting choices and feelings toward electoral candidates and political leaders.<sup>55</sup> With regards to the effects of black racial identity on candidate evaluations and leadership preference, Sullivan and Arbutnot found that racial identity influences blacks’ support for different candidates and influences how black respondents perceive white, biracial, and black candidates.<sup>56</sup> Specifically, “differences in how blacks feel about a black candidate will depend on the candidate’s racial background, their own attitudes and beliefs about being black, and where they fall on various demographic measures.”<sup>57</sup> In another study, Sullivan examined the effects of black racial identity (measured as racial salience and linked fate) on feelings toward black leaders using the 1996 National Black Election Study.<sup>58</sup> He found black racial identity was significant in predicting feelings toward liberal black leaders (i.e., Louis Farrakhan, Jesse Jackson, Carol Moseley Braun, and Kweisi Mfume) and not significant for conservative black leaders (i.e., Clarence Thomas or Colin Powell).

Besides influencing blacks’ feelings toward electoral candidates and leadership preferences, racial identity is also essential in accounting for their opinions on a range of policy issues. Researchers have found a relationship between racial identity and blacks’ support for affirmative action, social welfare programs, and reparations for slavery.<sup>59</sup> Dawson concluded that racial identity is a stronger influence than other identity categories, such as those based on class, gender, religion, or any other social characteristics on attitudes toward a range of policy issues.<sup>60</sup>

Lastly, racial identity has been shown to impact a number of other political choices. For example, Dawson examined the role of racial identity and perceptions of group interests in the development of blacks’ connections to the major political parties.<sup>61</sup> He suggests that blacks from various social classes form party attachments based on how well different parties pursue common black interests. This explains blacks’ enduring ties to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, Dawson’s

findings in *Black Visions* reveal the impact black racial identity has on support for various ideological beliefs.<sup>62</sup> For example, he found believing one's fate is linked to his or her race is a strong predictor for economic nationalism, support for black feminist orientations and ideology, allowing more women to become members of the clergy, and acceptance of lesbians.

### Measuring Black Identity: Multidimensional Measures

Scholars in the fields of psychology, education, and health have developed four major multidimensional measures of black identity. Within the areas of counseling and psychology, scholars have investigated black racial identity as a developmental process. In its original form, William Cross's nigrescence theory described an individual's progression from a preexisting state not connected with a positive reference group orientation to a self-actualized and healthy state of racial identity.<sup>63</sup> However, after research revealed that blacks' self-esteem does not change as they move through the stages of nigrescence, Cross revised his theory and later extended it in empirical work.<sup>64</sup>

Many regard the nigrescence model as the foundation for a number of subsequent theories and measures of black racial identity.<sup>65</sup> The original nigrescence model proposed five stages of identity development. Pre-Encounter (Stage 1) describes black individuals who minimize the importance of race in their lives. During Encounter (Stage 2), the individual confronts an event, which challenges their Pre-Encounter attitudes about themselves and their understanding of the condition of blacks. This reexamination can propel them into Stage 3, Immersion-Emersion, in which individuals immerse themselves in blackness and feel liberated from whiteness. Internalization (Stage 4) describes the individual's acceptance of being black. Finally, in Stage 5, Internalization-Commitment, the individual incorporates their new identity attitudes into a commitment to social activism.<sup>66</sup>

Parham and Helms designed the Racial Identity Attitude Scale (RIAS) to measure the original nigrescence model.<sup>67</sup> The RIAS measures various attitudes that individuals are likely to have as they move through the stages of nigrescence. Parham introduced a lifespan theory of racial identity development which challenged the nigrescence theory assumptions of a linear, unidirectional movement through the stages.<sup>68</sup> He suggested three alternative pathways to racial identity development: 1) stagnation (i.e., an individual maintains a single racial identity throughout their lifetime), 2) linear progression (i.e., an individual moves through

the stages as expected), and 3) recycling (i.e., an individual has moved through the identity stages but encounters an experience that causes them to reevaluate their racial identity and revert back to an earlier stage). Table 1.1 provides examples of question items and research findings for the RIAS.

In the 1990s, Cross's theorizing, which led to the development of the Cross Racial Identity Scale, was known as the revised model. The revised nigrescence theory suggested that individuals' racial identity attitudes may change over time, and these changes (i.e., stages) "reflect a restructuring in the cognitive and affective approaches to self and society rather than an invariant developmental trajectory."<sup>69</sup> The Cross Racial Identity Scale (CRIS) operationalized the latest version of the nigrescence theory.<sup>70</sup> The current version of the CRIS measures six identities: three Pre-Encounter identities (Assimilation, Miseducation, and Self-Hatred); one Immersion-Emersion identity (Anti-White), and two Internalization identities (Afrocentricity and Multiculturalist Inclusive).<sup>71</sup>

Pre-Encounter Assimilation describes individuals with a pro-American or mainstream identity for whom race is not important. In contrast, the Pre-Encounter identity characterizes individuals who despise blacks and being black. Anti-Black racial identity is based on two factors: Miseducation, in which individuals hold negative stereotypical beliefs about blacks depicted by mainstream society, and Self-Hatred, in which individuals fuse negative stereotypes about blacks into their personal identity. Internalized Afrocentric identity is actualized through social and political activism in empowering the black community. Multiculturalist Inclusive identity includes a matrix of three or more cultural frames of reference (e.g., black racial identity plus gender, sexual orientation, sense of "Americanness," or racial reference group orientation other than black).<sup>72</sup>

Another set of models describes the multidimensional structure and nature of racial identity. These instruments cluster questions to capture the different dimensions that may influence an individual's overall racial identity. This allows them to explore which factors are most influential and how the various elements of racial identity interact. Insofar as racial identity is multidimensional, its various elements may have different effects on political choice. These models are interested in the individual differences in racial identity. Demo and Hughes separated racial identity into three areas: 1) closeness (i.e., how similar an individual feels in their ideas, feelings, and thoughts to other blacks); 2) black separatism (i.e., commitment to African culture and the preference for separation between blacks and other groups in social and economic relations), and

TABLE 1.1 Multidimensional Measures of Black Racial Identity

MEASURE	ITEMS	FINDINGS
<p><b>Racial Identity Attitudes Scale (RIAS)</b> <i>Parham &amp; Helms (1981)</i></p>	<p>Fifty-item questionnaire that assesses four stages of the <i>original</i> nigrescence model: Pre-Encounter (e.g., “I feel black people do not have as much to be proud of as white people do”); Encounter (e.g., “I am determined to find my black racial identity”); Immersion-Emersion (e.g., “I believe everything that is black is good, and consequently, I limit myself to black activities”); and Internalization (e.g., “I feel good about being black but not limiting myself to black activities”).</p>	<p>Parham &amp; Helms used the RIAS to assess the influence of racial identity attitudes on counselor race preferences and found that black clients with Pre-Encounter racial identity attitudes preferred white counselors. However, Want, Parham, Baker, and Sherman (2004) found that counselors with high-race consciousness were preferred over low-race-conscious counselors, and black counselors were preferred over white counselors. Black counselors with high-race consciousness were the most preferred.</p>
<p><b>Cross Racial Identity Scale (CRIS)</b> <i>Vandiver, et al. (2001, 2002)</i></p>	<p>Forty-item inventory that measures six of the racial identities described in the <i>expanded</i> nigrescence model: Pre-Encounter Assimilation (e.g., “I am not so much a member of a racial group as I am an American”); Pre-Encounter Self-Hatred (e.g., “I sometimes have negative feelings about being black”); and Pre-Encounter Miseducation (e.g., “blacks place more emphasis on</p>	<p>Anglin and Wade (2007) found that an internalized multicultural identity positively contributed to college adjustment, while pre-encounter miseducated racial identity and an internalized Afrocentric identity negatively contributed. Additionally, Awad (2007) found racial identity does not predict either GPA or GRE test performance among college students.</p>

(continues on next page)

Table 1.1 (cont'd)

<p>CRIS (cont'd)</p>	<p>having a good time than on hard work"); Immersion-Emersion Anti-White (e.g., "I have a strong feeling of hatred and disdain for all white people"); Internalization Multiculturalist Inclusive (e.g., "I believe it is important to have both a black racial identity and a multicultural perspective that is inclusive of everyone"); Internalization Afrocentricity (e.g., "As black nationalists, we must work on empowering ourselves and not hating others").</p>	<p>Ferguson, Leach, Levy, Nicholson, and Johnson (2008) used the CRIS to revisit Parham and Helm's (1981) study of counselor preferences, and they found that racial identity predicts preferences for a black counselor.</p>
<p><b>Multidimensional Racial Identification Scale (MRIS)</b> <i>Sanders Thompson (1995a)</i></p>	<p>Thirty-item instrument that measures black racial identity based on four parameters: Physical (e.g., "black actresses, actors, models, etc., are as attractive as those of other groups in films and on TV"); Cultural (e.g., "blacks have a culture worth protecting and documenting"); Sociopolitical (e.g., "black representation is important in all occupations, activities, etc."); and Psychological (e.g., "There is more to like than dislike about blacks").</p>	<p>Sanders Thompson assessed predictors of the four parameters in a series of studies (1991, 1994, 1995b). She found that all four parameters were positively correlated with having had more family racial socialization. Also, psychological, sociopolitical, and cultural racial identities were positively related to political and community involvement. Lastly, physical racial identity was associated with having experienced racism at an older age, and psychological racial identity was related to having experienced more discrimination.</p>

Table 1.1 (cont'd)

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<b>Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI)</b> <i>Sellers, et al. (1998)</i>	Fifty-six-item measure consisting of seven subscales, including the following: Centrality (e.g., "Being black is important to my self-image"); Private Regard (e.g., "I feel good about black people"); Public Regard (e.g., "Others respect black people"); Nationalist Ideology (e.g., "blacks would be better off if they accepted Afrocentric values"); Oppressed Minority Ideology (e.g., "The same sources that have led to the oppression of blacks have also led to the oppression of other groups"); Assimilationist Ideology (e.g., "blacks should strive to be full members of the American political system"); and Humanist Ideology (e.g., "People, regardless of their race, have strengths and limitations").	Rowley, Sellers, Chavous, and Smith (1998) found that private regard attitudes were strongly related to higher self-esteem in black adolescents. In another study, Sellers, Chavous, and Cooke (1998b) found that assimilation and nationalist ideology subscales were negatively associated with GPA, and an oppressed minority ideology was positively associated with GPA for students who scored high on racial centrality. The relationships found in both studies were moderated by racial centrality (i.e., no significant relationship was found for those with low racial centrality scores). Sellers, Copeland-Linder, Martin, & Lewis (2006) suggest an interrelationship among racial identity, racial discrimination, and psychological functioning. Specifically, "although individuals who believe that other groups hold more negative attitudes toward blacks (low public regard) were at greater risk for experiencing racial discrimination, low public regard beliefs also buffered the impact of racial discrimination on psychological functioning" (187).
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3) racial group evaluation (i.e., the belief that most blacks possess positive characteristics but do not possess negative characteristics).<sup>73</sup>

Allen, Dawson, and Brown conceptualized racial identity as a black belief system based on five dimensions: 1) closeness to black elites (i.e., civic and political leaders); 2) closeness to black masses (e.g., blacks who are poor, religious, young, middle class, working class, and older); 3) positive stereotypes (e.g., “blacks are hardworking”); 4) negative stereotypes (e.g., “Most blacks are lazy”); and 5) black autonomy (i.e., an ideological position that advocates building political and social institutions based on the cultural values and interests of blacks).<sup>74</sup>

The multidimensional models proposed by both Demo and Hughes and Allen, et al., reflect a similar conceptualization of racial identity and share common subscales. Both models recognize the importance of closeness in one’s racial identity, although Allen, et al., divide closeness into two components. One component, closeness to black elites, measures whether an individual believes that their personal political interests and the political interests of the black community are best met by supporting black leaders. The other component, closeness to the black masses, indicates an individual’s perception that blacks share a “common fate” as a group. Both models also emphasize the importance of how an individual feels about blacks as a group. Allen, et al., measured these feelings using the positive and negative stereotype dimensions, while Demo and Hughes used the racial group evaluation component. Lastly, both models contain subscales that measure an ideological position emphasizing Afrocentric values: Allen’s model includes a black autonomy scale and Demo and Hughes use a similar black separatism scale.

Sanders Thompson proposed another multidimensional model, the Multidimensional Racial Identification Scale (MRIS), which divides black racial identity into four distinct parameters: 1) Physical (i.e., acceptance and comfort with the physical attributes of blacks); 2) Cultural (i.e., awareness, knowledge of, and commitment to the cultural traditions of blacks); 3) Sociopolitical (i.e., commitment to resolving the economic, social, and political issues facing the black community); and 4) Psychological (i.e., concern for and pride in the racial group).<sup>75</sup> Sanders Thompson developed this model based on the notion that individuals can have varying levels of identification among different components of racial identity. Responses within the parameters describe which components of racial identity are most important to the individual and which areas are lacking in the overall identification. Examples of items from the MRIS and research findings are located in Table 1.1.

Another multidimensional model, and the one we use in our analysis, emerged from Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, and Smith in 1997.<sup>76</sup> The Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI) defines four dimensions of racial identity that capture “the significance and qualitative meaning that individuals attribute to their membership in the black racial group within their self-concepts.”<sup>77</sup> The MMRI includes racial salience and centrality, which measures the significance of race for the individual, and racial regard and ideology, which assesses the meaning of race for the individual. Examining both the meaning and significance of racial identity affords the opportunity to investigate the complexity inherent in the role that race plays in the lives of blacks. The MMRI theorizes individuals have multiple identities that are hierarchically ordered. In examining the hierarchy of identities, the MMRI focuses on the relative importance of race compared to other identities.

The MMRI is operationalized using the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI), which encompasses a total of seven subscales. The first dimension, centrality, measures the extent to which an individual normatively defines him or herself with regards to race. The second dimension, regard, is divided into two subscales: private regard (i.e., an individual’s evaluative judgment about their race) and public regard (i.e., how an individual perceives that others view their group). The other four subscales are based on ideologies that capture blacks’ views on what it means to be a member of their racial group: nationalist (i.e., the extent to which one’s philosophy stresses the importance and uniqueness of being of African descent), oppressed minority (i.e., the extent to which one’s philosophy emphasizes the commonalities between blacks and other oppressed groups), assimilationist (i.e., the extent to which one’s philosophy emphasizes the commonalities between blacks and the rest of American society), and humanist (i.e., the extent to which one’s philosophy emphasizes the commonalities among all human beings). Sellers, et al., have reported valid and reliable scores for the MIBI, and these have been validated in various additional studies since the introduction of the model.<sup>78</sup> See Table 1.1 for sample items and research findings of the MIBI.

Although each of the models emphasize different elements of racial identity and have unique features, they actually complement one another.<sup>79</sup> For example, while the developmental models characterize individuals’ racial identity according to where they reside along the developmental sequence, the multidimensional measures provide a rubric for describing the significance and meaning

of race at various points on these developmental trajectories. Using one of the multidimensional models along with a developmental model could help validate the assumptions of both approaches and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and development of black racial identity.

### Measuring Black Identity: Unitary Measures

In the area of political science, scholars have typically relied on one of three items to measure racial identity: 1) self-identification with one's racial group; 2) a feeling of closeness to one's group; and 3) a belief that one's fate is linked to that of the group. Table 1.2 provides a summary of these measures and the corresponding research findings. Much of the early published work in this area determined racial identity based on a single item, asking whether a respondent identified as a member of a certain group. For example, Olsen asked respondents whether they identified as a member of an "ethnic minority."<sup>80</sup> Verba and Nie used an index that tallied the number of times black respondents referred to race in answering various open-ended questions, and Jones-Correa and Leal asked respondents whether they identified as a member of a certain group.<sup>81</sup>

However, self-identification indicates little about an individual's racial identity. Identifying with a racial group only demonstrates that an individual is aware that he or she is black; it says nothing about how the individual feels about being black (e.g., Are they proud to be black? Is race even important to that individual?). It is possible for two individuals to be equally identified with their group but to have very distinct ideologies about the meaning of their membership in that group, in addition to having different feelings about their group and beliefs about how others view that group.<sup>82</sup> Thus, according to Miller, et al., "There is no theoretical reason to assume a direct connection between basic group identification and individual political attitudes and behavior."<sup>83</sup> Hence, self-identification/classification is too basic and subjective to qualify as a valid measure of racial identity.

The second way that political scientists measure black racial identity is in the form of group closeness, i.e., the extent to which individuals feel that their ideas, feelings, and thoughts are similar to that of other blacks.<sup>84</sup> However, "close to" ratings are prone to intersubject variability. It is possible an individual could be psychologically attached to a group, but, on the other hand, closeness may merely "indicate feelings of sympathy, proximity, or even empathy for the group."<sup>85</sup>

The conceptualization of racial identity as closeness brings up another issue of measurement within the literature. Even when political scientists agree on the conceptualization of racial identity, they sometimes use different measures to tap the same component. This is often because the specific item measures depend on which of the surveys researchers use.<sup>86</sup> For example, when black racial identity is conceptualized as closeness, the American National Election Studies (ANES) asks respondents to rate their closeness to blacks as a whole; the National Survey of Black Americans assesses closeness with subgroups of blacks such as poor, middle class, religious, elected officials, or the elderly; and the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies (NBES) asked respondents to rate their closeness to blacks in Africa, the Caribbean, and America.<sup>87</sup> These are three very different psychometric questions that measure the same element of racial identity. This inconsistency has sometimes produced divergent results in political research. For example, although Tate, using the 1984 National Black Election Study, found a relationship between racial group closeness and blacks' support of social welfare programs, Kinder and Winter (2001), using the 1992 ANES, found little correlation between group closeness and preferences for social welfare policies.<sup>88</sup> Table 1.2 provides a breakdown of the three different measures of closeness.

Lastly, researchers often conceptualize racial identity through the notion of linked fate, or the degree to which blacks believe that their personal well-being is connected to that of other blacks. Dawson developed a framework for analyzing black political choice using the concept of linked fate. In Dawson's construction, racial identity is a function of self-interest and individual perceptions of racial group interests.<sup>89</sup> Among the three unitary measures, linked fate is largely regarded as the most valid measure of racial consciousness.<sup>90</sup> Blacks derive group consciousness and feelings of linked fate from a specific shared history and common experiences.<sup>91</sup> The linked fate measure captures the intricate heuristic processes used by most voters, and it incorporates the feelings of in-group identification and an awareness of a shared group status with other members. However, the linked fate measure is problematic because the closed-ended questions used to measure linked fate only measure the presence and degree (strong or weak) of this link between the individual and the group, while neglecting to measure whether this attachment could be positive or negative.<sup>92</sup> A description of the linked fate measure and research findings is located in Table 1.2.

TABLE 1.2 Unitary Measures of Black Racial Identity

MEASURE	OPERATIONALIZATION	FINDINGS
<b>Racial Categorization/ Identification</b>	<p>Olsen (1970) asked respondents whether they identify as a member of an “ethnic minority.” Verba and Nie (1972) used an index that summed the number of times black respondents referred to race when answering various open-ended questions. Hecht and Ribeau (1991) put together a short questionnaire that simply determined individuals’ self-labeling (referred to in the study as self-identification). Jones-Correa and Leal (1996) asked respondents whether they identify as a member of a certain group.</p>	<p>Olsen (1970) found that blacks who identified with the group were more likely to vote, discuss politics, engage in campaign activities, and contact government officials than were other blacks. Verba and Nie (1972) found that blacks who frequently mentioned race in their discussion of political issues were more likely to vote and engage in campaign activities than those who gave less race-oriented responses.</p>
<b>Linked Fate</b>	<p>Linked fate is the degree to which blacks believe that their own well-being is linked to that of other blacks (e.g., “Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” and “People differ in whether they think about being black—what they have in common with blacks. What about you—do you think about this a lot,</p>	<p>Tate (1993) found that linked fate was significantly related to blacks’ opinions on affirmative action as well as their political interest and voter participation in congressional elections. Dawson (1994) suggested Africans Americans’ feelings of linked fate leads them to form party attachments based on how well the major parties pursue common black interests. This explains blacks’ lasting ties to the</p>

Table 1.2 (cont'd)

MEASURE	OPERATIONALIZATION	FINDINGS
<b>Linked Fate</b> ( <i>cont'd</i> )	fairly often, once in a while, or hardly ever?”).	Democratic Party. Dawson (2001) concluded that racial identity is stronger than identities based on class, gender, religion, or any other social characteristics as appreciation of attitudes toward policy issues. Furthermore, believing one’s fate is linked to that of their race is a strong predictor of various ideological positions (e.g., economic nationalism, showing support for black feminist orientations and ideology, allowing more women to become members of the clergy, and warmth for lesbians).
<b>Closeness</b>	The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate their closeness to blacks as a whole. Respondents are given a list of groups and asked which ones they feel particularly close to—people who are most like them in their ideas, interests, and feelings about things. Once respondents have rated their closeness to all of the groups, they are asked to pick the one group to which they feel the closest.	Kinder and Winter (2001) found that group closeness is a strong predictor of blacks’ preferences for racial issues like affirmative action policies, but it has little effect on blacks’ opinions of implicitly racial issues like social welfare policies.

(continues on next page)

*Table 1.2 (cont'd)*


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<b>Closeness (<i>cont'd</i>)</b>	<p>The National Survey of Black Americans assesses closeness to various subgroups of blacks such as the poor, middle class, elected officials, religious, or the elderly. Researchers sum up respondents' level of closeness to the different groups of blacks and use this single score as a measure of black racial identity.</p>	<p>Broman, et al., (1988) found that blacks who were older, Southern, and less educated scored higher on the index measuring closeness to other blacks. They also found that childhood interracial contact decreases feelings of closeness to other blacks.</p>
	<p>The National Black Election Studies ask questions of closeness to blacks in Africa, the West Indies, and America. "Please tell me if you feel very close, fairly close, not too close, or not close at all to the following groups. First, how close do you feel in your ideas and feelings about things to . . . West Indians—like black people from Jamaica, Bermuda, or Haiti? Black people in Africa? Black people in the United States?"</p>	<p>Herring, et al., (1999) found less variance in closeness to blacks in the United States than in closeness to non-American blacks. Jackson, et al., (1991) used closeness ratings to measure in-group attachments and found that positive in-group orientations were weakly correlated to anti-white orientations.</p>

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In the use of unidimensional measures of racial identity, research has accounted for only a limited perspective of its multifaceted nature. To the extent that researchers have oversimplified the measurement of racial identity, they may have underestimated its effects on individual political attitudes and behavior. The effect of racial identity may vary depending on which conceptual element was measured and the specific items used to operationalize it. When researchers have relied on only one or two indicators of racial identity, it is possible that they

overlooked an existing relationship they would have found had they used a more comprehensive measure. In contrast, it is also possible that by oversimplifying the measure of racial identity, researchers may have mistakenly found a relationship that a more comprehensive measure would show to be statistically nonsignificant.

Some political researchers have recognized the methodological limitations of unitary measurements, and, in order to create a more comprehensive measure, they have combined items that already appear in the literature. For example, after Tate found that racial consciousness, narrowly defined and measured by two items of linked fate, only weakly influenced black political participation, Chong and Rogers returned to the same dataset (1984 NBES) to investigate whether a more comprehensive measure of racial identity demonstrates a greater impact on participation.<sup>93</sup> Using a more complex model that distinguishes between racial identification and racial consciousness, they found racial identification and consciousness had a more powerful influence on political participation in the 1984 presidential election than Tate previously found. Furthermore, the two forms of racial identity (i.e., linked fate and black autonomy) bolster participation in two different ways: those who believe in a linked fate are more likely to express their demand through conventional political channels, while those who endorse the more radical notion of racial autonomy favor protest and other forms of direct action. The independent influence of these two forms of racial identification confirms that groups can have multiple identities and ideologies, each of which may function as a source of political engagement for different sectors of the group.<sup>94</sup> Based on their findings, Chong and Rogers concluded that researchers using unidimensional measures of racial identity were likely to have systematically underestimated its influence on the political participation of blacks.<sup>95</sup>

## Conclusion

A review of the racial identity literature reveals that first, it is important not to assume that all blacks place the same importance on race in their overall self-concept. Second, individuals have multiple identities within their self-concept, which are hierarchically ordered in a way that has significant consequences for their identification. The use of unidimensional measures of racial identity in political science also has implications for our ability to make predictions regarding blacks' political attitudes and behavior. Consider the conceptualization of racial identity as closeness, which is often used in political research. Such a simple



conceptualization does not explain why one black may express political demands through protests and direct forms of action, another prefers using conventional political channels like contacting government officials, a third is only comfortable voting, while a fourth feels equally comfortable doing everything, and yet another prefers doing nothing. All of these individuals can feel equally close to members of their racial group. Explaining the different preferences in these individuals' political participation might be better explained by various racial identities, such as those described in the Multidimensional Measure of Racial Identity. Without these various dimensions, we cannot capture some of the individual differences in blacks' racial identity.

A multidimensional measure of black racial identity can potentially contribute to the extensive literature on political attitudes and behavior. Researchers have learned a great deal about the nature of racial identity and its effects on individual social behavior. Given the complexity of black racial identity, an accurate test of its influence on individuals' attitudes and behaviors requires a comprehensive measure that can tap into its various dimensions. We turn to the details of this measure in the next chapter.

## 2 Measuring and Analyzing the Influence of Multidimensional Racial Identity

In the previous chapter, we discussed the historical development of racial identity and the ways it has been traditionally measured and used in scholarly research. Most importantly, we laid out the case for why unidimensional or single measures of identity do not capture the full experience of what it means to be black or identify with being black. As we have stated previously, our hope is to show that a multidimensional approach to studying identity better captures the complexities involved in how someone identifies with his or her race.

In this chapter, we will discuss our multidimensional measures of racial identity and the empirics associated with these. We base our measures on the Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI) of Sellers, et al.<sup>1</sup> As discussed in the previous chapter, the MMRI is not the only model of racial identity, but it has become widely used by scholars examining questions of racial identity among both adults and adolescents across a range of areas from social psychology to child development. The adaptability and widespread usage of this measure makes it possible to apply our findings in the political context to a wide array of studies examining the influences of multidimensional racial identity.

We focus on three components of racial identity: centrality, private regard, and public regard. Our data source uses shortened versions of these subscales to assess the racial identity beliefs of the participants.<sup>2</sup> Table 2.1 lists the questions used to determine these beliefs. Each identity measure shows internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha for private regard being 0.81, public regard as 0.94, and centrality equaling 0.75.<sup>3</sup> Private regard is "consistent with the concept of psychological closeness and racial pride in other models."<sup>4</sup> Studies examining private regard show that high scores on the measure are related to positive health outcomes, increased self-esteem, increased well-being, and greater commitment to one's ethnic identity.<sup>5</sup>

The public regard measure is especially interesting, as it captures a different aspect of identity that, previously, single-item measures of identity have failed to capture. Since public regard is not related to any single-item measure, it is worth providing a bit more detail on its domain of racial identity. Researchers

TABLE 2.1 Questions Used to Create Multidimensional Identity Measures

MEASURE	QUESTION 1	QUESTION 2	QUESTION 3	QUESTION 4
<b>Racial Centrality</b>	“Being a black person is a large part of how I think of myself.”	“What happens in my life is largely the result of what happens to other black people in this country.”	“I do not feel strongly tied to other black people.”	“Being black is not an important part of who I am as a person.”
<b>Private Regard</b>	“I feel good about other black people.”	“I am not happy that I am black.”	“I am proud to be black.”	“Black people have made important contributions to the development of this country.”
<b>Public Regard</b>	“White people in the country do not respect black people.”	“White people in this country do not think of black people as important contributors to this country.”	“Other racial and ethnic groups in this country do not think of blacks as intelligent and competent.”	

Question wording from codebook for National Survey of American Life Self-Administered Questionnaire (NSAL-SAQ), February 2001–June 2003. Responses are reverse coded as necessary.

from both the mainstream and underground perspectives have argued that the concept of public regard plays an important part in how blacks identify with their own group. For example, the mainstream approach has generally argued that the devaluation of blacks by the broader society should have a deleterious influence on individuals' evaluation of their own group.<sup>6</sup> In terms of the MMRI version of public regard, after some initial concerns with reliability and validity, more reliable measures (including those in our data) show that high public regard, or thinking more positively about how other groups view blacks, is related to being more bothered by discrimination while those with low public regard may be better able to cope with discrimination.<sup>7</sup>

The centrality measure taps into a normative judgment about the extent people define themselves with regard to race and the importance of race in defining their self-concept. This is the most inward and psychological measure of the three. Previous studies show a link between scoring higher on racial centrality and higher levels of perceived discrimination while also related to lower levels of psychological distress.<sup>8</sup>

It is important to note that we are not making a normative case for the “best” version of racial identity, or the “right” combination of identity scores. Rather, our goal is to show that the role of racial identity for blacks is more complex than a single measure can capture, and these varying identity factors influence attitudes and behaviors in interesting and important ways. As such, our analytical expectations and strategies, discussed in detail later in this chapter, focus on the relationship of these measures in concert with each other while controlling for other important factors that may shape the attitudinal and behavioral issues we analyze.

## Data

In the following chapters, we rely on data from the National Study of American Life (NSAL), a public health survey from the National Institute of Mental Health Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology Survey (CPES), and the *Program for Research on Black Americans* at the University of Michigan.<sup>9</sup> Conducted in 2001 and 2003, the NSAL uses a nationally representative sample of blacks. Specifically, “data were collected using a stratified and clustered sample design, and weights were created to account for unequal probabilities of selection, non-response, and post-stratification.”<sup>10</sup> All of the respondents were age 18 and over. In

this first phase, face-to-face interviews, using a computer-assisted program, were utilized for data collection. After concluding the initial face-to-face interviews, all respondents who participated in the first phase were invited to the second phase—completing a self-administered questionnaire, which was referred to as the NSAL Adult Re-Interview (RIW). The total sample included 3,570 blacks, 1,621 African Caribbeans (blacks of Caribbean descent), and 891 whites. Of the 3,570 blacks, 2,137 completed the RIW. For this research, we focus on the black respondents who took both the initial NSAL and the RIW.

The major feature that makes the NSAL and NSAL RIW unique is that “the study includes a large, nationally representative sample of blacks, permitting an examination of the heterogeneity of experience across groups within this segment of the Black population.”<sup>11</sup> Additionally,

all respondents were selected from the targeted catchment areas in proportion to the Black population, distinguishing a first national sample of different ethnic groups within Black America who live in the same contexts and geographical area in which Blacks are actually distributed—both high and low density, urban and rural, inner-city and suburban, for example.<sup>12</sup>

In other words, unlike the most widely used public opinion surveys, the NSAL included a large and nationally representative sample of blacks, with sampling techniques designed to include blacks from all parts of the country and those living in various geographic contexts. This allows us to draw more robust generalizations from our analysis and make more confident claims regarding the role of racial identity on attitudes and behaviors.

Figure 2.1 shows a map of the number of respondents by state. The sample of 2,137 respondents came from 28 states plus Washington, DC. Georgia had the highest number of respondents in the sample, with 230, followed by North Carolina (174), Louisiana (158), Michigan (131), and South Carolina (123) rounding out the top five. Of the 22 states without any respondents, only two, Arkansas and Delaware, had a black population in the 2000 Census greater than 10 percent, and Arkansas was the only southern state without any respondents. Arizona, Oregon, and Minnesota were the only states with a black population less than 5 percent in the state with respondents in the sample. Overall, the number of respondents and percentage of state’s population that is black correlated at 0.62.




Figure 2.1 Respondents by State

The NSAL queried respondents regarding “intra and inter-group racial and ethnic differences in mental disorders, psychological distress and informal and formal service use, as they are manifested in the context of a variety of stressors, risk and resilient factors, and coping resources.”<sup>13</sup> The survey also included social, cultural, and political questions ranging from voting habits to policy positions. While these questions make up a small part of the project, when combined with the detailed questions on racial identity, the survey provides an excellent and unique opportunity for analysis, due to the nationally representative sample of blacks and the inclusion of the multidimensional scales of racial identity.<sup>14</sup>

## Descriptives

In the chapters that follow, we focus on the role of racial identity on black views and behaviors using a multidimensional approach. In this chapter, we present these measures in an empirical overview. Figure 2.2 shows a histogram of the three identity measures. Each measure is scaled on a 1–4 range, with 1 indicating the lowest level of the identity dimension and 4 the highest. Public regard, with 2,072 respondents, has the most dispersed range, with 18 percent of respondents having the lowest measure, or believing other groups have a negative evaluation of blacks. Fifty-three percent of respondents scored a 2, while 24 percent a 3, and 5 percent indicated the highest level of support that other groups have a positive

evaluation of blacks. On the private regard scale, the 2,088 respondents have an overwhelming positive evaluation of blacks and of being a member of the group, as 82 percent scored a 4, with 17 percent more scoring a 3. Less than 2 percent of respondents have a negative evaluation of being black.

Given the lack of variance, especially in the lowest categories, we collapse this private regard measure into a dichotomous variable for the purposes of the analyses in the upcoming chapters. We code all those that scored a 4 as having the highest private regard, and those with 3 or less as being lower on this measure. This still leaves nearly 82 percent of the sample scoring in the higher category, compared to only 18 percent in the new lower category.

For centrality, with 2,066 respondents we find the modal category is 3, with a slight majority (51 percent) agreeing that race plays a central role in their self-concept, with 13 percent in highest agreement that race plays a central role in their psychological self-identification. For 34 percent of respondents, race plays a somewhat less central (score of 2) role. However, only 2 percent of respondents indicate that race plays a minimal role in their self-concept. Overall, race has a moderate role in how people see themselves, while almost everyone has a positive view of their race and their membership in that group. They also indicate that other groups, mainly whites, have a slightly negative evaluation of blacks.




Figure 2.2 Racial Identity Histograms. Numbers in percentages.

### Racial Identity and Demographics

In the upcoming chapters, we test the explanatory power of these identity measures on various social, cultural, and political attitudes and behaviors. However, it is important to understand that these measures are not just a proxy for or artifact of demographics. We present the bivariate relationship between the identity measures and common attitudinal and behavioral explanatory variables to highlight the relationship between them.<sup>15</sup> We examine the relationship between racial identity and age, income, education, party identification, urban residence, and region. For ease of discussion, we focus on any interesting variations, while showing the full range of values in the figures.

Starting with age, we find few differences across age and one’s public regard. From the youngest to the oldest, each group is within 2 percent of the overall 52.6 percent of individuals in the modal category of 2. The same pattern emerges for private regard. There is slightly more variation for centrality, as race plays a more central role for respondents 45 or younger while it is slightly less important for older individuals. A person’s age appears to have little influence in terms of either their public or private regard, while race plays a more central role for younger individuals.




Figure 2.3 Age and Racial Identity. Numbers in percentages.



Racial identity across income groups has a slightly different pattern than for age. In terms of public regard, individuals in the \$21,000 to \$35,000 category have the highest levels of public regard overall, with only 15 percent of respondents believing whites have the least respect for blacks; however, these are not statistically significant differences across income groups. Moving to private regard, there is a significant difference, as respondents in the lowest income category have a lower private regard. Substantively, over three-fourths of respondents still have the highest private regard, but this is 6 to 10 percent lower than higher-income individuals. Overall, lower-income individuals still have high levels of respect for blacks and for being black; as fewer than 2 percent scored a 2 or 1. For centrality, there is almost no variation across the modal category, as there is less than a 2 percent range across income categories for those scoring a 3, with wealthier individuals (\$36,000 or more) having a slightly higher likelihood of saying race is most central to their self-concept (4).

Across each measure of identity, there is more variation by levels of education. In terms of public regard, individuals with higher levels of education scored higher, while those with less than a high school diploma were most likely to score a 1 (22.2 percent), although this is not a statistically significant




Figure 2.4 Income and Racial Identity. Numbers in percentages. Bottom scale in thousands of dollars.

difference. Individuals with more education were also more likely to score higher on private regard, with 88 percent of those with a college degree or higher scoring a 4, compared to only 78 percent of those with less than a high school diploma. Once again, regardless of education, less than 2 percent of individuals scored less than a 3 on private regard, but higher levels of education clearly lead to greater self-efficacy.

Finally, race plays a larger role in capturing one’s self-concept for those with more education. Those with at least some college had significantly higher scores on centrality than those with a high school diploma or less. While the modal category of 3 does not vary much, the difference is in those with the highest levels of centrality (4) and those who scored a 2. Those with at least some college were more likely to score a 4 or report that race plays a more central role in their life, while those with a high school degree or less were more likely to score a 2.

Next, we examine partisan identification. Not surprisingly, nearly 75 percent of respondents are Democrats, with only about 5 percent Republicans. Therefore, we code party into two categories: Democrat and Republican/Independent. Figure 2.6 shows that Democrats are slightly more likely to score lower on public regard while more likely to score higher on private regard.




Figure 2.5 Education and Racial Identity. Numbers in percentages.




Figure 2.6 Partisanship and Racial Identity. Numbers in percentages.




Figure 2.7 Urban Residence and Racial Identity. Numbers in percentages.

However, there is no statistically significant difference between party and centrality. While there is no partisan difference in terms of the central role race plays for blacks, Democrats do have statistically significant, but substantively minor differences in terms of both public and private regard than Republicans and Independents.

Turning to where the respondents live, Figure 2.7 looks at the relationship between racial identity and how urban the area is where a respondent lives. We categorize urban into three categories based on the percentage of a respondent's county population that is considered urban by the 2000 Census. Overall, the respondents live in highly urban counties with a mean urban population of 80.5 percent. Accordingly, the Low Urban category is for respondents living in a county with less than 75 percent of the population considered urban, Moderate Urban for counties with a population between 75 and 96 percent urban, and High Urban is for counties with an urban population greater than 96 percent.<sup>16</sup> We find similar relationships across the three racial identity measures and where a respondent lives. Individuals from low urban counties, on average, have slightly higher public regard (categories 3 and 4) while centrality is also slightly higher (modal category) compared to those from moderate and high urban counties.

Finally, Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the relationship between racial identity and region. Figure 2.8 maps the mean level of identity by state. Here we find very little regional difference, and regression models confirm there is no statistical difference for any of the racial identity measures by region of the country. Figure 2.9 breaks this down between southern and non-southern states to ascertain differences in this historically unique region. As the figure shows, there is no southern exceptionalism in terms of racial identity. There is no statistically significant difference for any of the three measures, while centrality shows the most variation, with southerners saying race plays a 4 percent (combining categories 3 and 4) more central role than non-southerners. The differences between region for both public and private regard vary by 3 percent or less across each category. Overall, there appears to be little regional variation in terms of racial identity among blacks, suggesting racial identity is an American construct and not one driven by regional factors.

This descriptive analysis highlights that racial identity is not a proxy for demographics. While we do show some statistically significant variation between the identity measures and demographics in the bivariate comparisons, most importantly, the modal category remains the same for all measures of identity




Figure 2.8 Racial Identity by State.




Figure 2.9 Region and Racial Identity. Numbers in percentages.

across all the demographics. In every bivariate comparison shown in Figures 2.2 through 2.8, the modal category is always a 2 for public regard, a 4 for private regard (or 1 for our collapsed measure), and a 3 for centrality. While there is some variation around the means for these categories, there is no clear demographic category that is a driving influence on racial identity. This suggests that racial identity is a separate concept not captured by any specific demographic traits, and that the influence of racial identity is independent and separate from any underlying demographic or socioeconomic factor.

### Analytical Strategy

**General Expectations.** To provide a baseline for our analytical expectations, we discuss the general relationships we expect to emerge for our three identity measures. Within each upcoming chapter, we provide specific hypotheses based on the dependent variable we are testing and greater context for understanding these relationships. In every analysis, we code the various dependent variables so that stronger agreement equates to stronger racial feelings, attitudes, or behaviors. Therefore, when we discuss a positive relationship, we are referring to one in which, as the strength of the identity dimension increases, so does the strength of agreement with the feeling, attitude, or behavior tested. Conversely, a negative relationship denotes that as the strength of the identity dimension increases, the strength of disagreement toward the dependent variable under question becomes stronger.

Throughout the analysis, we generally expect a positive relationship for racial centrality. As race becomes a more central dimension in a person's identity, they should have stronger and more agreeable views towards race-centric issues. We have similar expectations for private regard. The more pride someone feels toward their race, the more likely they are to express agreement towards race-related topics. However, our general expectations for public regard go in the opposite direction. We should see a negative relationship here, as the more someone thinks whites have a positive view of blacks, they should be less likely to favor racially or black-specific attitudes or policies. Table 2.2 shows these general expectations by chapter topic. The one major exception to these general expectations is the analysis of social dominance orientation (chapter 3). Here we expect a negative relationship for both private regard and centrality. As we discuss in detail in chapter 3, social dominance orientation refers to one's acceptance of group hierarchies in society. Given the history of race relations and white

control in our society, we do not believe that individuals for whom race plays a central role in their identity or have pride in being black will be likely to accept group hierarchies. Additionally, in chapter 6 we test a few questions in which the expectations are reversed due to the question wording; however, for each of these questions the general pattern holds, with the expectations for centrality and private regard running opposite of public regard.

TABLE 2.2 General Expectations

DEPENDENT VARIABLES	PUBLIC REGARD	PRIVATE REGARD	CENTRALITY
Chapter 3. Social Dominance Orientation	-	-	-
Chapter 4. Black Nationalism and Racial Attitudes	-	+ (possibly - for racial attitudes)	+
Chapter 5. Policy Attitudes	-	+	+
Chapter 6. Political Participation	- in most cases, + for others	+ in most cases, - for others	+ in most cases, - for others

Methods. As with many survey questions, the concepts we analyze are primarily in a Likert scale format, in which respondents pick their level of agreement with a given question. In our case, most of the questions had four categories to choose from: “strongly disagree,” “somewhat disagree,” “somewhat agree,” and “strongly agree.”<sup>17</sup> For the participation questions in chapter 6, we rely on dichotomous coding of 1 for someone indicating they took part in an activity, and 0 if they did not. Therefore, our analysis in chapters 3–5 uses the same methods, and we present the results in a similar manner. Chapter 6 uses a slightly different but related empirical model and follows the same presentation of the results as the previous chapters. This allows the reader the opportunity to see the results in a comparable and common format and,

hopefully, lessens the statistical confusion for anyone not well acquainted with social science statistical methodology. In the rest of this section, we discuss the methodological details of the upcoming analysis, so we can focus on the substantive relationships between racial identity and attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in the remaining chapters.

Before turning to our modeling choices, it is important to understand the setup of the dependent variables examined. Throughout most of the analyses, we examine individual survey questions related to the topic at hand. We often examine multiple related questions to provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the broader relationship under investigation, like the role that racial identity plays in shaping attitudes towards public policy. However, in a few areas, such as black nationalism and social dominance orientation, we investigate index variables created from multiple individual questions. In these cases we use the index variables, as they are well accepted and common in other research in this area and allow our findings to be consistent and comparable with these studies. As discussed in the chapters, we code these on the same 1–4 scale to be consistent with the other analyses in the manuscript.<sup>18</sup> This allows us to present a similar and consistent look to the discussion of the results. In these cases, we ran the models in a variety of formats (additive models, mean models in an interval and not ordinal manner) and found similar results. The use of both individual measures and indexed outcomes also adds a layer of robustness to our overall argument.

Given the categorical nature of the dependent variables tested, we rely on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) throughout the analysis. Maximum likelihood models are appropriate when the measure is ordinal and broken into a small number of categories without a clear and definable distance between the categories. MLE provides the ability to produce consistent and efficient estimators in a situation where Ordinary Least Squares regression does not.<sup>19</sup> Specifically, the models in chapters 3–5 use ordered logit since we have four possible outcomes, and in chapter 6 we rely on logit models, as the dependent variables are dichotomous.<sup>20</sup>

While MLE models provide a computationally efficient and appropriate way to determine statistical relationships between variables, the coefficients do not tell us anything about the practical or substantive importance of the relationship. The model results provide the direction of the relationship and the overall level of statistical significance, but not a direct understanding for the coefficient. For



each of the identity measures, a positive result indicates that as a person goes from lower to higher levels of identity, their likelihood of agreeing or having done a behavior increases, while a negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the identity scores leads to more disagreement with a statement or not having taken part in a behavior. To understand the meaning of the coefficients, we turn to post-estimation predicted probabilities to provide a substantive understanding of the model findings.<sup>21</sup>

While there are a variety of ways to express these relationships, we are most interested in the way each measure of identity influences the likelihood of a respondent selecting a specific outcome to a question (i.e., strongly agree, strongly disagree, etc.). To capture this relationship, we present bar graphs across the range of answers to a question (DV). Within each answer option, we show the likelihood that a person with a specific identity score would select that option. For the centrality and public regard measures, the four scores from lowest to highest appear within each DV question option (strongly disagree to strongly agree), and the private regard measure includes the collapsed two categories (Higher and Lower) for each answer option. This setup allows us easily to compare the influence of identity within each answer option and highlights not only the general likelihood of responses but also the change across the answer given a change in identity.

For all of the predicted probability figures, we present the influence of identity for the average respondent in the sample. This allows us to show the most generalizable influence as we hold all the other variables at the mean for interval variables or modal categories for categorical variables.<sup>22</sup> Finally, we include 95 percent confidence bars in the bar charts. The easiest way to think of these bars is indicating when there is a statistically significant difference between moving from one level of identity to another within an answer option.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, when the bars do not overlap, there is a statistical likelihood that there is a nonzero relationship for the influence of racial identity. In most cases, we find this statistical relationship when comparing moving from the lowest to highest levels of an identity score. For most analyses, we present the findings for the significant identity variables in the models, as the predicted probabilities are uninteresting and uninformative when the models do not show any statistical significance. In those cases, there is essentially no difference among levels of racial identity when explaining the likelihood of someone holding a particular view.

**Control Variables.** An important component of any analysis is controlling for competing factors that may also influence an attitude or behavior. In general, we rely on common demographic and contextual arguments to control for these factors.<sup>24</sup> Within each chapter we discuss specific variables that relate to the concept and discuss their role in explaining the concept. In Table 2.3 we list the control variables used in the various analyses along with a description of the variable and the appropriate summary statistics. We also include the models for which these variables appear. The most common variables are the standard demographic information for the respondents. Looking at Table 2.3, the average respondent is a 44-year-old female with a high school education who lives in the south with an annual household income of roughly \$30,000.

Our analyses first establish important descriptive details about the dependent variables to give context to the findings for racial identity. We then examine the role of racial identity in multivariate models and discuss the findings in an approachable and straightforward manner. Each chapter also looks at important findings for the control variables in comparison to the racial identity relationships. Finally, in each chapter we compare our results to models using the common single-item measures of closeness and linked fate. We provide these model results in the appendix. We do this to provide a comparison to the traditional research in this area. Linked fate is similar to centrality. While closeness is similar to private regard, no traditional measure is comparable to public regard. This allows us to compare our findings to what the traditional research shows in these areas and discuss where the multi-dimensional approach provides not only new insights but also confirms previous results. Overall, the upcoming analyses give us an opportunity to explore the role of racial identity across a spectrum of topics along with other important aspects related to the lives of blacks in America.

## Conclusion

This chapter has provided the details of our data, measures, and analytical strategies. We have established that our three measures of identity are important, independent concepts and are not simply proxies for other demographic components. This chapter is the reference for understanding the analytical details provided in chapters 3–6. The next chapters jump into the analysis and show the influence of racial centrality, private regard, and public regard across a range of concepts while controlling for multiple alternative factors of influence.

TABLE 2.3 Summary of Control Variables

VARIABLE (DATA CODING)	MEAN (SD)	% RESPONDING	N	NOTES	MODELS
<b>GENDER</b>			2137		All
Male (0)		32.43	693		
<b>Female (1)</b>		67.57	1444		
<b>AGE</b> ( <i>in years</i> )	44.32 (16.04)		2137		All
<b>HOUSEHOLD INCOME</b> ( <i>in \$1,000s</i> )	33.34 (28.13)		2137		All
<b>EDUCATION</b>			2137		All
Some High School or Less (1)		26.35	563		
<b>High School (2)</b>		37.20	795		
Some College (3)		22.55	482		
College Degree or More (4)		13.90	297		
<b>BLACK MEDIA CONSUMPTION</b>	3 (0.67)		2102	Mean composite score of six questions (1–4 range)	BN, Part, Attitude, Policy
<b>NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME</b> <b>Not at All True (1)</b>		40.96	2096 856	People often get mugged, robbed, or attacked in neighborhood;	BN, Part, Attitude

Not Very True (2)	37.08	775	higher values equal more crime	
Somewhat True (3)	15.89	332		
Very True (4)	6.08	127		
<b>DISCRIMINATION</b>		2070	More or less than 20 years ago	BN, Attitude, Policy
Same (1)	31.21	646		
<b>Less (0)</b>	54.44	1127		
More (2)	14.35	297		
<b>RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE</b>		1987		BN
Nearly Every Day (1)	9.86	196		
At Least Once a Week (2)	20.33	404		
A Few Times a Month (3)	26.37	524		
<b>A Few Times a Year (4)</b>	37.44	744		
Less Than Once a Year (5)	5.99	119		
<b>MEMBER OF BLACK ORGANIZATIONS</b>		2127		BN, Policy
<b>No (0)</b>	88.15	1875		
Yes (1)	11.85	252		
<b>POLITICAL IDEOLOGY</b>		1845		BN, Attitude, Policy
Conservative (0)	30.03	554		
<b>Moderate (1)</b>	38.27	706		
Liberal (2)	31.71	585		

*(continues on next page)*

Table 2.3 (cont'd)

VARIABLE (DATA CODING)	MEAN (SD)	% RESPONDING	N	NOTES	MODELS
<b>REGION</b>			2137	Includes states in Confederacy (- Arkansas which did not have any respondents) + Oklahoma and Maryland	All
Non-South (0)		35.33	755		
<b>South (1)</b>		64.67	1382		
<b>SOCIAL DOMINANCE</b>	4.06 (3.02)		2069	0–12 sum of questions	Part, Policy
<b>NEIGHBORHOOD COHESION</b>	2.80 (0.65)		2125	Mean of questions range from 1–4	Part
<b>POLITICAL PARTY</b>					Part
<b>Strong Democrat (1)</b>		56.79	903		
Moderate Democrat (2)		35.91	571		
Strong Republican (3)		3.52	56		
Moderate Republican (4)		3.71	60		

VARIABLE; **modal group within a variable**

All = variable appears in all models; BN = black nationalism model in chapter 4; Attitude = racial attitudes model in chapter 4; Policy = policy views model in chapter 5; Part = participation models in chapter 6

### 3 Social Dominance Orientation

Since the first Africans arrived in the United States around 1619, blacks have had to deal with group-based domination and oppression. This domination and oppression has been termed by social scientists as social dominance orientation (SDO) and has been demonstrated in many different ways, but none more legitimating than laws creating a hierarchy of human value based on race. For example, the United States Constitution affirmed slave trading and human enslavement. Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution states

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year one-thousand-eight-hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.<sup>1</sup>

Legally, from this point on, blacks had no social status, no respect as legitimate human beings (often described as “beasts, brutes, and savages”<sup>2</sup>), and no political rights. Blacks were more beneficial to their masters as slaves than as indentured servants, as Frederick Douglass indicated when he asked, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?”<sup>3</sup> He continued,

I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you this day rejoice are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity, and independence bequeathed by your father is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight has brought life and healing to you

has brought stripes and death to me. The Fourth of July is yours, not mine.<sup>4</sup>

The Dred Scott case (*Dred Scott v. Sanford*, 60 U.S. 393, 1857) was another decision that explicitly created a group-based hierarchy (e.g., a differentiation between blacks and whites). Dred Scott, a slave, lived with his master John Emerson in Missouri, where slavery was legal, and they often spent time in Wisconsin and Illinois, where slavery was prohibited. Upon Emerson's death, Scott sued for his freedom, claiming that he was a free citizen since he was in a territory that prohibited slavery. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney concluded that Dred Scott was a slave.

Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all.<sup>5</sup>

In 1865 and 1866 and well into the 1970s, through the use of "black codes" and later Jim Crow laws, governments in the South enacted laws regulating the lives of former slaves. For example, in Alabama, white nurses were not allowed to be in the same room as blacks. In Arizona, whites could not marry blacks; if they did, the marriage was null and void. In Florida, whites could serve twelve months in jail or pay a \$500 fine for marrying blacks; in Georgia, no one white was allowed to bury someone who was black.

In 1896 the Supreme Court of the United States took up the case *Homer Adolph Plessy v. Ferguson* (163 U.S. 537, 1896), which challenged the Jim Crow laws in Louisiana. Plessy, on June 7, 1892, was sent to jail for sitting in a railroad car reserved for whites. At that time the Louisiana law required blacks to sit in separate railroad cars. The Louisiana Supreme Court decided that Plessy was guilty, and Plessy appealed the lower court ruling to the United States Supreme Court. Judge Henry Brown, writing for the majority, argued

That [the Separate Car Act] does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery . . . is too clear for argument. . . .

A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races. . . . The object of the Fourteenth Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.<sup>6</sup>

The ramifications of this decision were that the principle of “separate but equal” was acceptable based on color alone. With the Compromise of 1877, the South went back to its old ways—forbidding blacks from participating in government and creating a segregationist society. During this period, blacks had no representation in government; white southerners, often through laws and intimidation, prevented blacks from voting or participating in electoral politics. Laws such as white primaries, grandfather clauses, literacy tests, understanding clauses, and poll taxes automatically disqualified blacks from voting.<sup>7</sup>

These and other laws gave legitimacy and rationale early on in American history for the creation of race-based hierarchy and oppression of blacks. Given a theoretical chance to support group-based hierarchy and domination of other groups, would blacks support such desires? How does black racial identity factor into social dominance sentiments? There has been a great deal of scholarly attention devoted to understanding the individual and structural factors that contribute to social dominance orientation, as it is one of the most robust predictors of prejudicial views towards differing groups.

Previous work indicates that SDO correlates with various forms of group membership, such as gender and ethnicity.<sup>8</sup> For example, the difference between the SDO of men and women tends to increase when gender identification is high and decrease when gender identification is low.<sup>9</sup> However, the role of racial identity (especially among blacks) is visibly absent in our understanding of the influences on SDO. Morrison and Ybarra’s article provides an initial exploration with one aspect of identity; they found that heightened racial identity (centrality), measured similar to ours, among group members who perceive a realistic out-group threat can heighten their SDO.<sup>10</sup> In this chapter we build from Morrison



and Ybarra's initial contribution by expanding on the role of racial identity on an individual's SDO, or tendency to embrace acceptance of group hierarchies.

Therefore, we use our three domains (racial centrality, private regard, and public regard) to investigate how different racial identities within an individual's self-concept interact and affect his or her beliefs about SDO. We argue, generally, that the various dimensions of racial identity will influence blacks' SDO—in that higher racial centrality, private regard, and public regard will be associated with lower SDO.

### Variables Affecting Social Dominance Orientation

Sidanius and Pratto define social dominance orientation (SDO) as “the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of inferior groups by superior groups.”<sup>11</sup> In other words, “it is the extent to which people desire dominance of the in-group over the out-group.”<sup>12</sup> In a practical sense, social dominance is “expressed in individual acts of discrimination and participation in intergroup and institutional processes that produce better outcomes” for the dominant group.<sup>13</sup>

For example, Sidanius, et al., explains it as follows:

Many social institutions (e.g., schools, organized religions, marriage practices, financial houses) and many powerful individuals disproportionately allocate desired goods—such as prestige, wealth, power, food, and health-care—to members of dominant and privileged groups, while directing undesirable things—such as dangerous work, disdain, imprisonment, and premature death—toward members of less powerful groups.<sup>14</sup>

In other words, acts of social dominance are often subtle, but the consequences are devastating to those who are not a part of the dominant group.

As further noted by the researchers, social dominance theory integrates ideas from previous theories, and some of these include realistic group conflict theories, social identity theory, and evolutionary psychology.<sup>15</sup> SDO is measured in multiple ways. The most often used scale is a single-dimensional measure, which includes either 14 items (SDO5) or 16 items (SDO6). Sample statements include the following: “Superior groups should dominate”; “Inferior groups should stay in their place”; and “It is sometimes necessary to use force against

other groups.” After 50 samples from over ten countries and roughly 20,000 respondents, psychometric properties of the SDO scales have been shown to have “high levels of internal and cross-time reliability, construct validity, and discriminant validity.”<sup>16</sup>

However, Jost and Thompson developed a multidimensional measure of social dominance orientation.<sup>17</sup> These dimensions measure “general opposition to equality” (seven items) and “group-based dominance” (seven items). Opposition to equality is defined as “system justification construct,” and “it is negatively predicted by personality variables related to empathy and universalism and it in turn predicts resistance to changing the status quo.”<sup>18</sup> Group-based dominance is defined similarly to that of Sidanius and Pratto, in that it “captures preference for one’s own group compared to those of others, and it is driven by negative attitudes toward the out-group and the belief that the world is a competitive, zero sum, place.”<sup>19</sup>

Sample statements for general opposition to equality include the following: “(It is) alright if people do not have equal chances”; “Forcing equal treatment creates more problems”; “Increased social equality is desirable”; and “Not obligated to help others.” Sample statements for the group-based dominance are similar to SDO5 and SDO6 measures, although worded differently. These include: It is “sometimes necessary to use force against others”; “Sometimes other groups need to be kept in their place”; “No group is inferior to any other group”; and “Other groups need to stay in their place.” Findings from Jost and Thompson’s study show that “items on the SDO scale tend to separate into two correlated factors or subscales, one of which taps attitudes pertaining to in-group vs. out-group competition, and the other of which taps general attitudes toward egalitarianism in the social system.”<sup>20</sup>

Social dominance theorists have examined both individual and structural factors that contribute to one’s tolerance of group-based hierarchy. In general, social dominance increases with age, political conservatism, and socioeconomic status.<sup>21</sup> Older individuals and those with more money tend to be more tolerant of group-based hierarchy than the poor and younger generations. The same can be said for political conservatives: their value system reflects more tolerance for group-based hierarchies than the liberal value system.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, social dominance decreases with education: individuals with a higher education are less likely to express feelings of social dominance.<sup>23</sup>

The influence of gender on SDO has also been widely studied. The most robust finding is that men tend to be more socially dominant than women,

even in the most gender-egalitarian countries in the world.<sup>24</sup> Studies confirm that the gender gap in SDO does not change significantly with variations in cultural background, ethnicity, age, social class, religion, political ideology, or gender-role orientation.<sup>25</sup>

Among the structural factors that influence levels of SDO, group status is believed to be one of the primary determinants. Previous research emphasizes that members of high-status groups have higher levels of SDO than members of low-status groups.<sup>26</sup> That is, high-status groups tend to have “hierarchy-enhancing” values, while low-status groups usually hold “hierarchy-attenuating” values. For example, whites have higher SDO than blacks, and individuals with a higher socioeconomic status have higher SDO than those of lower status. According to social dominance theory, this is because high-status groups want to maintain the social and economic benefits that their privileged position affords.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, SDO differences between groups can depend on individuals’ perceptions of relative group status. Studies have shown that there is a greater difference in SDO between groups that are perceived to have a larger gap in social status than between groups that are perceived to be closer in status. For example, Sidanius, et al., found that SDO differences between whites and blacks and between whites and Latinos (i.e., groups that vary widely in status) were larger than SDO differences between whites and Asians or blacks and Latinos (i.e., groups that are closer in status).<sup>28</sup>

In a related study, Levin also examined the interactive effects of group membership and group status on differences in SDO between groups.<sup>29</sup> She collected data in Israel, Northern Ireland, and the United States on arbitrary-set groups (ethnic and religious) as well as objectively defined gender groups. She found that the differences in SDO between the arbitrary-set groups were greater when the status gap between them was perceived to be larger. Specifically, in the U.S. sample she found that among those who perceived the white–black status gap to be large, whites had significantly higher levels of SDO than blacks, and among those who perceived the status gap to be small, whites did not differ from blacks in SDO. However, across all of the samples, gender differences in SDO did not change based on the size of the perceived status gap between men and women; even when the status gap was believed to be very small, men showed higher levels of SDO than women.

Social dominance theory proposes that differences in SDO between arbitrary-set groups can be moderated by group identification. Wilson and Liu

demonstrated that gender in-group identification moderates the gender–SDO relationship, such that increasing in-group identification was associated with increasing SDO scores for males and decreasing SDO scores for females.<sup>30</sup> In a similar study, Dambrun, Duarte, and Guimond tested whether gender identification mediated the effect of sex on SDO, as predicted by the Social Identity Theory (SIT), or, as social dominance theory predicts, SDO mediates the effect of sex on gender identification.<sup>31</sup> They defined and measured gender identification as the extent to which people identify with both men and women, and they found that SDO and identification with men are positively correlated, while SDO and identification with women are negatively correlated. These results provide strong support for the Social Identity Theory model.

Additionally, Morrison and Ybarra argued that SDO can increase as a result of realistic threat, or “perceived obstacles to the ingroup’s position and general welfare,”<sup>32</sup> and that this relationship was moderated by group identification. They assessed how the manipulation of realistic threats from Asian Americans can affect SDO among white Americans, and they found that the effect of a realistic threat on SDO is significantly stronger among highly identified group members than less-identified members. In a second study, they assessed the effects of symbolic threat and group identification on SDO, but this time they evaluated group identification along the lines of political parties. They found that greater identification with the in-group (i.e., increased party identification) was associated with higher SDO for threatened conservatives but lower SDO for threatened liberals. Morrison and Ybarra’s experiment suggests that the effects of symbolic threat and group identification on SDO are contingent upon the in-group’s fundamental political values.<sup>33</sup>

## Expectations

Researchers have examined the relationship between racial identity and various psychological orientations, ideologies, and policy attitudes. Much of their findings demonstrate that racial identity is associated with an overwhelming commitment to an egalitarian value system and social structure. For example, previous work has shown that blacks with higher racial identity show stronger support for hierarchy-attenuating policies such as affirmative action.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, Dawson found that black identity (i.e. believing one’s fate is linked to that of their race) is a strong predictor of support for black feminist orientations and ideology, warmth for

lesbians, and allowing more women to become members of the clergy.<sup>35</sup> These findings lead us to predict that higher racial identity will correlate with lower social dominance, and later we discuss these reasons for each measure individually.

Morrison and Ybarra argue that “SDO can reflect conformity to the social and political values of the ingroup, especially among highly identified members.”<sup>36</sup> In other words, high SDO is a manifestation of hierarchy-enhancing values, while low SDO is a reflection of hierarchy-attenuating values. Thus, in groups that endorse hierarchy-enhancing values (i.e., high SDO) like whites, higher ingroup identification was associated with higher SDO. Conversely, in groups that supported hierarchy-attenuating values (i.e., low SDO) like blacks, individuals who identified more strongly with the group showed lower SDO.

Thus for centrality, we expect:

Those for whom race plays a more central role in their life will show less support for group-based domination.

Turning to the regard measures, Levin’s study demonstrates that individuals vary in their perceptions of how society views their group, and this variation has a significant effect on between-group differences in SDO.<sup>37</sup> When whites perceive the status gap between whites and blacks to be larger, they demonstrate higher levels of SDO than do blacks; however, this difference disappears for individuals who perceive the group differences to be small. We build from these findings to generate expectations for within-group differences on SDO. For private regard, we expect:

Those who have a more positive feeling about being black to show less support for group-based domination.

Individuals with higher private regard are proud to be black, and this pride should limit their support for group hierarchy or domination.

For public regard, we expect a negative relationship as well:

Those who have a more positive view of how others see black will show less support for group-based domination.

However, this expectation could also run in the other direction. Based on previous work that demonstrated higher group status elicited a greater desire to maintain a hierarchy which benefitted the in-group, we might expect that blacks who perceive that others view their racial group more positively (higher public regard)

would have higher SDO than those who perceive that out-groups view them more negatively. However, if Morrison and Ybarra's theory is correct, and SDO can represent a group's attempt to protect its core values, then we should find that blacks with a stronger racial identity will be less tolerant of social hierarchies.

## Methods

**Dependent Variable: Social Dominance Measure.** To examine the relationship between racial identity and SDO, we use a modified version of the 16-item SDO scale that measures only the group-based dominance items.<sup>38</sup> Jost and Thompson found that the SDO scale was two-dimensional—one measuring general opposition to equality and another measuring group-based domination. Since NSAL only asks a limited number of questions pertaining to SDO, we are limited to using only the group-based domination measure. For the group-based domination measure, we created a composite score from responses to the following four statements:

Winning is more important than how the game is played.

We should try to get ahead by any means necessary.

Sometimes war is necessary to put other nations in their place.

Inferior groups of people should stay in their place.

All of the questions were coded using a 4-point Likert scale, from 1) "strongly disagree" to 4) "strongly agree." The reliability coefficient (alpha) was 0.73, and based on this, we combine the four questions into a single social dominance orientation scale. We create a mean score with categories 1–4 with higher values indicating a higher SDO. Table 3.1 breaks down the scores for the group-based domination SDO index. Nearly three-fourths of the respondents are on the lower end of the scale, with nearly half scoring 2 on the 4-point scale, while another 26 percent scored 1. This shows that most blacks do not view group-based inequalities and hierarchies as an acceptable part of society. While 23 percent of the respondents did rank in the third category or showing a higher SDO viewpoint, only 5 percent fall into the highest category. This fits with Levin's finding that blacks have lower levels of SDO, overall, compared to whites.<sup>39</sup> In the analysis, we combine the highest two categories into one to create a 3-point

scale as the dependent variable due to the small number of individuals falling into the highest category. The bottom two rows of Table 3.1 show the breakdown by these categories.

Given the range of social dominance scores, we examine the mean responses by state to look for any underlying distribution of social dominance orientation across the country. Figure 3.1 shows the mean score by state. We present four categories, with the lowest being any state with a mean score one standard deviation below the mean for all states, and lower equaling a mean state score between one standard deviation below the mean and the mean. Higher corresponds to a mean state score between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean, and states in the highest category have a mean score greater than one standard deviation above the mean. Here we find some regional patterns, with southern states having higher social dominance scores, as Mississippi stands out with the highest score. A *t*-test confirms there is a statistically significant relationship as well. It is worth noting there are several western states with higher-than-average scores, most notably Arizona.

**Analytical Strategy and Model Selection.** In this analysis, we present ordered logit models for the 3-category index of SDO to capture the independent variables of interest. The data has been weighted to account for nonresponse variations.<sup>40</sup> As a robustness check, we ran the model with an additive SDO index using Ordinary Least Squares regression and found the same results. Our three racial identity

TABLE 3.1 Descriptives of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION	%	n
Low SDO	25.50	534
Middle SDO	46.80	980
High + Highest SDO	27.70	580
High SDO	22.92	480
Highest SDO	4.78	100
<b>Totals</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2094</b>

measures are the focus of the analysis. However, we control for other important explanatory variables to better account for the relationship between identity and SDO. Here we focus on certain demographic variables that previous research shows to be significant for explaining SDO. We expect females, older individuals, high-income earners, and the more educated to show less support for SDO. For more details on the variables used in the analysis and for variable measurements, see Table 2.3 in Chapter 2.

### Results

In Table 3.2, we find that both private and public regard, as expected, are negatively related to SDO. However, there is no relationship between racial centrality and SDO. Individuals with higher levels of racial pride and those who are more likely to believe other races respect blacks are less likely to support group-based domination or hierarchies in society. Additionally, each of the statistically significant control variables is negatively related to SDO. However, living in the South is not a statistically significant predictor of social dominance orientation. This is somewhat surprising given the results in Figure 3.1, but a multivariate analysis at the individual level shows that where a person lives is not as important as their racial identity, in terms of both public and private regard. People with higher social dominance scores tend to live in the South; however, living in the South is not necessarily a cause of these attitudes. Given the established roles of




Figure 3.1 Social Dominance Orientation by State



TABLE 3.2 Models Results for Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

VARIABLES	SDO
Centrality	0.0677 (0.0765)
Private Regard	-0.6926*** (0.1454)
Public Regard	-0.1332* (0.0658)
Gender	-0.3003** (0.1070)
Age (in years)	-0.0174*** (0.0035)
Household Income (in \$1,000s)	-0.0063** (0.0024)
Education	-0.3318*** (0.0621)
South	0.0965 (0.1087)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-3.7962*** (0.4155)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	-1.5304*** (0.4024)
Observations	2026

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Ordered Logit

demographics in explaining SDO, it is not surprising that being female, older, or with a higher income or level of education predicts someone’s SDO. These expected results, in terms of statistical significance, give us more confidence that racial identity, at least in private and public regard, is an important component for understanding SDO as well.

To get a better substantive understanding of these results, we present the predicted probabilities for the regard measures in Figure 3.2. For private regard, the figure shows a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of having a low SDO for individuals with the highest private regard, while this is a 15 percent decrease in the likelihood of having a high private regard and a high SDO. There is no discernible relationship between private regard and the middle SDO category. While the model reports a statistically significant influence for public regard, the probabilities suggest a modest relationship at best. There is an 8 percent decrease from the lowest to highest levels of public regard in the low SDO category, and a 7 percent decrease from the lowest to highest levels in the high SDO category. The larger confidence interval bars suggest this is a less reliable relationship than found for private regard.




Figure 3.2 Predicted Probabilities for SDO

To provide a comparison for these results, we computed the predicted probabilities for each of the significant control variables, holding all other variables at their mean or modal value. Gender and income (comparing one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean) predicted a 5–6 percent difference in the low and high SDO categories, while age (using the standard deviation comparison) showed about a 10–12 percent change. These results are similar to the influence of public and private regard, while education stood out with about a 20 percent change between the highest and lowest education categories.

## Conclusion

The findings reveal that blacks' sense of racial identity significantly predicts their support of social dominance to a similar degree as important demographic factors. Individuals' endorsement of hierarchy-legitimizing ideology depends on the meaning of race in their lives—specifically, how positively or negatively they feel about their racial group (i.e., private regard) and how they perceive that others view their racial group (i.e., public regard). As predicted, greater racial group perception (public regard) was related to lower SDO. Individuals who believe that others view blacks more positively are less likely to desire and support group-based domination.

At first our results may seem counterintuitive, based on previous research that shows that higher-group status or perception of higher-group status elicits greater SDO. However, when we take into account group values, our results actually make sense. We know from other studies that members of prestigious or high-status groups generally have higher levels of SDO than do members of subordinate or low-status groups. This is presumably because support for group-based inequality (i.e., high SDO) is consistent with the interests of high-status groups, which are motivated to protect their in-group's power and resources, while low-status groups are motivated to level the playing field and thus seek to abate group-based inequality.

Morrison and Ybarra argue that “SDO can reflect conformity to the social and political values of the ingroup, especially among highly identified members.”<sup>41</sup> In other words, high SDO is a manifestation of hierarchy-enhancing values, while low SDO is a reflection of hierarchy-attenuating values. When we consider this effect on an individual level within groups, and apply Social Identity Theory, we

can understand the present findings even better. According to Social Identity Theory, individuals who highly identify with their group show stronger support for their group's values. Thus, in groups that endorse hierarchy-enhancing values (i.e., high SDO) like whites, high in-group identification is associated with higher SDO. Conversely, as we see in the present study, in groups that support hierarchy-attenuating values (i.e., low SDO) like blacks, individuals who have greater racial pride show lower SDO.

In addition to racial identity, certain demographic factors also influence an individual's SDO. As expected, we find that females and more educated individuals are less likely to desire and support group-based dominance. This finding seems to support the "invariance hypothesis" that states that men tend to be more socially dominant than women regardless of other demographic or socio-economic factors.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, contrary to previous studies that indicate that older individuals and those with a higher income tend to be more tolerant of group-based hierarchy, we find that individuals in the higher age group and higher income category are less likely to express feelings of social dominance. It is interesting that amongst blacks, at least in this sample, we find that certain demographic factors have the opposite effect on SDO as found for other groups, namely whites. It is possible that black racial identity plays a mediating role in the relationship between SDO and income and age. This is something future racial identity research can explore.

Some studies have begun to investigate the relationship between group identification and SDO and have found that SDO is correlated with several forms of group identification, including gender and ethnicity. However, these studies are limited in two major ways. First, they have only investigated between group differences, despite the fact that there is considerable variation in SDO scores within each of these groups. Second, instead of measuring group identity, previous works have mistakenly used basic group membership as an indicator of identification. For example, Sidanius, et al., looked at differences in SDO across a number of ethnic groups.<sup>43</sup> But merely categorizing individuals into racial groups does not represent their racial identity. Just because an individual is assigned to a particular racial group does not mean he or she necessarily identifies as a member or with the group in the same way.

We also ran models with linked fate and closeness measures. We find neither of these measures have an influence on SDO. Thus, this chapter highlights the importance of expanding the conceptualization and measurement of

racial identity in a more accurate and applicable way. This study illustrates how a multidimensional measure can expand our understanding of the nature and effects of racial identity. By using a multidimensional measure of racial identity, we were able to see that it is not the significance of race that influences blacks' SDO; rather, it is their evaluative judgments that matter.

## 4 Black Nationalism and Racial Attitudes

In a 2012 interview with *Black Enterprise* magazine, President Barack Obama responded to criticism that his administration had not done enough to support black businesses by saying, “I’m not the President of Black America. I’m the president of the United States of America.”<sup>1</sup> Echoing concerns in the black community, Bernard Anderson, a leading black economist and veteran of the civil rights movement, vented frustrations with the president’s second inaugural address in a speech at the Black Economic Summit at Howard University over the lack of attention to issues affecting the black community.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, Anderson stated, “He’s not going to run again for anything. He does not deserve a pass anymore. Let him not only find his voice but summon his courage and use his political capital to address racial inequality. He owes that to the black community.”<sup>3</sup>

The hopes that the country’s first black president would bring these concerns to the broader political agenda highlights questions among blacks on the proper role and place of the black community and relations between blacks and whites in American society. A protestor’s sign at a 2008 campaign rally for the then-candidate Obama succinctly summed up these questions: “What about the black community, Obama?”<sup>4</sup> Issues surrounding the relationship between the black community and broader American society are part of the long history of black nationalism. In this chapter, we examine the role black racial identity has on views of black nationalism and racial attitudes more broadly. We start by giving an overview of black nationalistic movements throughout the country’s history and discuss the connection between views of black nationalism and more general racial attitudes, an area that is more often studied from the perspective of whites.

## Study of Black Nationalism

Black nationalism has been a lasting ideological belief among many blacks. However, it is “complex, fluid, and consequently a multidimensional ideology whose core tenets are Black political, economic, and cultural autonomy either within or from White society.”<sup>5</sup> Leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois, Elijah Muhammad, and Marcus Garvey exemplified this multifaceted nature of black nationalism. For example, Du Bois called for a temporary autonomy within the United States. Even though he wanted blacks fully integrated into the American society, he still “encouraged the Negro church, the Negro college, the Negro public school, Negro business and industrial enterprises,” arguing that black institutions “should be made the very best and most efficient institutions of their kind judged by standard; not with the idea of perpetuating artificial separations of mankind, but rather with the distinct objective of proving Negro efficiency, showing Negro ability and discipline and demonstrating how useless and wasteful race segregation is.”<sup>6</sup> Clearly, for Du Bois, separate institutions reflected merely a stage in the evolution of society. He did not wish for permanent segregation. He encouraged separate institutions only because he felt that blacks had to show in this manner that they could succeed.

Conversely, Muhammad (and the Nation of Islam) felt that blacks’ chance of survival would be greater if they looked for a “permanent home for their nation”—a nation within a nation.<sup>7</sup> In other words, blacks possessed their own nation within the United States. This entailed that “it was time that the two people should separate.”<sup>8</sup> For Muhammad, there was no hope for survival of blacks in American society. Yet even though he wanted to separate his people from the white race, his ultimate goal was that they “make the Black nation the equal or superior of the White race.”<sup>9</sup> In this new nation—and only in this new nation—blacks could find “freedom, justice and equality, protection, and universal brotherhood.”<sup>10</sup>

Like Muhammad, Garvey’s vision required blacks to separate themselves from white society. However, in Garvey’s case, this involved returning to Africa. In his view, blacks should have a country of their own where they should be given the fullest opportunity to develop politically, socially, and industrially.<sup>11</sup> The choice of returning to Africa was indicated by his conviction that every human and every race must “return to its own vine and fig tree,” and he agreed with the cry “Africa for Africans.”<sup>12</sup> Garvey’s point was that by migrating to Africa, blacks would be in a better position to acquire respect from all humanity.

Despite the complex nature of black nationalism, it has been conceptualized as an ideological position that advocates such values as

Black self-determination, racial solidarity and group self-reliance, various forms of voluntary racial separation, pride in the historical achievements of those of African descent, a concerted effort to overcome racial self-hate and to instill Black self-love, militant resistance to anti-Black racism, the development and preservation of a distinctive Black ethnocultural identity, and the recognition of Africa as the true homeland of those who are racially Black.<sup>13</sup>

Equally varied is the measurement of black nationalism in research. The most frequently utilized scale has been a “singular, uniform ideology” based on several versions of the following set of statements: black children should learn an African language, blacks should always vote for black candidates when possible, black women should not date white men, black people should shop in black-owned shops whenever possible, black men should not date white women, and black parents should give their children African names.<sup>14</sup> Brown and Shaw, however, delineate black nationalism into two separate (and more specific) dimensions—community nationalism and separatist nationalism. Community nationalism seeks “Black self-determination within the existing social and political arrangement, whereas separatist nationalism seeks autonomy external to these arrangements”—for example, a nation within a nation, as Muhammad advocated.<sup>15</sup> Even so, the vast majority of the questions tapped to measure these domains are the same questions used by those who define autonomy as a singular, uniform ideology; in other words, the multidimensional measure of autonomy simply divides these questions into the community and separatist nationalism categories.<sup>16</sup> In *Black Visions*, Dawson measures black nationalism in a slightly different manner by including statements such as supporting black male academies, community control of government, community control of the economy, and shopping in black stores.<sup>17</sup>

While there are numerous conceptual and operational definitions of black nationalism, scholarly research has taken two tracks: one focuses on factors shaping autonomy sentiments, and the other seeks to understand the effects of black nationalism on behavior. Later, in our discussion of the literature, we will highlight research on the factors shaping black nationalist sentiments. Specifically, the literature is sometimes contradictory on the effects of demographic variables



on support for black nationalism. For example, those who are more likely to support black nationalism are younger, male, higher-income earners, middle class, working class or poor, liberal, religious, believers that Christ was black, Muslim, exposed to higher levels of black media, disillusioned, and members of black organizations.<sup>18</sup>

However, we know much less about the influence of racial identity on black nationalist sentiments, because most of the scholarly attention has been focused on identifying the effects of black nationalist beliefs on behavior. When models control for racial identity, they often rely on linked fate as the measure of identity. In general, studies show linked fate to predict support for black nationalism.<sup>19</sup> Specifically, Brown and Shaw found a significant positive relationship between linked fate and community nationalism, and Dawson shows believing one's fate is linked to that of their race is a strong predictor of economic nationalism. Consequently, using a multidimensional measure of racial identity, we investigate how different racial identities within an individual's self-concept interact and affect his or her support for black nationalism.

### The Study of Racial Attitudes

Although there are countless studies that explore white racial attitudes and the consequences for holding such attitudes, we know much less about black racial attitudes. Research on white racial attitudes often examines the presence of numerous forms of racism, including symbolic racism, modern racism, racial resentment, subtle racism, aversive racism, and racial ambivalence.<sup>20</sup> Sample questions used to tap the different forms of white racial attitudes include the following: "Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States" (symbolic racism); "blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights" (modern racism); "blacks need to work their way up, try harder," and "Slavery has made black success more difficult" (racial resentment); "How different or similar do you think blacks living here are to other white people living here in terms of values taught to children, religious beliefs and practices, sexual values or practices, and language they speak" (subtle racism); "I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black person in a public place" (aversive racism).

Research has shown whites hold a diversity of racial attitudes toward blacks. Smith found that whites often view blacks as lazy, poor, violent, unintelligent, and welfare dependent.<sup>21</sup> Peffley and Hurwitz discovered, through

a national survey, that 31 percent of the respondents accept blacks as lazy, 40 percent consider blacks as complainers, and 50 percent call blacks aggressive.<sup>22</sup> Sears, et al., using ANES data, found “whites regard blacks as less competent than whites and lack policy-management skills, while another study found whites view blacks as lazy and welfare dependent.”<sup>23</sup>

Given the lack of research specifically on black racial attitudes, we rely on the findings from white racial attitudes as a starting point. Generally, research findings on white racial attitudes show that region of the country (i.e., South), racial contexts, socioeconomic environment, along with individual-level variables (i.e., income, gender, age, party) influence white racial attitudes.<sup>24</sup> While we consider many of these variables in our model, we are primarily interested in understanding the influence of racial identity on black racial attitudes.

## Expectations

Generally, we expect racial identity to influence the beliefs of blacks about black nationalism and their overall racial attitudes in very different ways. Starting with black nationalism, for centrality we expect the following:

Those for whom race plays a more central role in their life will show more support for black nationalism.

Those who hold race as a more central identity are more likely to endorse black nationalism. In addition, we believe higher centrality will influence support for black nationalism, because individuals who are high on centrality report more recognition of social barriers and racial prejudice, a recognition that will lead them to want to act to alleviate inequalities.<sup>25</sup>

For private regard, we expect that:

Those who have a more positive feeling about being black will show more support for black nationalism.

Since higher private regard has been shown to be positively correlated with higher nationalist ideology, the expectation here is that the more positive their feelings are toward blacks and their membership in the group, the more likely they are to endorse support for black nationalism.<sup>26</sup>

We expect public regard to work differently:

Those who have a more positive view of how others see blacks will show less support for black nationalism.

The more an individual believes whites and other groups respect blacks, the less likely one is to support black nationalism, as they should not see a need for nationalistic ideas.

Turning to the expectations for racial attitudes, our hypotheses are less straightforward, given the varying questions we use to assess racial attitudes. For centrality, we expect that:

Those for whom race plays a more central role in their life will express more support for differences between whites and blacks.

The more central being black is to someone, the greater differences they will likely see among whites and blacks. In other words, those for whom race is a core part of their individual self-concept are more likely to think in a racial perspective or view the world through a racial lens, as well as to stress greater differences among the races (i.e., hold more extreme racial attitudes).

For private regard, we do not have clear theoretical expectations. There are two plausible arguments that lead to different outcomes. One is that having higher private regard will push people towards perceiving differences between blacks and whites. The other is that having a higher private regard could push people's perceptions in the direction of equality or to see fewer or no differences between whites and blacks. As such, we do not offer a specific hypothesis.

For public regard, we expect that:

Those who have a more positive view of how others see blacks will express less support for differences among whites and blacks.

A higher public regard should lead people to see fewer differences between blacks and whites. A higher public regard shows that people believe society respects blacks, which should also translate to believing there are fewer differences between races.

We also expect certain demographic and social environmental variables to be significant, as cited above. For example, we expect males and high-income earners will show greater support for black nationalism. Additionally, religious individuals will show less support for black nationalism, while those exposed to higher levels of black media, members of black organizations, and those who

believe discrimination is higher today than twenty years ago will have greater support for black nationalism. We also control for crime, whereas many studies in this area do not. We do so because there is extensive research that shows that it has an effect on social and political behavior. Those who experience crime are likely to lose trust in government, withdraw from society, have a sense of helplessness, develop survival strategies that restrict interpersonal contact, and experience a decrease in interpersonal trust.<sup>27</sup> Thus, we hypothesize that those exposed to higher levels of crime will have stronger black nationalist sentiments, because it creates societal and political disillusionment.

### Analysis

**Dependent Variables.** To test these expectations, we examine one composite measure of black nationalism generated from responses to four questions:

- Blacks should vote for black candidates.
- Blacks should form their own political party.
- Blacks should shop at black-owned stores.
- Blacks should give their children African names.<sup>28</sup>

Each response is coded from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4), and we use a mean score of these responses, scaled to the same 1–4 categories, to create the overall nationalism index, with larger values indicating stronger black nationalist views. Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of these views. There is a fairly even distribution across the four categories, with a majority of individuals showing less nationalistic tendencies (scores of 1 or 2), while 28 percent of the responses show more support for nationalism (score of 3). Only 14 percent of individuals scored in the highest category of nationalism. Overall, black support for nationalistic values ranges across the board, with a slight majority showing a less nationalistic bent.

Unlike with black nationalism, we use six separate models to capture racial attitudes. These are the common battery of questions asked of whites in measuring their racial attitudes, and we reproduce these as they generally appear in the literature. The six statements are as follows:

- If minorities fail, they should blame themselves.
- Minorities and whites teach kids different values.
- Racial differences are part of God's plan.

Minorities are born with less ability than whites.

Whites and minorities are not comfortable around each other.

Diversity may tear the United States apart.

The statements were coded on a 4-point Likert scale—from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). We decided against aggregating these six statements into a composite measure for the following equally important reasons. First, the statements are independent of one another; second, in aggregating, we may lose the differing effects of racial identity across different areas. The questions on teaching different values, racial differences as part of God’s plan, minorities being born with less ability than whites, and whites and minorities not being comfortable around each other provide the most direct tests for the hypotheses, while the questions on minority failure and diversity are not as clear as to the relationships we expect to find.

Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for each statement. Similar to the black nationalism index, most of the statements are evenly distributed across the four categories. The two most evenly split views are regarding who is to blame for minorities’ failures and the likelihood of diversity tearing apart the country. In both instances, the modal category is somewhat agree, at just over 30 percent in both questions. Nearly 42 percent of individuals somewhat agreed the races teach different values, with 60 percent agreeing with this idea (somewhat agree and strongly agree). Nearly half of the respondents strongly agreed with the

TABLE 4.1 Descriptives for Black Nationalism

LEVELS OF BLACK NATIONALISM SUPPORT (SCORE)	%	n
Lowest (1)	21.97	456
Lower (2)	35.31	733
Higher (3)	28.90	600
Highest (4)	13.82	287
<b>Totals</b>	100	2076

statement, with an additional 20 percent somewhat agreeing, while 23 percent strongly disagreed and only 8 percent somewhat disagreed.

Not surprisingly, the most agreed-upon area relates to ability, as 63 percent strongly disagreed that minorities are born with less ability than whites, with another 17 percent somewhat disagreeing. However, this still leaves 19 percent agreeing that minorities are born with less ability than whites. Finally, nearly 42 percent strongly disagreed with the idea that whites and minorities are not comfortable with each other, and an additional 30 percent somewhat disagreed with this idea. This seems to represent a different view than the attitudes about diversity

TABLE 4.2 Descriptives for Racial Attitudes

QUESTIONS	STRONGLY DISAGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	n
Minorities have self to blame for failure	15.30 (315)	26.32 (542)	<b>31.81</b> (655)	26.57 (547)	2059
Races teach dif- ferent values	16.95 (342)	23.89 (482)	<b>41.58</b> (839)	17.59 (355)	2018
Racial differ- ences are part of God's plan	22.50 (445)	8.09 (160)	20.48 (405)	<b>48.94</b> (968)	1978
Minorities are born with less ability	<b>63.34</b> (1282)	17.44 (353)	12.40 (251)	6.82 (138)	2024
Whites and minorities are not comfortable with each other	<b>41.93</b> (857)	30.33 (620)	21.38 (437)	6.36 (130)	2044
Diversity may tear United States apart	26.68 (535)	24.59 (493)	<b>30.22</b> (606)	18.50 (371)	2005

**Modal category** in bold

potentially tearing the United States apart. Overall, blacks have interesting and quite diverse racial attitudes (on questions normally reserved for whites).

**Results for Black Nationalism.** Table 4.3 shows the results from an ordered logit model for support for black nationalism. Focusing on the identity measures, we find each has a statistical influence on support for black nationalism. When race plays a more central role in someone's life, they are more likely to support ideas of black nationalism, while both a sense of private and public regard are negatively related to black nationalism. Both centrality and public regard fit with our expectations, while private regard runs counter to our expectation of a positive relationship.

Before turning to the substantive impact of racial identity, it is worth noting the findings with respect to the social environment and demographic variables. As expected, black media exposure also affects the propensity for blacks to support black nationalism. Specifically, those with higher levels of exposure to black media are more likely to support black nationalism. Blacks who get much of their news and entertainment from black sources may be more socially

**TABLE 4.3** Model Results for Black Nationalism

VARIABLES	BLACK NATIONALISM
<b>Centrality</b>	0.3519*** (0.0851)
<b>Private Regard</b>	-0.3708* (0.1796)
<b>Public Regard</b>	-0.4098*** (0.0776)
<b>Reside in South</b>	0.0173 (0.1269)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	0.2172** (0.0686)

*Table 4.3 (cont'd)*

VARIABLES	BLACK NATIONALISM
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.3586*** (0.0911)
<b>Gender</b>	-0.2027 (0.1232)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	-0.0172*** (0.0040)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	-0.0029 (0.0019)
<b>Education</b>	0.0207 (0.0602)
<b>Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago</b>	0.3054*** (0.0853)
<b>Church Attendance</b>	-0.1317* (0.0521)
<b>Member of Black Organization</b>	0.4087* (0.1864)
<b>Political Ideology</b>	0.0682 (0.0729)
<b>cut1: Constant</b>	-1.2611* (0.5874)
<b>cut2: Constant</b>	0.5473 (0.5863)
<b>cut3: Constant</b>	2.2729*** (0.5802)
<b>Observations</b>	1583

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ,  
\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; Ordered Logit



isolated from whites and generally more comfortable with blacks. Along with featuring black entertainers, these sources also feature black leaders and promote issues that are particularly relevant to the black community, all of which may encourage support for black nationalism. We also find that high neighborhood crime, perception of increased discrimination, and membership in black organizations increase support for black nationalism, while older individuals and those who attend church regularly are less likely to show support.

To highlight the substantive influence of racial identity, we present Figure 4.1, which shows the predicted probabilities of each identity measure while holding all other variables at their modal category or mean value. This allows us to isolate the influence of identity for the average respondent. The main impact of racial centrality is among those who scored the lowest on the black nationalism index, as we see the biggest range across values of centrality. For individuals for whom race is the least central in their lives, they had a 44 percent chance of scoring lowest on the black nationalism index, or the least amount of support for black nationalism, compared to 21 percent for those with the highest racial centrality. There is no influence for racial centrality in the “low nationalism” category, as across the centrality scores the predicted




Figure 4.1 Predicted Probabilities for Black Nationalism

probability was between 39 and 42 percent. For higher levels of black nationalism, centrality has a significant but smaller influence. In the “high nationalism” category, moving from lowest to highest, centrality leads to a 14 percent increase in support of black nationalism, while in the “highest nationalism” category the increase is 7 percent.

While the model results (Table 4.3) show an unexpected negative relationship for private regard, Figure 4.1 highlights a substantively small relationship. Individuals with low private regard are 7 percent less likely to have the lowest support for black nationalism and are about 7 percent more likely to fall into the “high nationalism” category; however, the wider range of the confidence intervals suggests this relationship is tenuous at best. While the results suggest a negative relationship between private regard and black nationalism, the substantive impact is small.

For public regard, we find a similar but reversed substantive influence as for racial centrality. For the lowest levels of black nationalism, we find a 20 percent increase for those individuals with the lowest public regard to those with the highest. There is no difference among those in the “low nationalism” category. There is a 15 percent decrease moving from the lowest levels of public regard to the highest for “high nationalism” support and a 7 percent decrease in the “highest nationalism” category.

Overall, our results indicate a significant relationship between racial identity and black nationalism. Whether blacks support black nationalism depends on the meaning and significance of race in their lives—specifically, the extent to which blacks define themselves with regard to race (i.e., racial centrality) and how they perceive that others view their racial group (i.e., public regard). As expected, racial centrality increases the likelihood that individuals endorse black nationalism. This makes sense because individuals who are high on centrality report more recognition of social barriers and racial prejudice.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, black nationalism seems to be a reasonable solution to alleviate inequalities. Also, as predicted, greater racial group perception (public regard) decreases the likelihood that individuals support black nationalism. Specifically, those who perceive that others view blacks more positively are less likely to support black nationalism. The question here is, if an individual perceives that out-groups view the group positively, why would they advocate for black nationalism? In many respects, being perceived positively by out-groups could lead to the assumption that one is being treated fairly and humanely.

On the other hand, our prediction does not hold for private regard. We hypothesized that private regard increases support for black nationalism. However, the findings show the opposite: there was a decreased support for black nationalism among those individuals who had positive feelings toward blacks and their membership in that group. However, as the predicted probabilities highlight, this is a substantively small difference. It shows that simply feeling close to one's group does not necessarily lead individuals to support black nationalism.

**Results for Racial Attitudes.** In Table 4.4, we find less consistent support for the influence of racial identity across the six racial attitude models. Additionally, the control variables show varying influence as well that support our decision to run these as separate models and not as an index of racial attitudes. Clearly, the factors shaping black racial attitudes are conditional on the exact attitude examined. However, the results show that higher education consistently, with statistical significance in four of the six models, decreases the odds of endorsing racial attitudes. These findings are not surprising. Previous studies show that individuals with higher education are less likely to express sentiments of overt and symbolic racism and feelings of social dominance, and more likely to reject negative stereotypes.<sup>30</sup>

First, turning to centrality, we find a statistically significant relationship in two of the six models. Higher centrality leads to less support for the idea that minorities should blame themselves for failure. Expressing agreement with this sentiment indicates (at least to some degree) that an individual feels their success or failure in life is inextricably connected to their race. Therefore, those who emphasize the role of race in their lives are likely more prone to attribute life failures to the disadvantages or uncontrollable factors associated with being black (e.g., discrimination). Higher racial centrality also leads to more support for the idea that racial differences are part of God's plan, highlighting the importance of race as a unique part of the human experience. Figure 4.2 shows the substantive role of racial centrality in these areas. For the failure model, clearly most people strongly agree with the sentiment that blacks should blame themselves for their failures. Individuals for whom race plays the least central role in their lives are about 60 percent likely to strongly agree, compared to 35 percent of those where centrality is the highest. The strongly agree category drives the finding (largest differences across levels of centrality), and it is the only category where lower centrality leads to a higher likelihood of selecting that option.

TABLE 4.4 Model Results for Racial Attitudes

VARIABLES	SELF-BLAME FOR FAILURE	TEACH DIFFERENT VALUES	RACIAL DIFFERENCES GOD'S PLAN	MINORITIES BORN WITH LESS ABILITY	WHITES AND MINORITIES NOT COMFORTABLE	DIVERSITY MAY TEAR U.S. APART
<b>Centrality</b>	-0.3261*** (0.0901)	0.1522 (0.0950)	0.3206** (0.1000)	0.0289 (0.0992)	0.0095 (0.1009)	-0.1051 (0.0955)
<b>Private Regard</b>	-0.0713 (0.1447)	-0.1937 (0.1520)	0.1186 (0.1493)	-0.7120*** (0.1607)	-0.7954*** (0.1531)	-0.1160 (0.1468)
<b>Public Regard</b>	-0.1264 (0.0849)	-0.5700*** (0.0835)	-0.0723 (0.0826)	-0.3439*** (0.0877)	-0.7087*** (0.0847)	-0.4470*** (0.0839)
<b>Reside in South</b>	0.4055*** (0.1137)	0.1954 (0.1166)	0.3102* (0.1224)	0.0220 (0.1396)	0.1573 (0.1224)	0.4045*** (0.1164)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	-0.0163 (0.0742)	0.1211 (0.0723)	-0.0371 (0.0703)	0.1310 (0.0810)	0.0635 (0.0730)	0.1252 (0.0697)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.0658 (0.0928)	0.0809 (0.0962)	-0.1189 (0.0966)	0.3197** (0.1057)	0.2960** (0.0986)	0.0927 (0.0920)

*(continues on next page)*

Table 4.4 (cont'd)

VARIABLES	SELF-BLAME FOR FAILURE	TEACH DIFFERENT VALUES	RACIAL DIFFERENCES GOD'S PLAN	MINORITIES BORN WITH LESS ABILITY	WHITES AND MINORITIES NOT COMFORTABLE	DIVERSITY MAY TEAR U.S. APART
<b>Gender</b>	0.1880 (0.1138)	0.0618 (0.1187)	0.5210*** (0.1200)	0.1759 (0.1390)	0.0200 (0.1228)	0.2484* (0.1207)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	-0.0041 (0.0037)	-0.0094* (0.0038)	-0.0068 (0.0039)	-0.0101* (0.0045)	0.0096* (0.0042)	-0.0025 (0.0039)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	-0.0019 (0.0021)	0.0016 (0.0020)	0.0023 (0.0021)	-0.0007 (0.0033)	-0.0005 (0.0021)	-0.0014 (0.0026)
<b>Education</b>	-0.2031** (0.0657)	-0.0421 (0.0665)	-0.1509* (0.0691)	-0.3076*** (0.0834)	-0.1324 (0.0688)	-0.1477* (0.0708)
<b>Feelings towards Whites</b>	-0.0032 (0.0027)	-0.0071* (0.0028)	-0.0005 (0.0028)	-0.0026 (0.0034)	-0.0160*** (0.0030)	-0.0069* (0.0030)
<b>Views on Race Relations</b>	0.0938 (0.0766)	-0.0260 (0.0857)	0.1247 (0.0773)	0.1117 (0.0929)	-0.0247 (0.0881)	0.0902 (0.0740)
<b>Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago</b>	-0.2711** (0.0876)	0.0332 (0.0887)	0.0407 (0.0900)	-0.1729 (0.0998)	0.0947 (0.0865)	0.0205 (0.0864)

<b>Political Ideology</b>	-0.0192 (0.0706)	-0.1677* (0.0743)	-0.1337 (0.0752)	-0.1358 (0.0860)	-0.0896 (0.0755)	-0.1120 (0.0715)
<b>Proud to be American</b>	-0.0587 (0.1016)	-0.1575 (0.1079)	-0.0028 (0.1031)	-0.0171 (0.1324)	-0.2290* (0.1154)	0.0266 (0.1059)
<b>Work Ethic/U.S. Opportunity</b>	0.6637*** (0.0782)	0.2291** (0.0780)	-0.0258 (0.0775)	0.2043* (0.0908)	0.2853*** (0.0828)	0.1481 (0.0779)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-1.7015* (0.6620)	-3.0334*** (0.6857)	-0.8578 (0.7183)	0.0370 (0.7881)	-2.3619** (0.7442)	-1.7393* (0.6966)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	0.0048 (0.6679)	-1.7490* (0.6898)	-0.4339 (0.7195)	1.0588 (0.7967)	-0.8169 (0.7421)	-0.5919 (0.6924)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	1.6014* (0.6652)	0.4212 (0.6918)	0.4837 (0.7211)	2.3309** (0.8142)	1.0890 (0.7504)	0.9978 (0.6940)
<b>Observations</b>	1565	1551	1509	1545	1559	1541

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Ordered Logit

For views on whether racial differences are part of God’s plan, differences in racial centrality is most important for the strongly disagree and strongly agree categories. For those who strongly disagree, there is a 15 percent decrease from the lowest to highest levels of centrality. Individuals for whom race does not play a central part in their life are significantly more likely to strongly disagree with the idea that racial differences are part of God’s plan. On the other hand, there is a 23 percent increase from lowest to highest centrality in the likelihood of strongly agreeing that racial differences are part of God’s plan. This suggests that when race is a key part of their identity, they are more likely to agree that race is an important feature that is divinely created.

Private regard is statistically significant in two of the six models as well, as we find a negative relationship for believing that minorities are born with less ability and that whites and minorities are not comfortable with each other. Substantively, Figure 4.3 shows those with the highest levels of racial pride, or private regard, are 18 percent more likely to strongly disagree with the idea that minorities are born with less ability, while individuals with the highest levels of private regard are about 6 percent less likely to somewhat or strongly agree with this statement, compared to those with lower levels of racial pride. These




Figure 4.2 Predicted Probabilities for Racial Attitudes (Centrality)

results show that higher levels of racial pride lead to greater feelings of equality among the races in terms of natural-born ability.

A very similar trend emerges when examining the question of whites and minorities feeling comfortable with each other. Higher private regard leads to stronger disagreement with this statement, around 15 percent more likely to strongly disagree, while lower racial pride leads to greater feelings that the races cannot be comfortable with each other. The substantive impact is essentially reversed when comparing the strongly disagree to somewhat agree categories, with a smaller difference in the strongly agree category.

Greater racial group perception (public regard) decreases the odds that individuals hold certain racial attitudes. Here we find the most consistent and significant results for racial identity. Specifically, those who perceive that others view blacks more positively are significantly less likely to believe the following: minorities and whites teach different values; minorities are born with less ability than whites; minorities and whites can never be comfortable with each other; and diversity may tear the United States apart. Figure 4.4 highlights the substantive influence of public regard. Starting with the attitudes towards teaching different values, we find significant differences across each category. Individuals with the




Figure 4.3 Predicted Probabilities for Racial Attitudes (Private Regard)



highest public regard are about 25 percent more likely to strongly disagree and 15 percent more likely to somewhat disagree than those with the lowest public regard. Conversely, individuals with the highest public regard are about 20 percent less likely to both somewhat and strongly agree with this view, compared to those with the lowest public regard. In terms of natural-born differences in ability, there is about a 20 percent gap between those with the lowest and highest levels of public regard in the likelihood of strongly disagreeing with this attitude. Higher levels of public regard predict that someone is more likely to strongly disagree with this sentiment.

One of the largest influences appears in whether races are comfortable with one another, as individuals with the highest public regard are about 50 percent more likely to strongly disagree with this view than those with the lowest levels of public regard. We also find those with the highest levels of public regard are much less likely to somewhat (24 percent) and strongly (8 percent) agree that the races cannot be comfortable with one another than those with the lowest levels of public regard. Finally, Figure 4.4 shows the results for views on the potential negative impacts of diversity in the United States. Here we find similar results to the other areas. Individuals with the highest public regard are 23 percent more




Figure 4.4 Predicted Probabilities for Racial Attitudes (Public Regard)

likely to strongly disagree and 20 percent less likely to strongly agree that diversity may tear apart the country than those with the lowest levels of public regard.

These results make sense when thinking about the role of public regard as an identity construct. When people believe other races (especially whites) respect blacks, they are less likely to hold attitudes that see a difference or a dividing line between the races. Also related to this is how individuals feel towards whites, as warmer feelings toward whites (measured on a 0–100 feeling thermometer) has a negative impact on the same racial attitudes as public regard. In other words, those who perceive that others view blacks more positively and feel more favorably toward whites are less likely to support certain racial attitudes. How favorably blacks feel toward whites is likely influenced by how positively blacks believe that others view their racial group.

While each of the three dimensions of identity was significantly related to at least some of the racial attitude questions, none was significantly correlated with all of them. This means that two of the dimensions can matter for a particular attitude, while the other dimension does not. For example, believing that whites and minorities can never be comfortable with each other is significantly affected by how proud an individual is to be black (private regard) and how they perceive that others view their race (public regard), but it is not significantly related to the importance of race in their lives (centrality). In this case, if we had measured racial identity using the popular linked fate items (“I believe what happens to my racial group affects me”) that are often employed by scholars in capturing the broader identity construct of centrality, we probably would have missed the meaningful impact that racial identity has on this particular ideology. Indeed, when we ran the models separately with both linked fate and closeness, we did not find any significance for either variable on the dependent variables. Thus, by using only unidimensional measures of racial identity, we actually risk drawing the wrong conclusion about its effect on racial attitudes.

## Conclusion

Our most important findings are that there is heterogeneity in racial attitude sentiments, and various dimensions of racial identity matter significantly in influencing these attitudes. The most important of the racial identity measures is public regard. It shows up as a consistent predictor of racial attitudes. Specifically, there is a decreased black nationalist sentiment among those who perceive that

others view blacks more positively (public regard). In addition, public regard also decreases feelings on the following racial attitude statements: minorities are born with less ability, whites and minorities are not comfortable with each other, and diversity may tear us apart. We also found, in different cases, that both racial centrality and private regard also matter. These findings are significant, in that using a multidimensional measure allows us to gauge which dimensions of identity are significant on racial attitudes. If we simply relied on a single domain of identity, we would conclude that racial identity would not be significant on racial attitudes. This, however, would not have presented an accurate and full picture.

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, research on white racial attitudes has been given a great deal of attention. Consequently, we wanted to explore black racial attitudes, using similar measures that often tap white racial attitudes. In addition, different from white racial attitudes research, we accounted for racial identity measures; however, similar to white racial attitudes research, we accounted for demographic and social environmental variables. Our general theory was that demographic and social environmental variables would have a significant effect on racial attitudes. As expected (and similarly found in white racial attitudes research), we found several of these demographic and social environmental variables to be significant on many of the racial attitude questions. For example, region, black information sources, age, and education all had significant influence on black racial attitudes. In this respect, these specific findings are not a surprise. However, we now know that demographic and social environment shape racial attitudes in a similar fashion as white racial attitudes. In the end, we show that some blacks hold similar sentiments as some whites on questions of racial attitudes, and among blacks, racial identity helps shape these attitudes.

## 5 Policy Attitudes

American society, both elites and the masses, fiercely debates racial policies, such as reparations and affirmative action. For example, Ta-Nehisi Coates' 2014 article in *The Atlantic*, "The Case for Reparations," sparked a public debate and interest in the topic among both blacks and whites.<sup>1</sup> His article brought to the mainstream a topic that white America, primarily, viewed as fringe and radical. Debates on racial policies also occasionally emerge forthrightly in political institutions as well. For example, a relatively noncontroversial discussion in the U.S. Senate over issuing an apology for slavery turned into a debate about reparations. On July 29, 2008, the United States House of Representatives passed a measure apologizing for slavery. Following the lead of the lower chamber, on June 18, 2009, the United States Senate, in a unanimous vote, apologized for "fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality and inhumanity of slavery, and the legal segregation of African Americans" (Concurrent Resolution 26). In explaining the Senate's actions, Senator Tom Harkin (D, Iowa) said, "It is important to have a collective response to a collective action."<sup>2</sup>

While most concur with Harkin's assessment, some believe that the apology from the federal government did not go far enough, since the Senate added the following disclaimer: "Nothing in the Senate's resolution authorizes or supports any claim against the United States, or serves as a settlement of any claim against the United States."<sup>3</sup> Senator Sam Brownback (R, Kansas), who cosponsored the resolution, stated that the Senate's "disclaimer was necessary to win the support of Senators who feared the apology could be used by Blacks seeking reparations."<sup>4</sup> While it turned out that the disclaimer was necessary for passage, many blacks were disappointed. Senator Roland Burris (D, Illinois) explained, "I want to go on record making sure that that disclaimer in no way

would eliminate future actions that may be brought before this body that may deal with reparations.”<sup>5</sup>

A simple, noteworthy discussion of whether the United States should apologize to blacks turned into a discussion of whether payment for the sins of prior governments be distributed as a form of reparations. Racial policies often leave the impression that there is uniform support among its beneficiaries. However, when we view public opinion polls, we know that there is not an intra-racial consensus, especially for reparations—but also for other racial policies, such as affirmative action. Let us examine some polling numbers on reparations and affirmative action over the past twenty years:

- When a national sample of 1,211 adults was asked in a 2016 Marist poll whether the government should make cash payments to slave descendants, 81 percent of white and 35 percent of black respondents answered “no” while 15 percent of white and 58 percent of black respondents answered “yes.”<sup>6</sup>
- An ABC News poll on June 18, 1997, asked, “Do you think the federal government should or should not pay money to Black Americans whose ancestors were slaves as compensation for that slavery?” Of 703 respondents (with an oversample of blacks), 19 percent supported reparations, 77 percent did not, and 4 percent had no opinion. Among whites, 10 percent supported reparations and 88 percent did not. Among blacks, 65 percent supported reparations and 28 percent did not.<sup>7</sup>
- A June 2015 Gallup poll of 2,296 national adults with an oversample of blacks and Hispanics found 77 percent of blacks supported affirmative action programs for racial minorities while 19 percent opposed, compared to 53 percent support among whites and 42 percent opposition.<sup>8</sup>
- A January 2003 ABC News/Washington Post poll of 1,133 national adults with an oversample of blacks found 65 percent of blacks favor affirmative action while 29 percent oppose. This is compared to only 24 percent support among whites with 73 percent of whites opposed.<sup>9</sup>

While these polling numbers show an unsurprising difference among whites and blacks on these issues, they also show divergent opinions regarding reparations and affirmative action among blacks both across issues and over time. Black opinion is different from whites on these issues, but it is also not uniform among black respondents. While there is a long line of research explaining black policy preferences, scholars have not placed black racial identity at the forefront of this work. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of black policy preferences research and then turn to our argument on the role of black racial identity in shaping these preferences.

### Influences on Black Policy Preferences

There has been a tremendous amount of research on the factors that influence blacks' policy preferences. In this chapter, we only scratch the surface of this research. For more details of this literature, Simien provides an excellent review of black public opinion over time, and Tate shows historical public opinion changes in policies related to those in this chapter.<sup>10</sup> These factors range from unified group interests, socioeconomic status, the presence of a "color-line," legislative district composition, and belief and trust in government, among others. For example, Bobo found the more a black voter feels that he or she is part of a unified racial interest group, the more likely it is that he or she will support policies usually associated with benefits for blacks.<sup>11</sup> In addition, attitudes toward "the Black political movement," racial conflict in society, and in- versus out-group objectives all influence black attitudes toward policy preferences. Shelton and Wilson found that blacks from a higher socioeconomic background were more likely to support racially specific policies aimed at reducing inequality, while blacks from a lower socioeconomic status were more likely to support race-neutral initiatives.<sup>12</sup>

Comparing policy preferences of blacks and Latinos from Los Angeles County Social Surveys, Sears and Savalei find that while Latinos appear likely to assimilate into the larger (white) American culture over time, a "color-line" still exists for blacks, making it likely that many blacks will continue to prefer policies that are seen to favor blacks, specifically.<sup>13</sup>

The literature reveals that scholars, although in a limited sense, have accounted for identity in influencing blacks' attitudes toward policy

preferences—more specifically, attitudes toward racial policies. However, these articles use linked fate as a sole measure of identity. Works by Tate, Dawson, Simien, Clawson, and Orey, et al., demonstrate that linked fate does influence policy attitudes.<sup>14</sup> For example, Orey, et al., found blacks who feel a linked fate with the larger black community are more likely to support welfare spending than those who feel a personal connection to President Obama. Simien and Clawson find black women with stronger race identity are less likely to support abortion, while race identity does not influence views on affirmative action. However, as we have made the argument in earlier chapters, using one-dimensional measures does not tap into the multidimensional nature of an individual's racial identity.

Our purpose throughout the book, and in this chapter, is to argue that the advantage of the multidimensional approach is that it does not assume that one measure (i.e., linked fate, closeness) accurately captures all of the complexities of racial identity. To be sure, our purpose is not simply to compare the results of our multidimensional measures against previous research using unidimensional measures, but to expand the empirical measure of the concept to capture the complexity of racial identity.

## Expectations

We expect racial identity to influence blacks' racial policy beliefs. Identity corresponds with an internal view of the world. In general, the realistic group conflict theory offers expectations about the role of identity in policy beliefs. When group membership or identity is an important basis for development of self-identity, then individuals' policy beliefs will emerge based on the perception of the policy to serve in the long-term best interests of their group.<sup>15</sup>

Working from this, we expect racial centrality to have a positive influence on beliefs involving black interests. The more central race is to someone's life, the more likely he or she will support policies from the government that benefit blacks specifically. The more race plays a central role in someone's life, the more likely he or she is to endorse policies that directly promote the group's interests.<sup>16</sup> Arguments from theories of symbolic politics also support this position, as greater racial centrality may increase the likelihood of assessing public policy in terms of the group's best interest and not individual self-interest.<sup>17</sup>

Those for whom race plays a more central role in their life will show more support for racial policies.

We expect private regard to be positively correlated with support for racial policies as well. Individuals who are proud to be black are more likely to recognize the need for policies that specifically deal with the black community and want policies to benefit their group.

Those who have a more positive feeling about being black will show more support for racial policies.

On the other hand, we expect the opposite result for public regard. The more an individual believes whites or the broader society respect blacks, the less likely they are to support policies geared towards helping blacks, as they are more likely to not see the need for these types of racially specific policies, given broader societal acceptance of blacks.<sup>18</sup> We expect similar results to Simien and Clawson's finding that blacks who feel more positively towards whites are less likely to support affirmative action programs.<sup>19</sup>

Those who have a more positive view of how others see blacks will show less support for racial policies.

## Analysis

Like in the previous chapters, we present ordered logit models to capture the influence of the three racial identity measures. We also control for several "usual suspect" demographic variables that are common in the political behavior literature. Finally, we account for general racial ideology (measured as social dominance, see chapter 3) that is outside of racial identity. Our dependent variables are views on racial policy. Generally, racial policy is seen as an extension of the liberal-conservative policy debate in the United States, since most Americans process racial policy debates similar to other political issues, and common nationality can trump racial differences in how individuals view the particularities of racial policies.<sup>20</sup> Much of this literature either examines white attitudes towards policies designed to help minority groups or compares white attitudes with minority attitudes. There is much less research focused on explaining black attitudes towards these policies. Much of this type of work shows blacks are much



more likely to support these policies, but that variation exists within the black community on support for various policies.<sup>21</sup>

## Results

We present three models of attitudes towards racial policy. Each of these relates to black interest policies: the need for majority-minority districts to elect minorities, a general view that the government should enact policies to help blacks, and the belief that the government should pay reparations to blacks for slavery. Table 5.1 provides a descriptive breakdown of these views. For each policy, a majority is in support, with nearly 50 percent strongly agreeing with the need for specific policies to help blacks and the need for reparations, and nearly half somewhat agreeing with the need for majority-minority districts. Overall, very few people do not support these policies, with less than 25 percent disagreeing (combining somewhat and strong disagreement) with the need for majority-minority districts and the need for reparations, while just under 12 percent disagree with the need for policies designed to help blacks.

Turning to the influences on these views, in Table 5.2 we find racial identity is an important factor in explaining racial policy views. Public regard has the most consistent influence, as individuals with a higher public regard (broader

TABLE 5.1 Descriptives for Racial Policy Beliefs

	NEED MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS	POLICIES TO HELP BLACKS	GOVERNMENT SHOULD PAY REPARATIONS
<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	7.85 (154)	2.95 (60)	8.75 (175)
<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	16.71 (328)	8.61 (175)	15.11 (302)
<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	47.33 (929)	39.15 (796)	29.66 (593)
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	28.12 (552)	49.29 (1002)	46.47 (929)
<b>n</b>	1963	2033	1999

TABLE 5.2 Model Results for Racial Policy Beliefs

VARIABLES	MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS	POLICIES TO HELP BLACKS	PAY REPARATIONS
Centrality	0.3579** (0.1152)	0.2500* (0.0993)	0.1204 (0.0932)
Private Regard	-0.0128 (0.1692)	0.4794* (0.1942)	0.2967 (0.1698)
Public Regard	-0.3864*** (0.0892)	-0.5349*** (0.0891)	-0.4720*** (0.0804)
Reside in South	0.1008 (0.1195)	-0.0180 (0.1259)	-0.1839 (0.1202)
Black Information Sources	0.3900*** (0.1047)	0.2709** (0.1032)	0.2339* (0.1000)
Member of Black Organization	0.1178 (0.2436)	0.5352** (0.1970)	0.1113 (0.1768)
Gender	0.1135 (0.1281)	0.1376 (0.1328)	0.0084 (0.1207)
Age (in years)	0.0060 (0.0040)	0.0049 (0.0041)	0.0151*** (0.0041)
Household Income (in \$1,000s)	-0.0026 (0.0019)	-0.0038* (0.0018)	-0.0013 (0.0024)
Education	0.0220 (0.0732)	-0.0061 (0.0773)	0.0906 (0.0711)
Political Ideology	-0.0193 (0.0746)	0.1097 (0.0777)	0.0314 (0.0778)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.0728** (0.0230)	0.0409 (0.0230)	0.0530* (0.0234)

(continues on next page)

Table 5.2 (cont'd)

VARIABLES	MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS	POLICIES TO HELP BLACKS	PAY REPARATIONS
<b>Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago</b>	0.1643 (0.0882)	0.1114 (0.0890)	0.3292*** (0.0850)
<b>Vote for President</b>	-0.0651 (0.1515)	-0.0742 (0.1473)	-0.2653* (0.1353)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-0.6267 (0.7118)	-2.4888*** (0.6305)	-1.3989** (0.5226)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	0.8367 (0.6983)	-0.9618 (0.5835)	-0.0274 (0.5199)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	3.1331*** (0.7080)	1.3453* (0.5838)	1.4784** (0.5234)
<b>Observations</b>	1527	1567	1551

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; Ordered Logit

society respects blacks) are less likely to support policies with specific benefits for blacks. They are less likely to believe that majority-minority districts are needed to elect minorities, that the government should enact policies to specifically help blacks, and that the government should pay reparations for slavery. Centrality has a positive and significant influence on views towards both the need for majority-minority districts and black-specific policies. Private regard has a positive and significant influence on the need for black-specific policies.

Examining the influence of social dominance allows us to see if the psychological aspects of racial policy views stem from racial identity or racial ideology. The findings show that social dominance has a consistent and positive influence on policy views; however, social dominance does not reach statistical significance in the “policies to help blacks” model. Most importantly, our findings for racial identity are significant while controlling for racial ideology.

We do not find much of a demographic influence, as most of these variables do not reach statistical significance. Older individuals are somewhat more likely to hold stronger policy views favoring government action for blacks, while higher-income individuals are slightly less likely. Finally, political ideology has little influence throughout the models. The most consistent influence beyond racial identity is the amount of black-information sources individuals use. Those receiving more of their information from black sources are consistently and significantly more likely to support racial-specific policies.

These findings show the link between internal identity and beliefs and highlight the importance of the multidimensional approach for understanding racial identity, as believing society has respect for blacks (public regard) leads to different beliefs than both the centrality of race in a person’s life and their own view of their race. To examine the differences between these measures of identity, we present predicted probabilities from the results in Table 5.2. To isolate the influence of the different dimensions of racial identity, Figures 5.1 through 5.3 show the predicted probability of policy support or agreement for individuals based on the strength of their racial identification across statistically significant dimensions from the models




Figure 5.1 Predicted Probabilities for Views on Majority-Minority Districts

in Table 5.2. We hold all other variables, including the other racial identity dimensions, at their appropriate means or modal categories.

Starting with views on majority-minority districts, Figure 5.1 shows, for centrality, a 25 percent increase in the likelihood of strongly supporting majority-minority districts of those with the highest levels of centrality compared to those with the lowest levels. A smaller but opposite influence occurs for those who disagree with the need for majority-minority districts, as there is a roughly 10 percent decrease from the lowest to highest levels of centrality in the somewhat disagree category and a 7 percent drop in the strongly disagree category. In terms of public regard, we find a similar trend in terms of magnitude but opposite predictions as compared to centrality. This matches our expectations and the model results, given that individuals who view society as having more respect for blacks should be less likely to find majority-minority districts necessary.

Figure 5.2 reports the likelihood of supporting policies that specifically help blacks. Once again, the largest influence is on the likelihood of strongly agreeing with the policy. Each of the measures of identity based on the model estimates has a statistically significant effect on the support for policies that specifically help blacks. In terms of the predicted influence, centrality and private regard have a positive influence with a roughly 15 percent and 12 percent




Figure 5.2 Predicted Probabilities for Views on Policies to Help Blacks

increase, respectively, in strong agreement between the lowest and highest levels of identification. Once again, public regard has a negative influence for strongly agreeing with the need for black-specific policies. The influence is clearly the strongest, with a 40 percent decrease from lowest to highest levels of public regard.

We also find interesting differences between levels of agreement with these policies within the separate identity measures. For public regard, the negative influence only occurs for those individuals strongly agreeing with the need for these types of policies, and, conversely, for private regard all other levels of support show a negative influence. This suggests that racial identity has its largest impact on those with the strongest levels of support for these policies, and the influence varies based on not only the identity measure but also level of support we examine.

In Figure 5.3, for public regard, the likelihood of supporting reparations for slavery looks similar to the pattern for supporting the other policies. The negative relationship emerges in the strongly agree category with the opposite but less substantial relationship in the disagree categories. In this case, those with lowest levels of public regard are about 30 percent more likely to support reparations than those with the highest levels. Additionally, public regard is the only identity measure to significantly predict views on reparation payments.




Figure 5.3 Predicted Probabilities for Views on Payment of Reparations

## Conclusion

Our results indicate a significant relationship between racial identity and racial policy beliefs. By examining the multidimensional components of identity, we find that identity is not a simple monolithic concept. For example, those who believe race plays a more central role (centrality) are more likely to hold beliefs about the need for majority-minority districts and the need for policies to support blacks, while it is not a factor for explaining views on reparations. Those who have a positive view of being black (private regard) are more likely to believe that government ought to enact policies to benefit blacks, while there is not a clear relationship in the other areas. Clearly, the most important identity factor is public regard, the area most often overlooked when studying racial identity. Individuals who believe society has a more positive view of blacks are less likely to strongly agree that there is a need for race-specific policies.

Putting our results into context with the single-item measures of linked fate and closeness (model results in the appendix), we find linked fate increases support for majority-minority districts and policies to help blacks, while there is no significance on paying blacks reparations. In the case of closeness, support increases for policies to help blacks and paying blacks reparations, while a need for majority-minority districts is not significant. Not surprisingly, these results are similar to what we found using the centrality and private regard measures and provide additional support for our main arguments. However, they do not address in any way the important findings for public regard. Our use of multi-dimensional measures uncovers an interesting domain of identity we would not know about if we simply relied on the single-item measures. In this respect, our findings show that in some cases, one set of identities matters, and in other cases it does not. Additionally, the magnitude of influence varies across the measure of identity, suggesting an important and more nuanced role for racial identity in shaping black political beliefs.

Racial identity matters for policy views on race-specific policies; however, does the influence of racial identity extend to policies beyond race? Theoretically, we do not see a clear path for a relationship between identity and other policy views, as we expect some of the demographic variables that were not that significant on racial policy views to trump any role of identity. To test this, Table 5.3 examines the influence of racial identity along with demographic and political

controls on nonracial policies. Our findings show that centrality and private regard are not significant on any of the nonracial policies; however, public regard shows significance in four of the five nonracial policy areas. Specifically, those who feel that outsiders view the group positively show lower levels of support for the following nonracial policy statements: government should provide jobs for all; people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes; free speech should be allowed for all political groups, even if insulting to some people; and a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion. There was not a significant relationship between public regard and the statement regarding whether homosexual, gay, or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt children.

Certainly, some would argue (as do we) that many of these nonracial policies could be implicitly racial. Even so, this only strengthens our findings on the importance of public regard. What we have found from this research is that it appears that blacks are more likely to be conservative, even when controlling directly for political ideology, on policy (both on racial and nonracial policies) if they believe whites or the broader society respect blacks. The use of multidimensional measures of identity has allowed for a more in-depth understanding on the role of racial identity on policy beliefs.

In some ways, our findings for centrality and private regard match the previous studies that use one-dimensional closeness and linked fate, and one could argue they provide a similar theoretical perspective. Most importantly, adding the new public regard dimension captures an important part of identity as it relates to the political world. Identity is not just about how close one feels toward one's race, or how much one feels their fate is linked to others like themselves, but it is also about one's perception of out-group sentiment toward one's group, one's own views of their race, and the central role race plays in one's life. While racial centrality and private regard were significant and positive on support for racial policies, public regard had an opposite, stronger, and more robust effect. Our results should serve as a starting point for understanding the role of multidimensional racial identity, both theoretically and empirically on public policy preferences. Given our focus highlighting the influence of our multidimensional measures across a broad spectrum of attitudes and beliefs throughout the book, we are in no way suggesting we have provided a definitive understanding of black policy preferences.



TABLE 5.3 Model Results for Non-Racial Policies

VARIABLES	JOB'S FOR ALL	RICH PAY MORE TAXES	ALL GROUPS FREE SPEECH	ABORTIONS AVAILABLE	GAY ADOPTION ALLOWED
<b>Centrality</b>	0.0186 (0.0814)	0.1000 (0.0873)	0.0583 (0.0884)	0.0471 (0.0866)	0.0565 (0.0841)
<b>Private Regard</b>	0.0987 (0.1509)	0.1607 (0.1341)	-0.1443 (0.1493)	0.0539 (0.1411)	-0.0359 (0.1530)
<b>Public Regard</b>	-0.2023** (0.0766)	-0.3456*** (0.0721)	-0.3113*** (0.0781)	-0.3023*** (0.0734)	-0.0557 (0.0751)
<b>Age</b>	-0.0087* (0.0036)	0.0199*** (0.0034)	-0.0001 (0.0033)	-0.0055 (0.0034)	-0.0215*** (0.0036)
<b>Gender</b>	0.1688 (0.1119)	-0.1458 (0.1143)	-0.1986 (0.1141)	0.0610 (0.1111)	0.3569** (0.1130)
<b>Income (\$1,000s)</b>	-0.0081*** (0.0017)	-0.0017 (0.0017)	-0.0032 (0.0018)	0.0041 (0.0021)	0.0019 (0.0023)

<b>Education</b>	-0.3224*** (0.0576)	0.1488* (0.0587)	-0.2013** (0.0619)	0.2573*** (0.0617)	0.0384 (0.0606)
<b>Political Ideology</b>	0.0299 (0.0712)	0.0345 (0.0698)	0.0200 (0.0679)	0.2071** (0.0692)	0.1614* (0.0703)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-4.4703*** (0.4249)	-1.5238*** (0.3983)	-2.9099*** (0.3972)	-0.9376* (0.4071)	-0.8605* (0.4085)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	-3.0366*** (0.3976)	-0.2569 (0.3955)	-1.6932*** (0.3927)	0.0302 (0.4087)	0.1229 (0.4068)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	-1.4738*** (0.3905)	1.0453** (0.3961)	-0.3991 (0.3888)	1.3094** (0.4134)	1.5076*** (0.4066)
<b>Observations</b>	1733	1742	1734	1694	1694

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Ordered Logit



## 6 Political Participation

In the 2012 presidential election, for the first time, blacks voted at a higher rate than whites, and a trend continued of increasing black turnout in presidential elections, only to see this trend interrupted in 2016. However, while the first black president may have lived in the White House, low turnout numbers in state and local elections led to a much different outcome. For example, in Ferguson, Missouri, the population is 67 percent black. Yet in the 2013 elections “just 6 percent of eligible black voters cast(ed) a ballot in Ferguson’s municipal elections, as compared to 17 percent of white voters.”<sup>1</sup> The outcome was a newly elected white mayor and five (out of six) white members of the city council. Ferguson is certainly not unique. In Maple Heights, Ohio, blacks are in the majority (66 percent), yet the mayor is white, as are seven out of nine city council members. According to Smith, “many North County towns—and inner-ring suburbs nationally—resemble Ferguson.”<sup>2</sup> These results are not unique across the country.

Understanding political participation, in both electoral and non-electoral form, is a cornerstone of research by scholars of American politics. Educational achievement, socioeconomic conditions, beliefs about government, church membership, neighborhood racial composition, and the type of candidates in elections are some of the most common explanations for individual participation in American democracy.<sup>3</sup> While much attention has been given to these factors, in this chapter we focus on the role of black racial identity on black participation while controlling for these important conditional factors. This chapter returns to one of the key findings related to race found in Verba and Nie’s seminal work, that blacks who demonstrate higher levels of group consciousness participate at higher levels.

## Influences on Black Political Participation

As in the previous chapter, we provide an overview of the large and diverse literature on black political participation and focus on the potential role of black racial identity on participation. Our concern is more with understanding black racial identity, and here we place the role of identity in this literature, especially with classic literature that considers racial identity from a single dimension.

The most often-mentioned factors affecting political participation are education and socioeconomic conditions.<sup>4</sup> Majete tested the theory of “locus of control” in relation to socioeconomic status and education, and the findings show that higher levels of education relate to increased black voter turnout.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, those who more firmly believe in the control of external social forces were less likely to vote. Campbell explored the relationship between socioeconomic status and political activity. He found that higher socioeconomic status is positively correlated to higher levels of political activity for blacks.<sup>6</sup> Peterson and Somit found that socioeconomic status does matter for predicting levels of political activity for black voters, but the ethnic community theory and the empowerment model of participation were much less helpful in predicting black political participation.<sup>7</sup> Plutzer and Wiefek show that urban black single mothers are less likely to vote than their married counterparts.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, single mothers who are urban blacks are less likely to vote as they grow older. These authors found that starting income levels and decreasing income levels over time are partly to blame for low turnout among inner-city black women.

Neighborhood composition has recently received a great deal of attention in explaining black political participation. For example, by comparing and contrasting New York City’s Harlem with Chicago’s Bronzeville, Hyra found that city and neighborhood characteristics are important factors in determining black political involvement.<sup>9</sup> Specifically, cities with fragmented and more localized systems of government (such as New York, in this study) are more likely to see black political protests than cities that have a more centralized governmental structure. Alex-Assensoh found that white or black residents in high-poverty neighborhoods are less likely to participate in political activity, when compared to residents in more affluent neighborhoods, even when the socioeconomic status of the individual is constant.<sup>10</sup> However, black participation is not impacted as much as white participation. Additionally, social isolation (which may result from

but is not the same thing as residing in a high-poverty neighborhood) is likely to depress levels of political participation among blacks. Using data from the 1993–1994 Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality, Stoll found that blacks living in mostly black neighborhoods were more likely to be participants in political and community organizations than blacks who did not live in highly populated black neighborhoods.<sup>11</sup>

Research also shows that beliefs and cynicism about government influence political participation. Mangum, using the 1996 National Black Election Studies data, found an inverse relationship between trust in government and black voter turnout.<sup>12</sup> While individual political efficacy is not found to be significant, higher levels of group-level efficacy are found to positively affect black voter turnout. Southwell explored whether meaninglessness, powerlessness, and cynicism had a significant effect on voting, and her findings show that cynicism was an important predictor on voting.<sup>13</sup> In another study, Southwell and Pirch found that cynicism (defined as “the belief that the government is not producing policies according to expectations”) was a significant influence on the voting behavior of blacks.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, Jackson, surveying black college students from both historically black colleges and predominantly white colleges, found a significant relationship between high cynicism and high political activity.<sup>15</sup>

Coracial candidates in elections may also influence black political participation. Bullock explored municipal and congressional elections in Atlanta between 1970 and 1982, finding that black turnout often increased when a black candidate was running in a race.<sup>16</sup> Chong and Rogers constructed a broader vision of coracial identification and found that black turnout increases due to the presence of a black candidate.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, black voters were more likely to participate in other political activities, such as petitions, protests, and boycotts, when a black candidate was available. Atkins, et al., explored two Florida supreme court races in 1976. One race had two white candidates while the other featured a white candidate and a black candidate. Black turnout was twice as high (approximately 25 percent to 13 percent) in the race with a black candidate.<sup>18</sup> Washington found that the presence of a black candidate in an election increased black voter turnout by two to three percent. However, this change is only present when the candidate is a Democrat.<sup>19</sup> Black Republican candidates do not cause a significant increase in black voter turnout. This seems to indicate that political ideology may also be a factor in predicting black turnout. Further, the empowerment theory argues seeing black candidates campaign for office can serve as an

ego-enhancing influence for voters that can lead to a higher likelihood of turnout and other political participation.<sup>20</sup>

Much of the research regarding political participation among blacks has focused on the influence of church membership. Tate, using a longitudinal study covering the 1984 and 1988 elections, found that church membership and “involvement in black political organizations” increased the likelihood of black voter turnout.<sup>21</sup> Fitzgerald and Spohn’s study examined the popular claim that church membership is a positive and significant variable in predicting black protest participation. Contrary to many findings, this research found that church membership was only independently significant in determining black protest activity among blacks with little education and with little involvement in organizations outside of their church.<sup>22</sup> While Swain and Magnum found church membership was less likely to produce political involvement than participation in a secular organization, both types of membership encouraged electoral and non-electoral types of involvement among black members.<sup>23</sup>

Reese, et al., found black voters who were members of a politically active church, as well as those who imagined Christ as a black figure, were more likely to be involved in non-electoral political activities than blacks who attended a mostly apolitical church, or who did not envision Christ as a black historical person.<sup>24</sup> Brown and Wolford found that blacks were more likely to participate in political activities if they were members of churches.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, it is of note that this phenomenon is especially pronounced among poor black voters. The authors note that there is an intriguing observation here, because blacks are consistently less satisfied with government than whites, yet blacks are more likely than whites to participate in the political process.

### Black Racial Identity Influence on Black Political Participation

While we know a great deal about the impact of education, socioeconomic conditions, beliefs about government, church membership, neighborhood racial composition, and the type of candidates in elections on political participation, we know much less about the influence of black racial identity or, more specifically, the multidimensional influence of identity on black political participation. There has been some research using single-item measures. For example, those with a greater sense of racial identification are more likely to engage in a wider range of political activities.<sup>26</sup> Olsen found that blacks who identified with the group were

more likely to vote, discuss politics, engage in campaign activities, and contact government officials than other blacks.<sup>27</sup>

Verba and Nie found that blacks who frequently mentioned race in their discussion of political issues were more likely to vote and engage in campaign activities than those who gave less race-oriented responses.<sup>28</sup> Tate found that “black identification was significantly related to black political interest and to voter participation in congressional elections.”<sup>29</sup> Shingles found that “black consciousness had a dramatic effect on political participation because it contributed to the combination of a sense of political efficacy and political mistrust, which in turn induces political involvement.”<sup>30</sup>

In another study on political participation, Leighley and Vedlitz measured black racial identity based on group closeness and intergroup distance (e.g., affect toward other racial groups). The authors found that in-group closeness was not statistically significant, but intergroup distance was significantly related to blacks’ political participation. Specifically, blacks “who feel more distant from other groups are *less* likely to participate than are those who feel closer to other groups.”<sup>31</sup> In other words, “negative attitudes towards out-groups ‘matter,’ but tend to demobilize, rather than mobilize, political involvement” for blacks.<sup>32</sup> These findings contradict the earlier argument of Miller, et al., that blacks are mobilized by negative feelings toward the out-group (i.e., polar affect).<sup>33</sup> More recent work examines the role of group consciousness on political mobilization in the modern heterogeneous American society of a growing Latino population.<sup>34</sup> As we noted earlier, while these studies give us some hints about the role of identity, examining these questions from a multi-dimensional perspective is absent in the literature.

## Expectations

Our expectations for the influence of black racial identity are more tenuous in this chapter than in previous ones. Clearly, we expect social context to influence black political participation. As discussed, much of what we know about black political behavior stems from environmental factors, specifically social context. Gay gave a good overview of this literature, while finding that neighborhood context was a significant predictor of black racial attitudes.<sup>35</sup> With that in mind, we pair our argument for the potential role of black racial identity with the important role of social context.



To understand the influence of black racial identity along with social context, we view these from an internal and external perspective. Identity corresponds with an internal view of the world, while social context represents external influences on the individual. These external influences should have a greater influence on political participation. Participation is action, and we believe the external environment will have a larger influence on spurring this action, while internal black racial identity may also play a role.

As mentioned in chapter 2, our expectations for the impact of black racial identity on political participation is less clearly defined and more variable than found in the other chapters. We argue racial centrality may spur participation in race-centric activities, such as joining a national black organization; however, we have no clear expectations for an influence on activities such as contacting government, working for parties, or voting. The relationship may exist in specific settings where a black candidate is on the ballot or represents the individual, but this is beyond the scope of our data.

We see two potential outcomes for both public and private regard. In terms of public regard, individuals who believe whites have a greater respect for blacks may be more likely to participate in the largely white political system by contacting government, working for a party, or voting. However, they may also be the most satisfied with government and therefore, have less motivation to contact government or become involved with political parties. For private regard, individuals with high scores may be more likely to become involved, because they feel the government should respond to their needs. However, they may also believe that the best way to address their concerns is within the black community, and this may make them less likely to participate in the political system. However, this would increase their likelihood of joining black organizations. Overall, we do not have a clear expectation for the influence of black racial identity on political participation. In fact, we are skeptical that these internal beliefs will translate into external actions, especially when controlling for demographics and social context.

We expect the external environment or social context to have a much stronger influence on political participation. The cohesiveness of an individual's neighborhood, levels of crime, and sources of information should all increase political participation. These social contexts provide an impetus to take action. Some situations lend themselves to involvement, while others may repress political involvement.

## Analysis

Unlike the previous chapters, we present logit models since each of the dependent variables is dichotomous. The models examine non-electoral forms of participation with four separate dependent variables. These include whether people ever contacted government, ever worked for a political party, are members of black organizations, and are involved in local community-oriented black groups. The second part of the analysis looks at self-reported voter turnout in presidential and state and/or local elections.

Our primary independent variables are the three domains of black racial identity: centrality, public regard, and private regard. We are also interested in social context as an external determinant. Here we focus on perceptions of neighborhood cohesion and crime along with the information networks people use. Specifically, we measure if individuals receive more information from black sources. We also control for several “usual suspect” demographic variables that are common in the political behavior literature. Finally, we account for general racial ideology (social dominance, see chapter 3) that is outside of black racial identity and past experiences with discrimination.

## Results

Starting with the non-electoral forms of participation, Table 6.1 shows that most people are overwhelmingly not involved in these activities. At the higher end, 30 percent of the respondents report being involved in black community groups and 26 percent state they have contacted government. On the lower end, 16 percent report working for a political party, while only 12 percent say they are a member of a black organization. Turning to the influences on these activities, Table 6.2 shows across the four models a limited influence for black racial identity. Racial centrality has the most influence but is only marginally significant in two of the four models. Higher levels of racial centrality make people more likely to contact government and work for a political party. This suggests that the central place of race in a person's life does have a limited influence on their likelihood to participate in various political activities. Similarly, we do not find much influence for public regard or private regard. Private regard has a negative influence on the likelihood of working for a party, while with public regard, an individual is less likely to contact

government officials when they have a more positive impression of how other groups view blacks.

Looking at the limited role of black racial identity, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present the predicted probabilities for the significant relationships. Starting with likelihood of contacting government (Figure 6.1), from the lowest to highest levels of centrality there is a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of contacting government officials, while there is an 8 percent decrease when looking at public regard. For having worked for a party (Figure 6.2), from the lowest to highest levels of centrality, this produces about a 7 percent increase in the likelihood of having worked for a party, while individuals with the highest private regard are about 7 percent less likely to have worked for a party than those with lower private regard. Overall, these are modest effects at best.

We are also interested in social context, and here we find stronger and more consistent findings. Most importantly, individuals from more cohesive neighborhoods are significantly more likely to participate across the four models. Additionally, greater perceived levels of neighborhood crime lead people to contact government more often, and they are also more likely to work for a party and

TABLE 6.1 Descriptives for Political Participation

NON-ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION	YES	NO	n
Ever Contacted Government	26.10 (545)	73.90 (1543)	2088
Ever Worked for Political Party	16.17 (337)	83.83 (1747)	2084
Member of Black Organization	11.85 (252)	88.15 (1875)	2127
Local Involvement in Black Groups	30.19 (253)	69.81 (585)	838
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION			
Vote for 2000 President	68.43 (1346)	31.57 (621)	1967
Vote in State/Local Elections	64.67 (1347)	35.33 (736)	2083

TABLE 6.2 Model Results for Non-Electoral Participation

VARIABLES	CONTACTED GOVERNMENT	WORKED FOR PARTY	MEMBER OF NATIONAL BLACK ORGANIZATION	LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
<b>Centrality</b>	0.2680* (0.1216)	0.2876* (0.1291)	-0.0428 (0.1787)	0.0953 (0.1633)
<b>Private Regard</b>	-0.4229 (0.2196)	-0.4564* (0.2248)	0.1594 (0.3489)	0.0133 (0.3383)
<b>Public Regard</b>	-0.2257* (0.1100)	0.0355 (0.1158)	0.0397 (0.1344)	0.0416 (0.1579)
<b>Reside in South</b>	-0.3508* (0.1611)	-0.1843 (0.1774)	-0.3473 (0.2066)	0.1910 (0.2235)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.2381 (0.1321)	0.3536* (0.1524)	0.3583 (0.1832)	0.2628 (0.1854)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	0.2783** (0.0926)	0.2458* (0.1026)	0.3633** (0.1278)	0.2397 (0.1285)
<b>Neighborhood Cohesion</b>	0.5083*** (0.1423)	0.5657*** (0.1506)	0.6658*** (0.1972)	0.6101** (0.1881)
<b>Gender</b>	0.3100 (0.1663)	0.2002 (0.1785)	-0.1200 (0.2201)	0.3586 (0.2257)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	0.0444*** (0.0057)	0.0305*** (0.0059)	0.0246** (0.0081)	0.0360*** (0.0077)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	0.0032 (0.0026)	-0.0010 (0.0035)	0.0081** (0.0030)	0.0028 (0.0032)
<b>Education</b>	0.4881*** (0.0887)	0.4978*** (0.1040)	0.7682*** (0.1129)	0.1781 (0.1063)

(continues on next page)

Table 6.2 (cont'd)

VARIABLES	CONTACTED GOVERNMENT	WORKED FOR PARTY	MEMBER OF NATIONAL BLACK ORGANIZATION	LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
<b>Party Identification</b>	0.2544* (0.1033)	0.0777 (0.1235)	-0.1313 (0.1764)	-0.4012 (0.2100)
<b>Social Dominance Views</b>	-0.0715* (0.0289)	-0.0334 (0.0324)	-0.0421 (0.0412)	0.0259 (0.0439)
<b>Experiences with Discrimination</b>	0.0396*** (0.0091)	0.0361*** (0.0095)	0.0277* (0.0116)	0.0212 (0.0150)
<i>Constant</i>	-7.8986*** (0.9376)	-8.6716*** (1.0331)	-9.1360*** (1.4826)	-6.7639*** (1.4011)
<b>Observations</b>	1488	1485	1490	615

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; Logit

join a national black organization. Somewhat surprisingly, this has no influence on their likelihood to join a local community organization. We also find some influence for information networks, as individuals who get more information from black sources are more likely to work for a party and join a national organization. Finally, experiencing greater levels of discrimination leads to greater levels of participation, as we find a positive and significant coefficient in three of the four models. Generally, the usual suspects of demographic controls perform as expected, with older and more educated individuals significantly more likely to participate in the various activities.

Turning to electoral participation, as Table 6. shows, we have two measures of turnout: self-reported voting in the 2000 presidential election and state and/or local elections. Roughly two-thirds of respondents reported voting in these elections.<sup>36</sup> Looking at the influences on turnout, Table 6.3 shows no statistical influence for black racial identity, as none of the three measures reach statistical significance in either model. The social context variables are once again important,




Figure 6.1 Predicted Probabilities for Contacting Government




Figure 6.2 Predicted Probabilities for Working for a Political Party

TABLE 6.3 Model Results for Electoral Participation

VARIABLES	VOTE FOR PRESIDENT	VOTE IN STATE/ LOCAL ELECTIONS
Centrality	-0.0473 (0.1327)	-0.0108 (0.1246)
Private Regard	-0.1621 (0.2497)	-0.1421 (0.2240)
Public Regard	-0.1389 (0.1011)	-0.1325 (0.0960)
Reside in South	-0.0472 (0.1802)	-0.0697 (0.1668)
Black Information Sources	0.2930* (0.1342)	0.5319*** (0.1274)
Neighborhood Crime	0.3006** (0.0998)	0.1218 (0.0929)
Neighborhood Cohesion	0.6162*** (0.1369)	0.3644** (0.1324)
Gender	0.5664** (0.1739)	0.6002*** (0.1613)
Age (in years)	0.0437*** (0.0055)	0.0442*** (0.0054)
Household Income (in \$1,000s)	0.0032 (0.0032)	0.0019 (0.0028)
Education	0.3724*** (0.1070)	0.3299*** (0.0937)
Party Identification	-0.0697 (0.1018)	0.0942 (0.0985)

*Table 6.3 (cont'd)*

VARIABLES	VOTE FOR PRESIDENT	VOTE IN STATE/ LOCAL ELECTIONS
<b>Social Dominance Views</b>	-0.0441 (0.0287)	-0.0647* (0.0275)
<b>Experiences with Discrimination</b>	0.0177 (0.0105)	0.0083 (0.0095)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.7599*** (0.9926)	-4.5981*** (0.9220)
<b>Observations</b>	1436	1485

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; Logit

as they show positive and significant relationships to voter turnout. Receiving more information from black networks and living in cohesive neighborhoods increase turnout as does, surprisingly, living in a neighborhood with more crime (this is marginally significant in the state/local model). Unlike in Table 6.2, past discrimination experiences do not have an influence on voter turnout. The usual suspects behave as anticipated, with older, higher income, more-educated Democrats more likely to turn out. We also see a gender gap, with women more likely to vote. These results generally match the long-established findings in the voter behavior research. Unlike in the previous chapters, black racial identity does not have a consistent influence on political participation. As expected, social and neighborhood context induces more across-the-board participation.

## Conclusion

Examining both the meaning and significance of black racial identity affords the opportunity to investigate the complexities inherent in the role that race plays in the lives of blacks. In this chapter, we find a limited role of black racial identity on political participation, while a much more important influence is the social context and demographics surrounding an individual.



In our first and second set of analyses, we find either no (or limited) significance for black racial identity on political participation—both in terms of electoral and non-electoral forms of participation. However, socioeconomic and external environment (or social context) variables are significant. For example, for non-electoral participation, the higher the neighborhood crime, the more likely respondents are to contact government, work for a political party, and become members of a national black organization; the more discrimination one encounters, the more likely respondents are to contact government, work for a political party, and become members of a national black organization; and as feelings of neighborhood cohesion increase, the more likely respondents are to contact government, work for a political party, become members of a national black organization, and get involved locally. In terms of electoral participation, none of the black racial identity variables is significant. Variables such as black information networks, neighborhood cohesion, and crime are significant. Of course, variables such as age, income, and party identification matter for both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation.

These findings are fascinating, in that black racial identity attitudes are not enough to get people to participate in politics. However, real everyday experiences (such as neighborhood cohesion, neighborhood crime, and income) in many ways seem to be catalysts for action. Simply holding certain beliefs about one's identity is not enough to motivate people to get involved in politics. A possible significance of these findings is that black candidates cannot rely simply on activating blacks' identity to get them to the polls. They must talk about everyday issues that their constituents confront. Based on our research, this is more likely to galvanize the electorate into participating. For example, simply giving a campaign speech about black pride or being a member of a black organization is not going to somehow lead people into action, although it may make people feel better about themselves and their beliefs about being black.

Putting our results into context with the single-item measures of linked fate and closeness (model results in the appendix), we find that neither linked fate nor closeness measures are significant in electoral forms of participation. For non-electoral forms of participation, the closeness measure is not significant; however, linked fate is significant only in working for a political party. Specifically, linked fate sentiments increase the likelihood of working for a party. These findings do not support much of the existing literature, which suggests that linked fate

and closeness matter on both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation. However, the findings do support Leighley and Vedlitz's conclusions, in that closeness does not affect political participation.<sup>37</sup>

In the end, our contributions add to the body of literature by showing that black racial identity variables are not significant on electoral participation, but social context variables are. This is contrary to a large body of work that suggests black racial identity is a significant influence on political participation. Once again, previous studies rely on single-item measures, most often some form of closeness. As with previous chapters, the goal in this chapter is to present the influence of multidimensional black racial identity in a similar fashion to studies using single-item measures of racial identity. Given the lack of significant results in this chapter, there is a need to, perhaps, update our thinking on black political participation in general, and specifically on the connection between internalized racial identity and the external acts of political participation.



## Conclusion

Returning to the disagreements between basketball analysts Charles Barkley and Kenny Smith, the comments by Stacey Dash on supporting Republican Mitt Romney in the 2008 presidential election, and Debra Dickerson's thoughts on blacks' support for Barack Obama, there certainly exists differing opinions on important issues involving the black community. These everyday differences among blacks give weight to the theoretical argument that race is not a monolithic concept. The role of race varies in every individual's life, from the central role race plays, to the pride in being black, and the beliefs about how others feel about blacks. While we see some general patterns for black racial identity among blacks, there is enough variation, as shown in this book (and other research), that deviations from the perceived "black view" should not come as a surprise to the media, broader American society, or blacks themselves.

In terms of behavior, recent protests and riots to the response to police shootings and acts of police brutality, America seems to be focusing on the behavior and actions of the black community in ways similar to the 1960s. These findings help us understand why people express differing emotions or views on difficult issues. Understanding the multidimensional components of black racial identity gives us an insight into reactions to actions by the police, the political system, the protestors, and rioters.

Our findings show that black racial identity is an important component in understanding the nuances and complexities of blacks' behaviors and attitudes. More importantly, we show black racial identity is not itself a monolithic psychological construct, and understanding it from a multidimensional perspective is one important way to start to understand these nuances and complexities within the black community. Understanding the central role of race in one's self-identity,

the level of pride in being black, and the views on how the broader society feels towards blacks are integral to understanding political disagreements and views. Consequently, our goal for this book has been to gain a clearer and more dynamic view of the influence of black racial identity, specifically on a variety of attitudes and behavior. In addition, we compared the traditional measures of black racial identity currently used in political science (e.g., linked fate and closeness) to the multidimensional measure utilized in this research. In our efforts, we have uncovered interesting findings.

Let us begin our discussion with a general finding. We analyzed 22 different models. In general, the findings show that for 17 out of the 22 models, at least one of the domains of multidimensional measures of black racial identity was statistically significant. In five of the models, none of the multidimensional measures of black racial identity reached statistical significance. However, when we ran linked fate as a measure of black racial identity for the same 22 models, only four out of 22 were statistically significant. Likewise, we ran closeness as a measure of black racial identity for the same 22 models; only five out of 22 were statistically significant (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2).

These findings are tremendously important as we advance our theoretical understanding of the influence of black racial identity on political attitudes and behaviors. Our central purpose for writing this book was based on the argument that black racial identity is complex, and thus multidimensional measures of black racial identity must be used to more fully capture these complexities. Our findings show precisely that when we account for the multidimensional nature of black racial identity, certain identities play more of an important role in some cases, while others do not. When we do not account for these complexities, we might come away with the impression that black racial identity is not significant on political attitudes and behavior, or that black racial identity as a broad concept is significant. This would not be accurate.

In the use of unidimensional measures of black racial identity, political science researchers often say that one dimension of identity is significant or not, but they fail to acknowledge the other domains of identity were not accounted for in the analysis. Scholars who tap only one dimension of identity (for example, linked fate) often categorically conclude that black racial identity is not significant. Instead, the proper statement should be that black racial identity measured as linked fate, which measures one domain among many domains of identity, is

TABLE C.1 Summary of Model Results

RESULTS	CENTRALITY	PRIVATE REGARD	PUBLIC REGARD
<b>Chapter 3: Social Dominance</b>	n.s.	-	-
<b>Chapter 4: Black Nationalism</b>	+	-	-
<b>Chapter 4: Racial Attitudes</b>			
<i>Self-Blame for Failure</i>	-	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Teach Different Values</i>	n.s.	n.s.	-
<i>Racial Differences God's Plan</i>	+	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Minorities Born with Less Ability</i>	n.s.	-	-
<i>Whites and Minorities Not Comfortable</i>	n.s.	-	-
<i>Diversity May Tear U.S. Apart</i>	n.s.	n.s.	-
<b>Chapter 5: Policy Attitudes</b>			
Racial Policies			
<i>Need Majority-Minority Districts</i>	+	n.s.	-
<i>Policies to Help Blacks</i>	+	+	-
<i>Pay Reparations</i>	n.s.	n.s.	-
Non-Racial Policies			
<i>Jobs for All</i>	n.s.	-	n.s.
<i>Rich Pay More Taxes</i>	n.s.	-	n.s.
<i>All Groups Free Speech</i>	n.s.	-	n.s.
<i>Abortions Available</i>	n.s.	-	n.s.
<i>Gay Adoption Allowed</i>	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
<b>Chapter 6: Participation</b>			
Non-Electoral			
<i>Contacted Government</i>	+	n.s.	-
<i>Worked for Party</i>	+	-	n.s.
<i>Member of National Black Organization</i>	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Local Community Involvement</i>	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Electoral			
<i>Vote for President</i>	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Vote State/Local Elections</i>	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

+ = increase, and significant; - = decrease, and significant; n.s. = not significant

TABLE C.2 Summary of Single-Item Measure Model Results

RESULTS	LINKED FATE	CLOSENESS
<b>Chapter 3: Social Dominance</b>	n.s.	n.s.
<b>Chapter 4: Black Nationalism</b>	n.s.	n.s.
<b>Chapter 4: Racial Attitudes</b>		
<i>Self-Blame for Failure</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Teach Different Values</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Racial Differences God's Plan</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Minorities Born with Less Ability</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Whites and Minorities Not Comfortable</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Diversity May Tear U.S. Apart</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<b>Chapter 5: Policy Attitudes</b>		
Racial Policies		
<i>Need Majority-Minority Districts</i>	+	n.s.
<i>Policies to Help Blacks</i>	n.s.	+
<i>Pay Reparations</i>	+	+
Non-Racial Policies		
<i>Jobs for All</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Rich Pay More Taxes</i>	n.s.	+
<i>All Groups Free Speech</i>	+	+
<i>Abortions Available</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Gay Adoption Allowed</i>	n.s.	+
<b>Chapter 6: Participation</b>		
Non-Electoral		
<i>Contacted Government</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Worked for Party</i>	+	n.s.
<i>Member of National Black Organization</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Local Community Involvement</i>	n.s.	n.s.
Electoral		
<i>Vote for President</i>	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Vote State/Local Elections</i>	n.s.	n.s.

Note: + = increase, and significant; - = decrease, and significant; n.s. = not significant

not significant. There is a possibility that other domains of black racial identity could be significant.

More specifically, the findings show that in certain conditions, our measures of black racial identity are significant on attitudes and behavior. When centrality is significant, it most often increases support for black nationalist sentiments, the belief that racial differences are part of God's plan, feeling that majority-minority districts and policies to help blacks are needed, and non-electoral political activities, such as contacting government and working for a political party. For example, in the case of centrality, increase in support is explained by the fact that individuals who are high on centrality report more recognition of social barriers and racial prejudice, and, therefore, support policies and take action that seem to be a reasonable solution to alleviate inequalities. On the other hand, when private regard and public regard are significant, it often decreases support for the various ideologies and racial policies.

Public regard, when significant, has a decreasing effect in all of the models. For example, greater racial group perception (public regard) decreases the likelihood that individuals support black nationalism, hold certain racial attitudes, support racial policies, and contact government. In many respects, positive out-group perception can lead to the assumption that one is being treated fairly and humanely. When private regard is significant, it also has a decreasing effect in most of the models—9 out of 10. As private regard sentiments increase, decreases are seen in beliefs about black nationalism, beliefs that minorities are born with less ability, beliefs that whites and minorities are not comfortable with one another, social dominance, non-racial policies, and working for a party. The conclusion we draw from this particular finding is that simply feeling close to one's group does not necessarily lead individuals to support racial attitudes and policies. The point of emphasis is that while at least one of the three dimensions of racial identity is significantly related in at least 17 out of the 22 models, only one model shows a significant correlation with all of them. This means that two or even one of the dimensions can matter for a particular dependent variable, while other dimensions do not.

Social psychological research on black racial identity has a long, rich history. The concept of black racial identity emerged from Tajfel's initial work on social identity theory, that an individual's sense of self is based on their group membership.<sup>1</sup> Much of the research since then has explored understanding black racial identity, specifically, ways to define it, influences on identity development,



measurement issues, and its influences on human behavior. In an effort to measure black racial identity, psychologists and political scientists have taken diverging paths—one that measures black racial identity as multidimensional while the other measures it as unidimensional. While both have their theoretical reasons, we agree with psychologists that black racial identity is much too complex to measure simply as unidimensional—specifically, as linked fate or closeness.

While unidimensional measures try to capture racial identity as a single concept or at least some aspect in one empirical dimension, our argument is that racial identity has several important components, and a multidimensional approach allows those to be considered simultaneously. To that end, we use multidimensional measures of racial identity, and we explore how different group identities within an individual's self-concept interact and affect political attitudes and behavior. In the end, a review of the black racial identity literature in political science reveals inconsistent findings in this area. In addition, we have presented a number of theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues that can account for discrepancies in the findings. Consequently, we have applied the theoretical perspectives of social psychologists by accepting the notion that black racial identity is multidimensional and ought to be measured as such. In doing so, the findings in this book show a path for further investigation of black racial identity on political attitudes and behavior. If we are to get a more consistent black racial identity effect, then we must think through some of the following issues currently facing black racial identity research in political science.

One issue concerns the lack of a clear conceptual definition of black racial identity. The wide range in conceptualizations is bound to have caused disparate findings and disagreements regarding the effects of black racial identity. Still, even though researchers may not agree on the best conceptualization of it, there does appear to be a general consensus (at least outside political science) that black racial identity is a multidimensional concept that requires complex measures. Another concern deals with the different theoretical underpinnings associated with the concept (racial identity versus ethnic identity and group identification versus group consciousness). It is sometimes assumed that ethnic identity is theoretically the same as black racial identity, and the two constructs have been measured using the same identity model. However, the definitions of these two concepts are noticeably different. On one hand, racial identity refers to the connectedness among members of a group based on common physical traits and a shared experience of social oppression. On the other hand, ethnic identity refers to the sense

of belonging with a group that is united by a shared culture. Although race and ethnicity are two distinct constructs, in a discussion of racial identity, there is a great deal of overlap because the ethnic identities of many blacks are often closely intertwined with their racial identities. Nevertheless, black racial identity requires models and measures separate from ethnic identity.

Similarly, racial identity is often confused with racial consciousness in the literature. Yet many scholars argue that the two concepts are significantly different. Group identity refers to a psychological sense of attachment to a group. Group consciousness involves in-group identification along with ideological beliefs about the group's social status and commitment to collective action. Political science research does not always distinguish between the elements of racial identification and consciousness, and consequently, racial identity sometimes refers to a narrow form of group identification and other times to a complex belief system. Although racial group identity and racial group consciousness are related, they are two different concepts that should not be used interchangeably or in place of one another.

Another issue in the political research on black racial identity is the need for more recent data. Much of the work in the field uses data from the National Survey of Black Americans and the National Black Election Study, which were gathered in the 1980s. Many of the blacks surveyed had experienced the civil rights or black power movements, unlike young black adults today. Some researchers have suggested that race-conscious and politically discontented blacks may no longer be the most politically active sector of the group. Thus, political scientists need to investigate the racial identity of this younger generation to better understand and predict black political attitudes and behavior. Furthermore, it is possible that future researchers will need to update their measures periodically to reflect ideological changes in the group.

The most critical issue facing political scientists in the study of black racial identity is the use of a more valid and reliable measure of the construct. Given the complexity of black racial identity, an accurate test of its influence on individuals' behaviors and attitudes requires a comprehensive measure that can tap into its various dimensions. Without a more valid measure of the key concept, there is little that can be done in the way of political research on black racial identity. We strongly urge political scholars to fill the current methodological void in the existing literature by employing a more comprehensive measure of black racial identity that can be applied across various areas of academic study. This will not

only promote better-integrated research and greater intersubject reliability, but it will also aid in the overall development of racial identity theory in future research.

While we have moved the research on black racial identity further down the path, this book is not without limitations. We would be remiss if we didn't mention these here. The NSAL dataset we use is the only dataset that is a nationally representative sample of blacks, which asks multidimensional black racial identity and political attitude and behavior questions. This makes this dataset a diamond in the rough for scholars who are interested in both black racial identity and politics research. The mere fact that the dataset comes from the National Institute of Mental Health Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology Survey (CPES), a mental health survey, should be an indicator that the political measures might not be the standard measures we would find in, for example, National Black Elections Studies or National Election Studies datasets. Nonetheless, the importance of this study outweighs concerns about question of standardization (or how these measures have been previously used). It is not that the political measures in the dataset are new, but, instead of the full set of questions, they have been reduced. Survey research often reduces question items for reasons of survey length. In a perfect world, we would have preferred that the questions about politics would have been the full measures found in prior research. Nonetheless, the important component of this research is that we are able to test the multidimensionality of black racial identity, which is not accounted for in political surveys. We are essentially working with what we have currently; thus, this makes this research more exploratory in nature, with the understanding that the findings are not set in stone but susceptible to revisions with new data that accounts for black racial identity as multidimensional and a full spectrum of political measures.

Our contribution is twofold: first, to challenge the discipline to move away from relying solely on unidimensional measures, and second, to explore the ways multidimensionality of black racial identity impacts political attitudes and behavior. Our findings reveal that blacks are not a monolithic group, and different dimensions of black racial identity impact political attitudes and behavior very differently. We would not have known this by using unidimensional measures, which do not account for the complexity of black racial identity.

## Appendix    Models for Single-Item Measures

TABLE A.1    Single-Item Model Results for Social Dominance Orientation

	LINKED FATE	CLOSENESS
Linked Fate	0.0098 (0.1085)	
Closeness		-0.0259 (0.0743)
Gender	-0.3526** (0.1304)	-0.3027** (0.1037)
Age (in years)	-0.0168*** (0.0043)	-0.0141*** (0.0035)
Household Income (in \$1,000s)	-0.0051 (0.0029)	-0.0066** (0.0023)
Education	-0.3289*** (0.0759)	-0.3496*** (0.0594)
Reside in South	-0.0381 (.1358)	0.0912 (0.1058)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-2.9657*** (0.4087)	-3.0874*** (0.3366)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	-0.6718 (0.3947)	-0.8603** (0.3276)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	1.7922*** (0.4143)	1.3739*** (0.3254)
Observations	1277	2071

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Ordered Logit

TABLE A.2 Single-Item Model Results for Black Nationalism

	LINKED FATE	CLOSENESS
Linked Fate	0.0282 (0.1128)	
Closeness		0.1063 (0.0891)
Reside in South	0.0628 (0.1607)	-0.0080 (0.1255)
Neighborhood Crime	0.2853*** (0.0838)	0.2443*** (0.0676)
Black Information Sources	0.3667** (0.1173)	0.4208*** (0.0909)
Gender	-0.1235 (0.1520)	-0.2035 (0.1221)
Age (in years)	-0.0191*** (0.0048)	-0.0149*** (0.0039)
Household Income (in \$1,000s)	-0.0043* (0.0021)	-0.0022 (0.0017)
Education	-0.0087 (0.0792)	0.0447 (0.0608)
Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago	0.4909*** (0.1041)	0.4405*** (0.0839)
Church Attendance	-0.1768* (0.0693)	-0.1330* (0.0517)
Member of Black Organization	0.3878 (0.2191)	0.3701* (0.1856)
Political Ideology	0.1155 (0.0932)	0.0684 (0.0727)

Table A.2 (cont'd)

	LINKED FATE	CLOSENESS
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-1.0708 (0.6690)	-0.1223 (0.5033)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	0.7906 (0.6753)	1.6115** (0.5025)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	2.5653*** (0.6700)	3.2761*** (0.5022)
<b>Observations</b>	1009	1600

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Ordered Logit

TABLE A.3 Model Results for Linked Fate on Racial Attitudes

	SELF-BLAME FOR FAILURE	TEACH DIFFERENT VALUES	RACIAL DIFFERENCES GOD'S PLAN	MINORITIES BORN WITH LESS ABILITY	WHITES AND MINORITIES NOT COMFORTABLE	DIVERSITY MAY TEAR U.S. APART
<b>Linked Fate</b>	0.0164 (0.1146)	-0.0137 (0.1137)	0.0649 (0.1295)	0.1067 (0.1401)	0.0424 (0.1249)	0.0787 (0.1271)
<b>Reside in South</b>	0.3538* (0.1435)	0.0040 (0.1459)	0.4319** (0.1590)	0.0655 (0.1878)	-0.0270 (0.1558)	0.4611** (0.1504)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	0.0016 (0.0965)	0.0230 (0.0927)	-0.0871 (0.0932)	0.0665 (0.1127)	0.0731 (0.0976)	0.1058 (0.0891)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	-0.0397 (0.1154)	0.2480* (0.1216)	-0.0461 (0.1283)	0.3161* (0.1363)	0.2927* (0.1197)	0.2355 (0.1219)
<b>Gender</b>	0.3629* (0.1423)	0.1626 (0.1458)	0.6098*** (0.1500)	0.2681 (0.1765)	0.0748 (0.1503)	0.2984* (0.1518)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	-0.0085 (0.0048)	-0.0133** (0.0049)	-0.0099* (0.0050)	-0.0103 (0.0062)	0.0131* (0.0054)	0.0006 (0.0055)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	-0.0027 (0.0027)	0.0035 (0.0023)	0.0017 (0.0026)	0.0020 (0.0040)	-0.0007 (0.0026)	-0.0018 (0.0033)
<b>Education</b>	-0.2576** (0.0856)	-0.0818 (0.0817)	-0.1950* (0.0887)	-0.4012*** (0.1070)	-0.1254 (0.0861)	-0.2297** (0.0872)

<b>Feelings towards Whites</b>	-0.0020 (0.0034)	-0.0112** (0.0035)	-0.0035 (0.0036)	-0.0052 (0.0043)	-0.0247*** (0.0038)	-0.0085* (0.0038)
<b>Views on Race Relations</b>	0.0427 (0.1022)	-0.1053 (0.1115)	-0.0129 (0.0981)	0.0320 (0.1221)	0.0791 (0.1107)	0.0872 (0.0973)
<b>Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago</b>	-0.2679* (0.1058)	0.2068 (0.1111)	0.0298 (0.1148)	-0.2689* (0.1294)	0.1506 (0.1106)	0.0538 (0.1027)
<b>Political Ideology</b>	0.0072 (0.0906)	-0.0894 (0.0932)	-0.1590 (0.0986)	-0.1792 (0.1186)	-0.1105 (0.1005)	-0.0500 (0.0967)
<b>Proud to be American</b>	-0.1280 (0.1167)	-0.1100 (0.1323)	0.0643 (0.1255)	-0.1769 (0.1553)	-0.1859 (0.1371)	0.0412 (0.1264)
<b>Work Ethic/ U.S. Opportunity</b>	0.7804*** (0.1021)	0.1359 (0.0943)	-0.1160 (0.0978)	0.2396 (0.1228)	0.1621 (0.1027)	0.1013 (0.0995)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-0.8978 (0.7891)	-2.3724** (0.8206)	-2.2042* (0.8790)	0.4028 (0.9738)	-0.4240 (0.8412)	0.0681 (0.8016)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	0.8520 (0.7935)	-1.2017 (0.8193)	-1.7713* (0.8784)	1.3031 (0.9825)	0.9729 (0.8355)	1.1408 (0.7987)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	2.4274** (0.7892)	0.8718 (0.8210)	-0.8435 (0.8768)	2.4277* (0.9918)	2.7007** (0.8563)	2.6226** (0.8016)
<b>Observations</b>	996	988	954	986	992	987

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Ordered Logit



TABLE A.4 Model Results for Closeness on Racial Attitudes

	SELF-BLAME FOR FAILURE	TEACH DIFFERENT VALUES	RACIAL DIFFERENCES GOD'S PLAN	MINORITIES BORN WITH LESS ABILITY	WHITES AND MINORITIES NOT COMFORTABLE	DIVERSITY MAY TEAR U.S. APART
<b>Closeness</b>	0.0583 (0.0855)	0.0182 (0.0881)	-0.0251 (0.0917)	-0.0507 (0.1025)	0.0496 (0.0863)	-0.0536 (0.0820)
<b>Reside in South</b>	0.3890*** (0.1132)	0.1887 (0.1153)	0.3234** (0.1218)	0.0136 (0.1416)	0.0916 (0.1222)	0.4206*** (0.1168)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	-0.0218 (0.0740)	0.1276 (0.0723)	-0.0347 (0.0681)	0.1464 (0.0821)	0.0886 (0.0729)	0.1264 (0.0688)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.0103 (0.0901)	0.1585 (0.0959)	-0.0502 (0.0981)	0.3246** (0.1025)	0.2783** (0.0938)	0.1071 (0.0912)
<b>Gender</b>	0.2222 (0.1135)	0.0398 (0.1176)	0.4653*** (0.1179)	0.1999 (0.1395)	0.0546 (0.1215)	0.2528* (0.1198)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	-0.0034 (0.0037)	-0.0079* (0.0039)	-0.0078* (0.0038)	-0.0073 (0.0046)	0.0129** (0.0042)	-0.0008 (0.0039)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	-0.0022 (0.0021)	0.0020 (0.0020)	0.0024 (0.0020)	-0.0004 (0.0033)	-0.0004 (0.0020)	-0.0013 (0.0026)
<b>Education</b>	-0.2216*** (0.0666)	-0.0376 (0.0665)	-0.1326* (0.0661)	-0.2968*** (0.0832)	-0.1146 (0.0679)	-0.1553* (0.0689)

Feelings towards Whites	-0.0039 (0.0027)	-0.0122*** (0.0028)	-0.0011 (0.0028)	-0.0060 (0.0033)	-0.0215*** (0.0030)	-0.0099*** (0.0029)
Views on Race Relations	0.0895 (0.0780)	-0.1255 (0.0836)	0.0845 (0.0764)	0.0698 (0.0891)	-0.0814 (0.0842)	-0.0058 (0.0723)
Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago	-0.2542** (0.0856)	0.1143 (0.0868)	0.0608 (0.0874)	-0.1313 (0.0971)	0.1922* (0.0848)	0.0879 (0.0820)
Political Ideology	-0.0475 (0.0705)	-0.1400 (0.0749)	-0.0994 (0.0757)	-0.1283 (0.0877)	-0.0998 (0.0751)	-0.0947 (0.0716)
Proud to be American	-0.0265 (0.1013)	-0.1434 (0.1069)	0.0012 (0.1032)	-0.0807 (0.1281)	-0.2485* (0.1119)	0.0185 (0.1020)
Work Ethic/U.S. Opportunity	0.6555*** (0.0778)	0.1792* (0.0755)	-0.0577 (0.0754)	0.2084* (0.0904)	0.2388** (0.0815)	0.1584* (0.0759)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-0.3861 (0.6374)	-2.2056*** (0.6529)	-1.7577** (0.6278)	0.8429 (0.7729)	-0.4523 (0.6086)	-0.7850 (0.6206)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	1.2717* (0.6431)	-0.9642 (0.6535)	-1.3464* (0.6305)	1.8409* (0.7748)	0.9961 (0.6106)	0.3440 (0.6183)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	2.8519*** (0.6443)	1.1440 (0.6582)	-0.4292 (0.6329)	3.0683*** (0.7853)	2.8311*** (0.6168)	1.8837** (0.6175)
Observations	1577	1558	1518	1555	1571	1552

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Ordered Logit

TABLE A.5 Single-Item Model Results for Racial Policy Views

	NEED MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS		POLICIES TO HELP BLACKS		PAY REPARATIONS	
<b>Linked Fate</b>	0.3334*		0.1491		0.2417*	
	(0.1375)		(0.1274)		(0.1226)	
<b>Closeness</b>		0.0791		0.3149***		0.3277***
		(0.0913)		(0.0913)		(0.0925)
<b>Reside in South</b>	-0.0438	0.0927	-0.1168	-0.0879	-0.1539	-0.2220
	(0.1532)	(0.1180)	(0.1593)	(0.1239)	(0.1525)	(0.1204)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.3577**	0.4802***	0.3774**	0.3784***	0.2618*	0.2990**
	(0.1322)	(0.1066)	(0.1249)	(0.0991)	(0.1200)	(0.0996)
<b>Member of Black Organization</b>	-0.1082	0.1468	0.6922**	0.4810*	0.1242	0.0535
	(0.3039)	(0.2460)	(0.2242)	(0.1871)	(0.2011)	(0.1781)
<b>Gender</b>	0.2501	0.0682	0.1785	0.1202	-0.0082	0.0344
	(0.1561)	(0.1217)	(0.1559)	(0.1277)	(0.1490)	(0.1191)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	0.0047	0.0060	0.0077	0.0052	0.0211***	0.0160***
	(0.0050)	(0.0039)	(0.0052)	(0.0041)	(0.0055)	(0.0041)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	-0.0036	-0.0020	-0.0043*	-0.0026	-0.0019	-0.0000
	(0.0024)	(0.0019)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)	(0.0033)	(0.0024)

<b>Education</b>	-0.0146 (0.0917)	0.0381 (0.0708)	-0.0603 (0.0937)	0.0117 (0.0743)	0.0811 (0.0892)	0.0935 (0.0699)
<b>Political Ideology</b>	-0.1087 (0.0940)	0.0142 (0.0744)	0.0897 (0.1009)	0.1218 (0.0773)	-0.0157 (0.0991)	0.0406 (0.0755)
<b>Social Dominance Views</b>	0.1000** (0.0308)	0.0743*** (0.0220)	0.0504 (0.0300)	0.0426 (0.0218)	0.0428 (0.0289)	0.0555* (0.0227)
<b>Discrimination More/ Less than 20 Years Ago</b>	0.3089** (0.1084)	0.2872*** (0.0854)	0.2220* (0.1061)	0.2643** (0.0835)	0.5427*** (0.1044)	0.4430*** (0.0822)
<b>Vote for President</b>	-0.1207 (0.1999)	-0.0428 (0.1509)	-0.0025 (0.1900)	-0.1244 (0.1467)	-0.2794 (0.1695)	-0.2817* (0.1310)
<i>cut1: Constant</i>	-0.4809 (0.7508)	-0.0120 (0.5383)	-1.6768** (0.6242)	-0.7998 (0.5337)	-0.2636 (0.5745)	0.5809 (0.5284)
<i>cut2: Constant</i>	0.9444 (0.7179)	1.4167** (0.5338)	-0.2973 (0.5854)	0.6885 (0.5019)	1.2044* (0.5763)	1.9241*** (0.5258)
<i>cut3: Constant</i>	3.2419*** (0.7328)	3.6606*** (0.5524)	1.9470** (0.5946)	2.9179*** (0.5102)	2.6540*** (0.5821)	3.3899*** (0.5356)
<b>Observations</b>	979	1539	1004	1582	995	1566

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Ordered Logit

TABLE A.6 Single-Item Model Results for Non-Electoral Participation

	CONTACTED GOVERNMENT		WORKED FOR PARTY		MEMBER OF NATIONAL BLACK ORGANIZATION		LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	
<b>Linked Fate</b>	0.2417 (0.1474)		0.3654* (0.1536)		-0.0389 (0.2307)		0.1826 (0.2000)	
<b>Closeness</b>		0.0915 (0.1293)		0.2200 (0.1383)		0.0646 (0.2006)		0.1967 (0.1641)
<b>Reside in South</b>	-0.2087 (0.1955)	-0.3147 (0.1609)	-0.0453 (0.2095)	-0.1791 (0.1746)	-0.2533 (0.2442)	-0.2746 (0.2096)	0.6202* (0.2779)	0.2577 (0.2209)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.2973 (0.1618)	0.2764* (0.1316)	0.3341 (0.1801)	0.3806* (0.1515)	0.2407 (0.2246)	0.3774* (0.1902)	0.3861 (0.2220)	0.2701 (0.1904)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	0.1286 (0.1190)	0.3098*** (0.0939)	0.0960 (0.1267)	0.2439* (0.0997)	0.2326 (0.1633)	0.3119* (0.1281)	0.1679 (0.1694)	0.2161 (0.1291)
<b>Neighborhood Cohesion</b>	0.3388 (0.1755)	0.4585** (0.1400)	0.5673** (0.1813)	0.5004*** (0.1456)	0.5142* (0.2448)	0.6132** (0.1986)	0.4682* (0.2218)	0.5236** (0.1854)
<b>Gender</b>	0.3045 (0.1932)	0.2398 (0.1630)	0.1069 (0.2089)	0.1608 (0.1761)	-0.0227 (0.2481)	-0.1996 (0.2170)	0.3538 (0.2633)	0.2702 (0.2228)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	0.0504*** (0.0074)	0.0447*** (0.0056)	0.0336*** (0.0072)	0.0299*** (0.0059)	0.0266** (0.0095)	0.0252** (0.0077)	0.0441*** (0.0093)	0.0355*** (0.0076)

<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	0.0034 (0.0030)	0.0034 (0.0026)	-0.0058 (0.0037)	-0.0012 (0.0036)	0.0067* (0.0033)	0.0079* (0.0031)	0.0006 (0.0038)	0.0027 (0.0032)
<b>Education</b>	0.5186*** (0.1083)	0.4816*** (0.0859)	0.5376*** (0.1184)	0.5055*** (0.1028)	0.8207*** (0.1385)	0.7531*** (0.1103)	0.2341 (0.1333)	0.1893 (0.1060)
<b>Party Identification</b>	0.2185 (0.1318)	0.2727** (0.1024)	0.1634 (0.1508)	0.0836 (0.1182)	-0.0362 (0.2102)	-0.1430 (0.1776)	-0.2410 (0.2537)	-0.4106* (0.2095)
<b>Social Dominance Views</b>	-0.0455 (0.0377)	-0.0603* (0.0291)	-0.0252 (0.0400)	-0.0224 (0.0309)	-0.0006 (0.0505)	-0.0468 (0.0413)	0.0756 (0.0532)	0.0318 (0.0425)
<b>Experiences with Discrimination</b>	0.0421*** (0.0108)	0.0409*** (0.0087)	0.0347** (0.0120)	0.0368*** (0.0094)	0.0208 (0.0138)	0.0245* (0.0115)	0.0092 (0.0171)	0.0183 (0.0139)
<b><i>Constant</i></b>	-8.3412*** (1.0726)	-8.3940*** (0.9186)	-8.7668*** (1.2378)	-8.8551*** (1.0121)	-8.2436*** (1.6357)	-8.9578*** (1.3353)	-7.3736*** (1.5660)	-6.7338*** (1.2461)
<b>Observations</b>	948	1504	947	1501	948	1507	409	618

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Logit

TABLE A.7 Single-Item Model Results for Electoral Participation

	VOTE FOR PRESIDENT		VOTE IN STATE/LOCAL ELECTIONS	
<b>Linked Fate</b>	0.2251 (0.1824)		0.0643 (0.1643)	
<b>Closeness</b>		0.2176 (0.1155)		0.1947 (0.1086)
<b>Reside in South</b>	0.0927 (0.2251)	-0.0809 (0.1812)	0.1148 (0.2112)	-0.0777 (0.1684)
<b>Black Information Sources</b>	0.3894* (0.1728)	0.2951* (0.1364)	0.5426*** (0.1640)	0.5102*** (0.1285)
<b>Neighborhood Crime</b>	0.2329 (0.1367)	0.2668** (0.0992)	0.1012 (0.1217)	0.1253 (0.0923)
<b>Neighborhood Cohesion</b>	0.5696** (0.1884)	0.5218*** (0.1433)	0.3755* (0.1813)	0.3074* (0.1360)
<b>Gender</b>	0.6992** (0.2137)	0.5688*** (0.1690)	0.7905*** (0.2042)	0.5739*** (0.1594)
<b>Age (in years)</b>	0.0429*** (0.0071)	0.0448*** (0.0054)	0.0436*** (0.0068)	0.0446*** (0.0052)
<b>Household Income (in \$1,000s)</b>	0.0039 (0.0040)	0.0034 (0.0031)	0.0042 (0.0038)	0.0021 (0.0028)
<b>Education</b>	0.2870* (0.1242)	0.3513*** (0.1028)	0.2638* (0.1129)	0.3195*** (0.0914)
<b>Party Identification</b>	-0.0578 (0.1509)	-0.0678 (0.0995)	0.1902 (0.1378)	0.1072 (0.0972)
<b>Social Dominance Views</b>	-0.0408 (0.0391)	-0.0298 (0.0276)	-0.0252 (0.0376)	-0.0502 (0.0267)
<b>Experiences with Discrimination</b>	0.0126 (0.0129)	0.0182 (0.0102)	0.0122 (0.0119)	0.0094 (0.0094)
<b>Constant</b>	-5.7329*** (1.1783)	-5.827*** (0.8637)	-5.674*** (1.1331)	-5.558*** (0.8394)
<b>Observations</b>	917	1452	946	1501

Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Logit

# Notes

## Introduction

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## Chapter 1

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## Chapter 2

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2. It is not uncommon for studies to use shortened versions of these measures. See, for example, Hurd, N., Sellers, R., Cogburn, C., Butler-Barnes, S., and Zimmerman, M. (2013). Racial Identity and Depressive Symptoms Among Black Emerging Adults: The Moderating Effects of Neighborhood Racial Composition. *Developmental Psychology*, 49, 938–50.

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15. In the discussion, we refer to statistically significant differences. We ran simple regression models to test for any statistical differences but do not report the results here.

16. The substantive results do not change with various categorical cutoffs.

17. We code all questions so that 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Somewhat Disagree, 3 = Somewhat Agree, and 4 = Strongly Agree. In the original data, individual answers could include “Refused” or “Don’t Know.” We code these as missing and do not include these responses in the analysis.

18. As we discuss in chapter 5, the original ranking for black nationalism is a 1–5 scale, but we combine the highest two categories due to the small number of respondents scoring in the highest (5) category.

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22. Table 2.3 shows the means and modes for each of the control variables found in all of the analyses.

23. Technically, there is more to it, and this is a statistically conservative way to interpret the relationships. See Long and Freese, *Regression Models Using Stata*, pp. 297–300. However, by using the eye test for overlap, we are providing a conservative test for significant relationships. This provides a quick and easy way to compare the outcomes while not overstating our findings.

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While the dynamics of racial oppression limit the range of attitudes blacks may construct and hold, their basic humanity introduces additional attitudinal *variance* that is nearly boundless. Rather than claim it is possible to conceptualize and measure every iteration of blackness, modern social theorists such as Robert Sellers and William Cross Jr. contend that one should systematically “sample” the unmanageable range of different identity frames found among blacks. In *Dimensions of Blackness*, the authors suggest there is no single, solitary way to express black racial identity. They move away from blackness as binary and instead reveal what happens when black racial identity is conceptualized with “difference of opinion.” Using a multidimensional perspective this book explores whether black racial identity differences among blacks influence political attitudes and behavior.

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